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The oil and gas industry has always had a high vulnerability to risk, despite the high 
risk associated with the industry companies continue to invest in the industry because 
of the potential high profit return. Traditionally one of the biggest risks facing oil and 
gas companies is the political risk of terrorism.  Since the early 1990s international oil 
and gas companies have been the target of terrorist groups with the number of attacks 
increasing yearly. The advent of the Internet and the rapid development and 
advancement of technology has brought with it a new political risk: cyber-threats. In 
comparison to terrorist attacks on oil and gas companies, cyber-threats are more of a 
recent phenomenon with cyber-attacks only starting to be documented over the last ten 
years. Two of the most well-documented cases of cyber-attacks on oil and gas 
companies were the 2012 attack on Saudi Aramco and the 2014 attack on Norwegian 
oil and gas companies. These two cyber-attacks resulted in greater attention being paid 
to the risk of cyber-threats facing the oil and gas industry and their overall influence. 
This study argues that while cyber-threats are a more recent phenomenon, they are 
already having a noticeable influence on international oil and gas companies. Cyber-
attacks are starting to occur more frequently and increasing the political risk faced by 
international oil and gas companies, as well as forcing them to change the way that they 
think and do risk mitigation and management. As such, the main research question 
informing this study seeks to determine whether or not cyber-threats increase the 
political risk which oil and gas companies face; it specifically analyses the Shamoon 
attack on Saudi Aramco and the cyber-attack on Statoil and other Norwegian oil and 
gas companies. The aim of this study is to answer this question along with three others, 
which complement and support the main research question. The first sub-question 
concerns which vulnerabilities of cyber-threats can be identified and used by companies 
in the oil and gas industry in order to help them manage and/or mitigate the risk of 
cyber-threats. The second looks at whether cyber-attacks will result in oil and gas 
companies losing revenue and halt their operations. The third sub-question looks at the 
possibilities of international oil and gas companies mitigating the risk of cyber-threats, 
or whether cyber-threats are a risk that can only be managed. Findings suggest that 
cyber-attacks are increasing the political risk faced by international oil and gas 
companies in various ways and they will need to change the way they approach risk 




Die olie- en gasindustrie was nog altyd baie vatbaar vir risiko’s.  En tog, ten spyte van die hoë 
risiko’s wat met die industrie geassosieer word, gaan maatskappye voort om in die industrie te 
investeer omrede die potensiële hoë winsopbrengs.  Tradisioneel is terrorisme een van die 
grootste politieke bedreigings in die olie- en gasbedryf.  Sedert die vroeeë 1990’s word 
internasionale olie- en gasmaatskappye deur terroriste groepe geteiken en was daar jaarliks ‘n 
toename in die aantal aanvalle.  Die koms van die Internet en die vinnige ontwikkeling en 
vooruitgang van tegnologie het ‘n nuwe politieke risiko, nl. kuberbedreigings meegebring.  In 
vergelyking met terroriste aanvalle op olie- en gasmaatskappye, is kuberaanvalle ‘n meer 
onlangse verskysel wat eers gedurende die afgelope tien jaar gedokumenteer word.  Twee van 
die mees gedokumenteerde gevalle van aanvalle op olie- en gasmaatskappye, is die aanval op 
Saudi Aramco in 2012 en die aanval op ‘n Noorweegse olie- en gasmaatskappy in 2014.  Hiedie 
twee kuberaanvalle het daartoe gelei dat meer aandag gegee word aan die risiko van 
kuberbedreigings wat die olie- en gasbedryf in die gesig staar, asook die omvattende impak 
daarvan. Die uitgangspunt van hierdie studie is dat ten spyte daarvan dat kuberbedreigings ‘n 
baie onlangse neiging is, dit reeds ‘n beduidende impak op internasionale olie- en 
gasmaatskappye het.  Kuberaanvalle vind al meer gereeld plaas en verhoog die politieke risiko 
wat deur internasionale olie- en gasmaatskappye ervaar word.  Verder dwing dit die 
maatskappye om hulle denkwyse te verander en, risiko’s te verminder en te bestuur.  
Vervolgens is die primêre navorsingsvraag van die studie om te bepaal of kuberbedreigings die 
politieke risiko wat olie- en gasmaatskappye in die gesig staar, toeneem al dan nie.  Die studie 
analiseer spesifiek die Shamoon aanval op Saudi Aramco en die kuberaanval op Statoil en ander 
Noorweegse olie- en gasmaatskappye.  Die doel van die studie is om hierdie vraag in 
ooreenstemming met drie ander  aanvullende en ondersteunende vrae te beantwoord.  Die eerste 
subvraag het betrekking op watter kwesbaarhede in die kuberaanvalle geïdentifiseer en gebruik 
kan word deur die maatskappy om sodoende ‘n bydrae te lewer tot die bestuur en/of 
vermindering van die risiko wat kuberbedreigings inhou. Die tweede vraag is gerig op die 
moontlikheid dat kuberaanvalle op die maatskappy sal lei tot ‘n verlies aan inkomste of selfs 
die staking van produksie.  Die derde vraag ondersoek die moontlikhede dat internasionale olie- 
en gasmaatskappye die risiko van kuberaanvalle verminder, of indien daar ‘n risiko van 
kuberaanvalle bestaan, dit bloot bestuur kan word.  Volgens bevindinge verhoog kuberaanvalle 
die politieke risiko wat die internasionale olie- en gasmaatskappye in die gesig staar op verskeie 
maniere en maatskappye sal die wyse waarop hulle risikobestuur benader ten eide die aanslag 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the Research Study  
Political risk is a concept that first began to emerge during the 1970s.1 For a long-time 
political risk was predominantly associated with its application to an investing company 
and the host government of a country, in which the company was seeking to invest. In 
this instance it was only select groups, majority groups and foreign business operations 
and investments that were negatively impacted by a government’s policies or societies’ 
actions (Simon, 1982:68). Political risk analysis would have sought to assess and 
manage any risk that could have occurred from a government’s decision or from a social 
event. Since the 1970s globalisation has forced a change in the thinking of political risk 
and where its primary focus lies.  
 
Globalisation is a very complex process, which can be defined in a wide variety of 
ways. From an economic perspective globalisation is merely the widening and speeding 
up of global connectedness (Lutz & Lutz, 2015:27). Yet another perspective states that 
globalisation has occurred because of favourable circumstances between technology, 
politics and economics, thus creating a society that has seen an increase in flow of 
foreign and domestic assets, goods, services and changes in migration. The changes in 
migration have created market fluidity through the immigration or emigration of 
workers. Market fluidity has resulted in bringing dissimilar groups into much closer 
proximity thus leading to the possibility of increased conflict between these groups, 
which can result in civil wars (Lutz & Lutz, 2015:27; Brynjar, 2005:23). Paul 
Wilkinson observed that modern terrorism has occurred as a reaction to globalisation 
(2003:124). The increased interaction and expansion of the global economy requires 
companies to take risks into consideration (Brink, 2004:3). The growth and 
 
1  The emergence during the 1970s resulted from the oil crisis. During the 1970s American oil 
consumption was on the rise but their domestic production was decreasing. The US became dependent 
on oil, which was imported from abroad. During the Yum Kippur war (which was between the State of 
Israel and other Arab nations) the US was one of Israel’s main supporters. In response to their support 
of Israel, the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) reduced their petroleum 
production and placed an embargo on oil shipments to the US. Ultimately this created fuel shortages and 





development of technology is one component that aided in the creation of globalisation.  
The advancements in technology have been a major factor in creating the 
interconnected world that exists today. These advancements in technology are of great 
importance to this research study as its development has changed the threat landscape 
in the twenty-first century and the definition of political risk. 
 
Globalisation has been coupled with an increasingly capitalist focused economy where 
profit remains the main motivation. This coupling is an important factor as the capitalist 
focused economy informs how companies run. When you combine the interconnected 
world and capitalist thinking, companies can now move their operations overseas where 
labour may be cheaper or in the case of the oil and gas industry, they can set up 
operations in countries where new oil reserves have been located. The possibility of a 
good profit return results in companies being more willing to invest in foreign countries, 
of which some are unstable or unsafe, in order to achieve this goal. The oil and gas 
industry is no exception to this, as it yields very high profits. The extractive industry as 
a whole is lucrative but the most lucrative of them all remains  the oil and gas extraction. 
As a result of this, many countries, which are rich in oil and gas, are highly dependent 
on the revenue they receive from this industry to drive their growth and development. 
This dependency makes them economically vulnerable with any disruptions having the 
potential of a negative impact on the particular country, as well as the global market. 
 
Investment in oil and gas has a very long history, which can be traced all the way to 
British and German companies’ attempt to gain access to the oil reserves located in the 
Middle East (Lambrechts & Blomquist, 2016:2). Explorations into oil and gas reserves 
during the late 1980’s were predominantly conducted in areas that were classified as 
politically safe, which left areas of the developing world unexplored. Exploration for 
new oil and gas reserves is now occurring in places that are not considered politically 
safe and are characterized by instability and conflict. According to data gathered by 
Berlin, Berlin and Vrooman in 2003, sixty-five percent of oil reserves were located in 
the Middle East. Data collected by British Petroleum (BP) showed that in 2015 South 
and Central America had the highest reserve to production ratio when it came to oil 
production, standing at a staggering 116.96 percent, and the Middle East the nearest 





that is oil rich is Africa. Africa is host to five oil-producing countries, which are in the 
top thirty oil producers in the world (Carpenter, 2015). These top five countries are 
Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Egypt and Libya (Carpenter, 2015). These five countries are 
not the only oil producing countries in Africa; there are a number of other countries in 
Africa with oil reserves. 
 
To achieve this level of financial return in the oil and gas industry, a company’s 
investment is dependent on effective risk management and risk mitigation. This means 
that effective consideration needs to be taken of the potential risk factors that they could 
face within the industry through the utilisation of political risk analysis. Political risk 
analysis can be utilised by a business in order to determine whether it would be 
financially advantageous for them to invest or expand in specific countries. Political 
risk analysis will allow businesses to determine whether their investment will not 
receive financial returns because of the political decisions or events that occur within 
the country that they are potentially going to invest in. 
 
The gas and oil industry has always been an exceptionally vulnerable sector. As was 
indicated by Lambrechts & Blomquist, there are a number of risk that could potentially 
affect the oil and gas industry such as, “corruption, taxation systems, governmental 
regulations, civil and labour, political instability, environmental activism, repatriation 
restrictions, war, external threats and terrorism” (2016:2).  Despite these vulnerabilities 
classifying the oil and gas industry as a high-risk industry, many companies are willing 
to risk investing because of the potential for a high profit return. The oil and gas industry 
has always had a high demand placed on it by the global community. The slightest 
disruption of the production of oil and gas can have a severe negative impact on revenue 
creation for oil and gas companies. Such impacts include an increase in global political 
and economic tension (Blomquist & Lambrechts, 2016:2). The effects of these 
disruptions could become even greater as fewer oil reserves are being discovered each 
year and the fact that oil is a finite resource. The demand for oil, however, presents no 
inclination of decreasing in the near future.  
 
As was indicated in Blomquist and Lambrechts (2016), one of the political risk factors 





has always been a risk factor that the oil and gas companies have had to contend with. 
As such, terrorism has been classified as an industry specific risk within the oil and gas 
industry (Blomquist & Lambrechts, 2016:15). Since the 1990s oil and gas companies 
have experienced terrorist attacks. In 1997 there were an estimated 344 terrorist attacks 
on Algerian oil and gas companies alone (Terrorist Attacks and Threats in Algeria, 
2016). The number of attacks that oil and gas companies have experienced showed a 
rapid increase following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States of 
America (US). This marked increase is a result of the success that terrorist attacks have 
on disrupting the economics of the West, in particular the US.  Terrorist groups around 
the world have utilised attacks on oil and gas companies as their primary attack method 
because of the success it allows them in achieving two of their main goals: 
“undermining the internal stability of the regimes they are fighting, and economically 
weakening foreign powers with vested interests in their region” (Luft & Korin, 2003).  
 
However, in the research conducted by Blomquist and Lambrechts, they concluded that 
it would never be possible to completely mitigate the threat of terrorism in the oil and 
gas industry (2016:15). While it may not be possible to mitigate the threat of terrorism, 
it is possible to manage the threat of terrorism. The threat of terrorism can be managed 
through the implementation of an effective political risk management strategy. This 
political risk management strategy should help companies be continually aware of 
situations on individual, national and transnational level (Blomquist & Lambrechts, 
2016:15). 
 
Terrorist attacks on oil and gas companies by terrorist groups have traditionally been 
conducted through the use of weapons; bombs and by infiltrating the oil and gas 
plantations and by holding workers hostage have traditionally been physically carried 
out gas companies. An example of this is the 2013 terrorist attack on the In Amena’s 
facility. While terrorist attacks such as these will continue to occur, there is a new rising 
trend in attacks on oil and gas industries: cyber-threats. In the past few years, 
technology has rapidly advanced. Broadband Internet was not available to everybody 
and Internet services providers (ISPs) restricted access to it. Now large numbers of the 
world’s population have access to the Internet in their homes.  It has led to the advent 





Technological products, such as phones and computers, are continually changing and 
improving to be better than products that are already on sale. Apple has brought out 
new models of the iPhone once every year for the last eleven years, each model seeking 
to be better than the previous and more user-friendly than any other phone on the 
market. These advancements have led to industries becoming increasingly digitalised. 
As a result of this increased digitalisation companies are placing themselves at a greater 
risk of being infiltrated and hacked by external sources. The oil and gas industry is no 
exception to the risk of cyber-threats.  
 
According to Alexander Polyakov, the founder of ERPscan a security firm that 
specialises in software security, the oil and gas industry is one of the industries that is 
most plagued by cyber-attacks (Keane, 2015).  Cyber-threats against the oil and gas 
companies can be classified as a more recent phenomenon, with attacks only starting 
and being documented in the last ten years (Polyakov, 2016). One of the most well-
known cyber-attacks against the oil and gas industry, according to Keane, occurred in 
2012 when Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s state-run oil giant was hacked (Keane, 
2015).2 During this attack Saudi Aramco computers were wiped clean by a virus and 
replaced by an image of a burning American Flag (Polyakov, 2016). The Cutting Sword 
of Justice claimed responsibility for this attack. The group stated that they aimed to stop 
oil production and its flow into the international market because of the Al-Saud regime 
utilising Muslim oil resources.  
 
Cyber-attacks can be carried out from a great distance but will still have the potential 
to put the safety of oil and gas companies’ workers at risk. Depending on the method 
of attack, cyberterrorism attacks can result in deaths and injuries much like physical 
attacks would. Death and injury, as a result of cyber-attacks, can occur if hackers violate 
safety measures, change alarm settings and disable communications between workers 
on the field (Keane, 2015; Polyakov, 2017). Cyber-attacks can be coordinated with 
physical terrorist attacks that will allow for greater damage and casualties. The fact that 
cyber-attacks can be conducted from a distance makes it is possible for attacks to occur 
in regions that are not characterised by political upheaval, instability and conflict. 
 





According to data gathered by ABI Research it is predicted that by 2018 oil and gas 
companies will be spending roughly US$1.87 billion on cyber-security alone 
(Polyakov, 2017). Despite this predicted increased expenditure on cyber-security the 
oil and gas industry still fall victim to cyber-attacks because of a lack of awareness and 
lack of trust between oil companies (Polyakov, 2017). In Africa there are countries that 
refuse to acknowledge the threat of cyber-attacks, despite being the third oil rich region 
in the world. (Shaw, 2018). Ultimately there is a struggle in African countries to build 
technical and financial capacity that is needed to target, monitor and stop such attacks 
(Shaw, 2018). The refusal to acknowledge this threat and not having the capabilities to 
prevent cyber-attacks is not just an in issue in African countries, it is a problem for most 
countries and industries. There has been no identifications of risk indicators or how the 
threat can be managed and there is a lack of transparency in sharing methods to prevent 
cyber-attacks in the oil and gas industry. Additionally, the oil and gas industry still has 
not fully acknowledged the threat that cyber-attacks pose to their daily operations or 
how it will increase the political risk they already face. 
 
1.2 Preliminary Literature Review 
This study will be divided into four broad fields of literature, which will focus on the 
concepts necessary for this research study. The first field of literature will provide a 
theoretical grounding that is needed in this study. This will be conducted by looking at 
the literature relating to political-risk analysis. In looking at this first field of literature, 
the following theories that are related to political risk will be examined rational choice, 
problem-solving and decision-making theories. Political risk is becoming increasingly 
more important in this interconnected global society. Despite the importance of political 
risk being recognised, it remains a complex subject. There is a great deal of literature 
that covers the topic of political risk and it has been covered by plenty of influential 
scholars. Two of these influential authors are Simon and Kobrin who both have a 
number of works that address political risk, such as Simon’s 1982 article Political Risk 
Assessment: Past Trends and Future Prospects and Korbin’s 1979 article Political 
Risk: A Review and Reconsideration. Work, which has been published by the following 
influential authors, will also be examined to further develop the theoretical grounding: 
Robock (1971), Political Risk: Identification and Assessment, Fitzpatrick (1983), The 





Literature, Alon and Martin (1998), A Normative Model of Macro Political Assessment 
and Alon, Gurumoorthy, Mitchell & Steen (2006), Managing Mircopolitical Risk: A 
Cross-Sector Examination.  
 
The second field will focus on industry specific-risk in the oil and gas industry. The 
purpose of the section will be to use literature to establish that a connection exists 
between the gas and oil industry and political risk. One of the articles that will be used 
predominantly in order to achieve this is Managing Political Risk in the Oil and Gas 
industry published by Berlin, Berlin and Vrooman in 2003. While their article will be 
used predominantly in this section, it will not be the only source of information utilised 
in looking at industry specific risk in the oil and gas industry. Lax (1983), Political risk 
in the International Oil and Gas industry, Frynas and Mellahi (2003), Political risks as 
Firm Specific (Dis)advantages: Evidence on Transnational oil Firms in Nigeria and 
Alon et al. (2006), Managing Micro political Risk: A Cross-Sector Examination. 
 
The third field of literature will focus on cyber-threats. Cyber-threats are a relatively 
new subcategory of terrorism. Thus, in order to gain a better understanding of cyber-
threats additional literature will be utilised in order to better understand this new form 
of terrorism and establish what threat it poses. This literature will aim to show that there 
are different types of cyber-attacks that utilise different methods, have different targets 
and have different motivations. Examples of the literature that will be reviewed are as 
follows: Lachow (2009), Cyber Terrorism: Menace or Myth, Shattuck, Slaughter and 
Mittal (2017), Refining at risk: Securing downstream assets from cyber-security 
threats, Ernst and Young (2014), Oil and gas cybersecurity: Penetration testing 
techniques, Weimann (2004), Cyberterrorism: How Real Is the Threat, Polyakov 
(2017), Cyber Security Risks To Be Aware of In The Oil and Gas Industries. 
 
The fourth and final field will look at the influence of cyber-attacks on the oil and gas 
industry. As this is considered to be a relatively new field of study, there is only a 
limited amount of literature that focuses on cyber-attacks as an industry specific threat 
to oil and gas companies. The literature that will be looked at will be reports published 
by the firm Ernst and Young titled Oil and gas cybersecurity: Penetration testing 





Network and Information Security’ (ENISA) report (2017) on Cyber Security 
Information Sharing in the Energy Sector. To further develop the understanding of the 
influence that cyber-attacks have on the oil and gas industry two selected cases of oil 
and gas companies, which have experienced cyber-attacks will be examined and 
compared. This section will look at each case individually and look at how the attack 
influenced oil and gas companies that were targeted in the attack. 
 
The first is the 2012 attack on Saudi Arabian Oil Company, more commonly known as 
Saudi Aramco which, is a Saudi Arabian national petroleum and natural gas company. 
The article written by Perlroth (2012) and Pagliery (2016) and the writings of Bronk 
(2016), as well as other sources will be used, to outline how the attack was carried out 
and its impact on Saudi Aramco. The second cyber-attack occurred in 2014 and 
involved dozens of oil and gas companies in Norway, including Statoil, one of Europe’s 
biggest suppliers of energy.3 Information on the events of the attack on the Norwegian 
companies will be gathered from an article documenting the attack written by John 
Leyden (2014) as well as other sources. Statoil will be the focus of the impact of the 
attack that occurred in Norway. Following the 2013 In Amenas terrorist attack, in 
Libya, Statoil undertook an assessment to look at the risk of an attack occurring again 
(Boman, 2015). After the assessment’s completion, Statoil determined that cyber-
security attacks would act as a long-term threat to their operations and not physical 
attacks.  
 
1.3 Research Problem and Research Question 
Political risk analysis continues to be an increasingly important field in today’s world, 
which is continually becoming more interconnected through globalisation and 
technological advances. Furthermore, the increased levels of foreign investment have 
added to the importance of political risk analysis. The oil and gas industry is an 
extremely lucrative business, which has led to numerous international companies 
seeking to invest in the industry. The majority of oil and gas reserves are located in 
 
3 It is important to note that this research study is aware that in 2018 the company changed their name to 






areas that are typically characterized by political upheaval, instability and conflict.  
Most oil and gas reserves are located in these troubled areas, with increased political 
risk, which result in investments into reserves located in these areas being a high-risk 
investments. Despite the high risk associated with these investments, firms are often 
willing to accept the risk because globally the business environment is harsh and there 
is the potential of high rewards in this industry. The high risk, which is associated with 
the oil and gas industry, is further highlighted by the increased number of terrorist 
attacks. 
 
Terrorist attacks are one of the primary political risk factors which oil and gas 
companies face. Since 1986 attacks on refineries have been documented as only 
happening infrequently (Lia & Kjøk, 2004:109).  During the period 1992 to 1998 
according to The International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) 
there were 5000 attacks. However, only 22 of these attacks were documented as being 
directed at oil and gas facilities. Terrorist attacks against the oil and gas facilities only 
increased following the September 11 terrorist attacks, as oil and gas companies 
become the focus of terrorist organisations (Yetiv, 2011:109). Terrorist organisations 
utilise attacks on oil and gas companies in order to destabilise the economies of the 
West and in particular the USA. Evidence of the increase is seen in Iraq, which is one 
of the main suppliers of oil to the USA, where between 2003 and 2006 there were an 
estimated 374 attacks on oil pipelines during that three-year period. Even though 
terrorist attacks are a known risk in the oil and gas industry, the necessary security 
measures to mitigate or manage the threat of attacks are not always put in place by the 
different oil and gas companies. 
 
Political risk analysis has become necessary in order to ensure the safety and security 
of the personnel working at the plantations with the increased level of risk of terrorist 
attacks that oil and gas companies now face. It has resulted in a change in the way in 
which the oil and gas industry thinks about risk. The change in thinking in risk is 
necessary to help put in place the needed security measures that will limit the damage 
that can be done to the infrastructure of oil and gas plantations; damage to plantations 
that would cost companies millions to repair. There is however a new threat to oil and 





again. The new threat facing oil and gas facilities is cyber-threats, which is a new sub-
field of terrorism.  
 
Cyber-threats indicate that the methods of terrorist attacks are changing in nature in 
order to mimic the rapid development of technology. Traditionally most terrorist attacks 
are characterised as being conducted in countries or regions that have political 
upheaval, instability and conflict. However, terrorist attacks are not solely carried out 
in regions or countries that are politically unstable. The 11 September attack in the 
United States of America, conducted by the terrorist group al Qaeda, is the best 
evidence of such attacks. The attack consisted of four USA airlines being hijacked, two 
crashed into the north and south towers of the World Trade Centre complex. The third 
crashed into the Pentagon. The fourth crash-landed in a field, after passengers 
overwhelmed the hijacker. This is not the only example of terrorist attacks being carried 
out in countries that are viewed as politically safe. There are a number of different 
incidents such as this one.  Following the 11 September attack, the leader of al Qaeda, 
Osama Bin Laden, published a statement where he announced that the best method of 
achieving their primary goal of crippling Western economies was by attacking oil and 
gas companies (Luft & Korin, 2003).  Since Bin Laden published this statement 
numerous attacks have been carried out against the oil and gas facilities around the 
world. Following the US invasion of Iraq, Iraqi pipelines were repeatedly targeted 
which cost them more than US$ 10 billion in oil revenues, Mexican pipelines were 
targeted six times in 2007 the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), which resulted in 
several supply shortages and temporary closure of several of their factories as well as 
the In Amenas attack which will be discussed further in the next section. 
 
As stated in the background to this study, explorations into oil and gas reserves are now 
being conducted in places that have political upheaval, instability and conflict. Attacks 
on oil and gas reserves in regions classified as such have occurred. An example of such 
attacks can be seen in the 2013 attack on the In Amenas. The In Amenas was a severe 
attack, which was carried out against a gas installation and resulted in one of the most 
serious international crises Statoil has ever faced. However, cyberterrorism on oil and 
gas facilities is not limited to areas categorised by political instability and conflict. 





mentioned attack that occurred in Norway in 2014 is an example of just such a cyber-
attack. The extent of the influence that the attack in Norway had on the various oil 
facilities remains unknown, as there is only a limited amount of information available 
that covers the event (Bryne, 2014). More importantly the number of cyber-attacks has 
increased annually, which poses the question of how the oil and gas industry is affected 
by these attacks and if the industry is equipped and has the capabilities to deal with the 
new threat that faces them. Consequently, the main research question of this thesis will 
be:  
 
• Do cyber-threats increase the political risk which oil and gas companies face?  
 
In order to help supplement and support the main research question sub-questions have 
been developed: 
• Which vulnerabilities of cyber-threats can be identified and used by companies 
in the oil and gas industry in order to help them manage and/or mitigate these 
risks? 
• Will cyber-attacks result in oil and gas companies losing revenue and halt their 
daily operations? 
• Can international oil and gas companies mitigate the risk of cyber-threats, or is 
this risk something that can only be managed? 
 
1.4 Objective and Relevance of the Research Study 
As pointed out previously, following the 11 September attacks, terrorist attacks carried 
out against the oil and gas industry started to occur far more frequently. The reason for 
this is Bin Laden’s statement, which identified the oil and gas industry as the most 
attractive option of attack to achieve their primary goal, of destabilising Western 
economies. The number of terrorist attacks have continued to increase through the 
years. Coupled with the increase of attacks is the fact that there have been fewer 
discoveries of new oil and gas reserves. In addition, there are numerous oil and gas 
companies already in existence this is something that will continue to increase rapidly. 
As a result of these two factors companies have a greater willingness to accept the high 
risks. The high risk placed on the oil and gas industry could only increase now as a 





recent phenomenon, there has been little to no research undertaken which seeks to 
identify vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks in the oil and gas industry. The primary purpose 
of this research is to identify the influence that cyber-threats have on political risk for 
the oil and gas industry. Along with discovering which vulnerabilities to cyber-threats 
can be identified by companies in the oil and gas industry and can be used to help them 
manage and mitigate the threat of cyber-attacks.  
 
1.5 Research Design and Research Methodology 
The main purpose of this research study is gauging the influence that cyber-threats have 
on the oil and gas industry. Additionally, vulnerabilities to cyber-threats will be 
identified. As well as evaluating how oil and gas companies can utilise these identified 
vulnerabilities to mitigate and manage the political risk of cyber-threats. The 
methodology used in this research study will be primarily qualitative. Qualitative data 
provides in-depth knowledge (Burnham, Lutz, Grant & Layton-Henry, 2008:40). In-
depth knowledge comes as a result of the vast amount of data that qualitative data 
generates from the findings in specific cases. However, a limitation to the findings 
acquired through qualitative data, is that they cannot be used to make generalisations 
as they are focused on specific cases. The direction of theorising that this research study 
utilises is an inductive direction. Inductive research is an observation of the empirical 
world that results in “a general topic and vague ideas” that will be established and later 
refined and elaborated into more precise theoretical concepts and propositions 
(Neuman, 2014:70).  
 
The research design of this study will be a comparative design. Burnham et al. state the 
comparative design within political science is one of the most important methods of 
research (2008:66). Comparative design allows for the discovery of a common cause 
between the cases. This allows for generalisations to be formed (Burnham et al., 
2008:66). When it comes to making these generalisations, it is very important to be 
careful, as they do not always hold the truth. Normally in a comparative design, only a 
small number of cases are selected and utilised. A limitation with comparative design 
is that it is often difficult to find comparable cases. To help in selecting comparative 
cases it is necessary to decide between the two basic designs of comparative research: 





this study cases have been selected utilising the most similar research design. With a 
most similar design the independent variable (x) in all cases is the same but they differ 
in the dependent variable (y) and all other variables. For this study the independent 
variable is cyber-attacks on oil and gas facilities. The dependent variable is risk 
indicators of cyber-attacks that can be identified by the oil and gas industry. These risk 
indicators will differ as a result of different circumstances found in the attacks such as: 
different facilities, difference in the code written for the cyber-attack and there could 
be a difference in the sophistication of the attacks. Ultimately, there is a possibility that 
the risk indicators identified could vary between the two different cases and not have 
any similar risk indicators. 
 
Two cases have been selected for the comparative design of this study. The cases, that 
will be used, are the following: the 2012 cyber-attack on Saudi Aramco and the 2014 
cyber-attack on Norwegian oil companies, including Statoil. These two cases have been 
selected, as they are the most documented cyber-attacks on the oil and gas facilities. 
Looking at these attacks will be interesting as they will establish whether or not cyber-
attacks increase the risk faced by oil and gas companies as well as establish whether 
cyber-attacks can be either managed or mitigated by oil and gas companies. Of 
particular interest is Statoil’s response to the Norwegian attack, as following the 2013 
In Amenas attack, they conducted a full risk assessment in which they determined that 
their greatest threat in the future would be cyber-attacks. 
 
This study will predominantly utilise secondary sources in its research. The reason for 
this is that research on political risk faces certain limitations. One particular limitation 
is the fact that most risk analysis bureaus as well as oil and gas companies prefer not to 
publish their security management models to the wider public. These models are often 
classified as intellectual property. In addition to this there is no funding involved in this 
research study therefore the use of secondary sources is useful as it is a more cost-
effective method (Burnham, et al., 2008:43). The greater part of this study will be based 
on secondary information and data that is gathered from academic books, journals, and 
reports, which can be found at both the Stellenbosch University library and their online 
database, along with additional information found online. In order to ensure the 





information gathered is accurate. The additional information acquired from online 
sources comes from trusted domains and trusted authors. 
 
Additionally, this study will be predominantly descriptive in nature. Descriptive 
research, according to Neuman, begins with a “well-defined issue or question and tries 
to describe it accurately” (Neuman, 2014:39-40). At the end of this research study, a 
detailed explanation of the problem should be given, which provides a sufficient answer 
to the initial research question (Neuman, 2014:39). This research study will be 
descriptive in nature when it comes to trying to explain the way recent cyber-attacks 
have had an influence on the oil and gas industry. Moreover, a descriptive approach 
seeks to answer the questions of ‘how’ and ‘who’ (Neuman, 2014:39). The main 
question of this research is how cyber-attacks increase the risk faced by the oil and gas 
industry. According to Neuman, it can be hard to separate descriptive and exploratory 
research, which can lead to these two forms of research being blurred, which is the case 
with this research study (2014:38). This research study will be exploratory due to the 
fact that it is seeking to provide a new insight into and perspective to the topic. The 
focus on cyber-threats is a rather new phenomenon. When looking at political risk 
within the oil and gas industry, there has been very little research on this topic. 
Explanatory research seeks to answer the question of ‘why’. Answering the question of 
‘why’ builds on descriptive research and helps in trying to explain why something 
occurs (Neuman, 2011:40).  The focus of this thesis is entirely on the oil and gas 
industry resulting in research being on a micro-level. 
 
1.6 Limitation of Research Study 
In this research study the focus is on the political risk of cyber-threats and how it 
influences the oil and gas industry. One of the limitations to this study is the fact that 
cyber-attacks and cyber-security within the oil and gas industry is a topic that is now 
only starting to attract the interest of academic scholars. As a result, there is a limited 
amount of literature available on this topic. In order to overcome this limitation, 
documented attacks against oil and gas companies will be looked at to help identify risk 
indicators. In addition, the extent of political-risk analyses being used within companies 
will be examined by looking at their practices to see if oil and gas companies take into 






A second limitation of this study is that limited primary data will be utilised in this 
research study due to the lack of information sharing surrounding cyber-attack and 
cyber-security in the oil and gas industry. A further limitation of this study is that 
interviewing a terrorist would present a number of dangers to the author. Conducting 
interviews with hackers would be difficult as most hackers operate anonymously, 
making it difficult to identify individuals for this study to potentially interview in order 
to collect primary data. Overall, these limitations will be overcome by using the 
relevant data from sources that are found online, in newspaper articles and in journals 
on cyber-threats in the oil and gas industry. 
 
As previously stated, a further limitation of this study relates to the fact that it is difficult 
to gain access to different risk management companies’ models on risk, as these models 
are often regarded as the intellectual property of these companies. As a result, this limits 
this studies’ ability to see how oil and gas companies have already addressed the 
security threat posed by cyber-attacks. Through the use of other sources on the topic, 
such as reports published by Deloitte and Ernst and Young along with new articles, it 
will be possible to overcome this limitation and gain a picture of how oil and gas 
companies have been addressing the issue of cyber-attacks. 
 
1.7 Outline of the Research Study 
Chapter Two of this research study will utilise secondary data. The data will be utilised 
to provide a greater understanding of the theoretical grounding needed for this research 
study. The theory of political risk is founded in problem-solving, rational choice and 
decision-making theory. It would therefore be prudent to begin with the 
conceptualisation of these theories. Following the conceptualisation of these theories, 
this study will provide a report on the concepts of risk, political risk, and macro- and 
micro-risk. Within this section industry-specific or firm-specific risk will be explored 
closely. In Chapter Two a conceptualisation of risk management and mitigation will be 
provided. Chapter Two will conclude with the provision of the conceptualisation of 






In Chapter Three secondary data will be used to further contextualise the research study. 
This Chapter will provide an account of the development and evolution of cyber-threats 
and cyber-attacks on the oil and gas industry, as well as identify vulnerabilities to cyber-
threats. In looking at the development of cyber-attacks in the oil and gas industry, the 
focus will be on the ways in which the different sectors’ operations are vulnerable. After 
establishing how cyber-threats can be carried out on different operations in the oil and 
gas industry the vulnerabilities which put oil and gas companies at risk of being 
attacked will be further examined.  
 
Chapter Four will utilise the data that has been presented in Chapters Two and Three 
to critically analyse it through the theoretical framework created in Chapter Two. The 
vulnerabilities to cyber-threats against oil and gas companies, identified in Chapter 3, 
will be used to analyse the two cases. Both the cases of cyber-attacks against Statoil 
and Saudi Aramco, will be analysed to establish which vulnerabilities to cyber-threats 
should have been utilised to identify and forewarn the companies about the cyber-
attacks. In looking at these attacks, their influence will be examined in order to assess 
if they increased political risk for companies in oil and gas. Lastly, the possibilities of 
how oil and gas companies can effectively mitigate the risk of cyber-attacks will be 
examined or whether it is something that can only be managed. 
 
Chapter Five will provide the conclusion of this research study. This will be conducted 
through utilising the research that was done in Chapters Two, Three and Four and will 
be framed by the research question of this study. The results of the analysis from 
Chapter Four will be critically evaluated. Through this critical examination suggestions 
for possible improvements will be reflected on. Chapter Five will ultimately conclude 
with the provision of suggestions of what can be explored in future research within the 
field of political risk analysis in the oil and gas industry. 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a general introduction to the research problem. Along with 
this an outline has been given of the objectives and relevance of this research. The 
research design and methodology of this thesis has been outlined and explained. Lastly 





research problem of this study necessitates examination and analysis of vulnerabilities 
to cyber-threats, which can be identified to help manage and mitigate this threat to the 
oil and gas industry. The cyber-attacks carried out on Saudi Arabia’s facility Saudi 
Aramco in 2012 and the attack on Statoil’s facility based in Norway in 2014 will be 
used as the case studies for the most similar comparative design of the study.  Three 
sub-questions have been developed in order to supplement and support the main 
research question. These questions will seek to examine whether cyber-threats will 
result in an increase in political risk and how it will influence the production and 
revenue of oil and gas companies. The last sub-question of this study explores whether 
or not it is possible for oil and gas companies to mitigate the risk of cyber-attacks or if 



























Chapter Two: Theoretical Perspective and Contextualisation 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The management and mitigation of risk is forecasting, and is set to become increasingly 
more important to international companies. One of the factors, which has resulted in 
the increased significance being placed on forecasting, is globalisation. Globalisation 
has led to closer economic cooperation in the global system and greater mobility of 
capital. The global environment is rapidly becoming far more complex with the aid of 
technological developments. Political and social changes in the world are also occurring 
at a much faster pace than in the past. This increased pace is the result of the rapid 
growth of technology and has led to increased risks to global stability. As stated in 
Bremmer and Keat (2009), this is why more value will be placed on being able to 
successfully manage political risks that companies could potentially face. Within the 
oil and gas industry, this is especially true as risk management and mitigation has 
always been of great significance within the industry.  
 
The importance of risk management and mitigation is the result of the fact that 
investments within the oil and gas industry have the ability to exceed billions of US 
Dollars. In order to achieve such high returns, management and mitigation of risk is of 
a great necessity. Terrorism has been a long-standing threat that the oil and gas industry 
has faced but now the nature of the terrorist attacks is changing to mimic the rapid 
development of technology. Thus, non-state actors such as corporations, religious 
groups, violent non-state actors, such as terrorist organisations, can move to cyber-
attacks on the oil and gas companies. As such, it is necessary for oil and gas companies 
to develop techniques to manage and mitigate the risk that cyber-threats pose to the oil 
and gas companies. In order for oil and gas companies to properly manage and mitigate 
the risk that cyber-threats pose, it is necessary to identify the risk indicators of a cyber-
attack occurring. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the theoretical foundation, on which this 
research study is based. The first section will examine rational choice theory, problem 
solving and decision-making theory. The second section will explain the main concepts 





such as risk, political risk and cyber-threats is essential to this research study as it 
provides the in-depth knowledge which will be needed for analysis later.  
 
2.2 Rational Choice Theory, Problem-Solving and Decision-Making Theory: A 
Theoretical Grounding 
This section will make use of older sources of literature as new literature has continued 
to be heavily dependent on the older sources of writing on rational choice, problem-
solving and decision-making theory. Rational choice theory emerged from traditional 
economic theory. Rational choice theory has historically been a dominant paradigm of 
thinking within economics, as well as other academic disciplines, such as political 
science. Traditional economic theory introduces the idea of a man who is economical 
as well a rational thinker (Simon, 1955:99). Traditional economic theory referred to 
this man as the rational man.  
 
The rational man, according to economic theory, is assumed to have the relevant 
knowledge of the important aspects of the environment in which he works. However, 
it is important to be aware that this knowledge of the environment may not be complete, 
but it will be enough to enable him to make the correct decisions. The rational man is 
considered to be capable of choosing the best course of action. Traditional economic 
theory provides the foundation on which to build a theory. Rational choice theory can 
be utilised to help understand human behaviour. Traditional economic theory focuses 
on the individual rational man while rational choice theory focuses on the behaviour of 
the decision-making unit (Green, 2002:4). For the instance of this research study that 
unit refers to international oil and gas companies. 
 
In international or national oil and gas companies, managers or executives continually 
make decisions on current or future plans for the company or will select the best 
solution to a problem that may have arisen. Making such decisions is essentially a core 
element of the daily work of any business manager (Simon, Dantzig, Hogarth, Plott, 
Schelling, Shepsle, Tversky & Winter, 1987:11).  For managers of oil and gas 
companies, these decisions can cover a wide range of issues ranging from strikes of oil 
rig workers; changes or the introduction of new petroleum laws, which could 





threats and acts of terrorism. Managers are required to make the choice of which 
problems need to be addressed and especially which one needs to be dealt with first. In 
order to do this, decision-makers will utilise the knowledge of the environment that 
they have to help aid them in selecting the best alternative and deciding what needs to 
be done in order to continue to achieve the company’s primary goals. An example of 
this can be seen in decisions regarding whether to expand operations into new regions 
or whether production should be increased which can make the company more 
profitable. When managers decide which issues need attention, set goals and come up 
with a plan of action, these three actions are referred to as problem-solving (Simon et 
al., 1987:11). When managers evaluate and select the best alternative actions, this 
process is referred to as decision-making (Simon at al. 1987:11). 
 
One of the first steps that a business should take in decision-making, when it is seeking 
to potentially expand its business into a new country, is to conduct a political risk 
analysis. The focus of political risk analysis is placed on optimizing the profit of the 
investment. Political risk assessment is generally understood to help with decision-
making problems. A political risk assessment for a company will focus on whether or 
not they should go forward with investing in a new region (Brink, 2004:30). However, 
a critique put forward is that these models are only normative models of what an 
idealised decision maker would do (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986:251). As a result, these 
models do not necessarily take into account the decision-making behaviour of a normal 
individual’s daily decision-making process (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986:251). Despite 
the fact that the focus is on an idealised decision-maker, these models remain useful as 
they provide knowledge about and insight into why certain decisions in a company are 
made. The argument, which supports the continued usefulness of these models, is that 
individual decision-makers are considered to be more effective in the pursuit of their 
own goals. 
 
It is believed that individuals who are both rational and organised tend to have a better 
chance of achieving their goals, especially in a competitive environment. This is 
particularly true when there are incentives and opportunities that allow for individuals 
to learn from their experiences (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986:251). Thus, it makes sense 





industry as well. An oil and gas company will have an already well-established set of 
preferences and an ability to effectively determine their best alternative action (Simon, 
1955:99).  Examples of this in oil and gas companies can be found by looking at 
investing in new oil fields, whether to acquire new equipment or if they should expand 
operations to a new country. This requires individuals and organisations to act 
rationally in a competitive environment. In a competitive environment, the best 
decisions result in an increased profit for oil and gas companies (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1986:251). Allowing oil and gas companies to achieve their primary business goal of 
making a profit. 
 
An additional factor that the rational actor has to focus on in the decision-making 
process is reducing or minimising uncertainty. The rational actor will seek to reduce 
this uncertainty by applying expert knowledge and experience to the topic (Simon, 
1955:99). Knowledge and experience may not always be sufficient. When this happens 
and a decision-maker cannot identify a suitable method of minimising the risk that they 
could face, they are more likely to withhold their investment or remove their investment 
from a region (Brink, 2004:30). In the oil and gas industry investors could choose to 
abstain from investing in a new country or consider pulling out. One of the ways for 
decision-makers to avoid this uncertainty is to ensure that they follow the basic steps 
of decision-making. According to Chicken, decision-making requires the 
conceptualisation of the plan on investing in new projects or expanding operations, 
which already exist (1986:40). This is done through utilising internal or external actors 
in conducting studies in order to determine the possible outcomes and to plan how to 
implement the decisions that have to be taken (Chicken, 1986:40). 
 
In later literature, Simon et al. (1987) provides an alternative six steps to follow in order 
to reduce uncertainty: 
 
1. Identify what the problem and/or opportunities are and determine which to deal 
with first 
2. Set goals to help collect the necessary information 
3. Develop as many suitable alternative plans as possible 
4. Evaluate the various alternatives 





6. Implement the alternative selected and re-evaluate the alternative in order to 
ensure that it has been effective 
(Simon et al., 1987:11). 
 
Decision-makers are required to take into consideration different alternatives, calculate the 
consequences of applying the different alternatives, reduce the uncertainties that might 
accompany the best alternative and ultimately find a solution that will satisfy investors (Simon, 
1979:11).  In the instance of political risk analysis, it provides information to decision-makers, 
which highlights the different political risks, that could possibly affect the profitability of 
projects for a specific company. Once the company has the political risk analysis, they can 
develop strategies on a method to manage the identified risks (Brink, 2004:30). In the case of 
this research study oil and gas companies would obtain information identifying vulnerabilities 
that put the oil and gas industry at risk of being a target of a cyber-attack.  
 
2.3 Risk 
It was during the 1970s and 1980s that the concept of risk began to emerge and became 
of greater concern to different industries and all levels of government began to discuss 
it. Risk is still being discussed at a governmental level, but it is now also being 
discussed at a business level. With increased importance placed on the concept of risk, 
numerous types of risk started to emerge. Some of the predominant types were business 
risk, investment risk and political risk (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981:11). The main focus of 
this study is on political risk. One of the issues that arose from the study of risk, is that 
there are numerous definitions, developed over the years seeking to explain it. Most of 
these definitions of risk tend to be quite broad. An example of a broad definition of risk 
is found in Bremmer and Keat’s writing in which risk is defined as “the probability that 
any event will turn into measurable losses” (2009:4).  Another common definition that 
is used in defining risk states that: it is when there has been change, damage or loss that 
had not been present previously (Lax, 1983:8). Lax added to the conceptualisation of 
the definition of risk stating that it is dynamic and often deals with change and that 
“current conditions are not risks; rather, risk stems from changes in those conditions” 
(Lax, 1983:8). The definition is conceptualised further by Vertzberger who states that 
risk is defined as “the likelihood that validly predictable direct and indirect 
consequences with potential adverse values will materialise, arising from particular 





(1998:22).  Vertzberger identifies that risk can be the result of both direct and indirect 
actions. Thus actions, which are not directed at a specific company or industry, can still 
impact negatively on these companies.  
 
Examples of common words associated with risk are: threat, loss, danger, vulnerability, 
hazard and misfortune. These words support the uncertainty that comes with risk 
because of the potential negative or positive outcomes that could occur. Hough defines 
risk as “uncertainty that is associated with a particular event and the potential 
consequences of these events” (2008:1). Hough’s definition helps show how risk and 
uncertainty, as well as instability, are often used interchangeably. However, uncertainty 
and instability are merely properties associated with risk. Brink explains this through 
the following statement, “risk is a more objective measurement of the amount of doubt, 
in contrast to the more subjective nature of instability and uncertainty” (Brink, 
2004:19). Uncertainty implies that there is an “inability to determine the probability or 
the impact (or both) of a certain future event” (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:16). Ultimately, 
this creates the understanding that risk should be used when looking at a situation where 
there is uncertainty and the outcome is unknown and could have potential negative 
outcomes (Hough, 2008:4-5). Hough, thus provides one of the most well-rounded 
definitions of risk. 
 
Kaplan and Garrick add to this definition by stating that there will be some form of 
damage or loss to an investor’s property (1981:12). They portray their definition of risk 
through the use of a basic equation which appears as follows: Risk = Uncertainty + 
Damage (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981:12). Ultimately, both risk and uncertainty deal with 
what could potentially happen in the future but as has been stated risk is capable of 
calculating probabilities. Thus, it is possible for risk to have the opportunity to protect 
your company and create a plan for anything that could happen in the future. 
Uncertainty, on the other hand, is incapable of providing such opportunities. Even if 
uncertainty exists, a company can decide to take the risk, as there is the potential for a 
positive outcome. There is also possibility for a company to exploit these uncertainties 
(Brink, 2004:21). More often than not smaller companies are more willing to take such 
risks. Companies are willing to accept this high risk because of the potential high return, 





companies. An example is when oil and gas companies will occasionally invest in new 
oil fields despite the high risks, as there are a limited number of new oil reserves being 
discovered, because of the potential high profit return. 
 
2.4 Political Risk 
The first issue that has to be acknowledged about the concept of political risk is the 
continued lack of consensus on how political risk is defined. Even in early writing on 
political risk, this issue is identified by Fitzpatrick who states that the definition of 
political risk can range between general definitions and specific definitions (Fitzpatrick, 
1983:249). However, the concept of political risk is becoming increasingly more 
important.  The greater importance of political risk stems from the tectonic shifts, which 
have occurred in geopolitics in the last three decades as they have drastically altered 
the international landscape (Rice & Zegart, 2018). This shift in geopolitics stems from 
the process of globalisation and the end of the Cold War. These two factors resulted in 
the distance between markets and politics shrinking, as well as the distance between 
producers and consumers. The shrinking of these distance has created an interconnected 
world and global economy that has forced companies to take risk into greater 
consideration (Brink, 2004:3). This interconnected world has made it necessary for 
companies to be able to forecast if there is any potential risk and have a strategy in 
place in order to address such a risk should it arise. However, the greatest effect these 
changes have had is that they have forced a change in the thinking of political risk and 
where its focus lies. 
 
For a long time, political risk was predominantly associated with its application to an 
investing company and the host government of a country. One of the earliest definitions 
of political risk has the focus of the definition being placed on the whole environment 
instead of being placed on isolated events. Robock (1971) in his writing argues that 
political risk in a business happens when there are disruptions that are caused by 
political change. However, it is very difficult to anticipate when something such as this 
will occur. A company’s main focus is ensuring that they make a profit and achieve any 
other goals that they may have set, as was outlined in the section in the grounding theory 
section of this chapter. If these outcomes are affected by political changes then it is 





political risk can exist in the business environment which supports his definition: “(1) 
when discontinuities occur in the business environment; (2) when these are difficult to 
anticipate; and (3) when they result from political change” (1971:7).  
 
Within Robock’s definition of political risk he stated that government interference in 
business affairs is the primary reason that investors do not make a return on their 
investments, thus government interference is the primary source of political risk. One 
of the definition’s that best supports Robock’s writing is found in Kobrin (1979).  
Kobrin, in developing his definition of political risk, cites the definition of political risk 
developed by Weston and Sorge’s, which states that “political risk arises from the 
actions of national governments which interfere with or prevent business transactions, 
or change the terms of agreements, or cause the confiscation of wholly and partially 
foreign-owned business property” (Korbin, 1979:67). A critique of this definition is 
that only select groups or majority groups and foreign business operations and 
investment are negatively impacted by a government’s policies or society’s actions 
(Simon, 1982:68). Despite this critique, Weston and Sorge are not the only authors on 
political risk that support this definition. Fitzpatrick (1983) continued the support for 
Robock’s writing as he defined political risk through a host government and a foreign 
business company’s relationship (1983:249). This understanding of political risk has 
remained within the definition of political risk as later writing further simplified 
Robock’s writing by stating that it is ultimately viewed as originating from two main 
sources: nationalisation and expropriation (Alon, Gurumoorthy, Mitchell & Steen, 
2006:624). Despite the strength of Robock’s definition it would not go unchallenged. 
 
While Robock’s definition of political risk may have continued to be supported in later 
literature, other authors have challenged the validity of Robock’s (1971) definition. 
More recent authors make the argument that there is far too much importance placed 
on the factor of political instability and government actors. Firstly, Kobrin and a few 
years later Lax, argued that the events, which are usually associated with political 
instability, only happen infrequently (Kobrin, 1981; Lax, 1983). Kobrin (1981) states a 
consequence of the focus being predominately placed on the more drastic events of 
political instability such as coups or revolutions has caused a lack of attention to be 





1981:253). This critique is further expanded, by Kobrin (1981), who stated that these 
lesser events can actually be just as damaging. Kobrin states that these smaller events 
happen far more frequently than the more drastic events and thus these events are very 
under-analysed (Kobrin, 1981:253). It is in Kobrin’s (1981) article that the best 
examples of how lesser events are not considered nearly as much as major events. 
Kobrin conducted a survey asking mangers of international companies to list their top 
twelve contingency plans. The majority of these companies ranked civil disorder first 
and external war as second, nothing else came anywhere close to these (Kobrin, 
1981:252). More literature on political risk written by Jakobsen (2012) agrees and 
supports the critiques on Robock’s definition, put forward by Kobrin, even though it 
was published thirty-one years later. Jakobsen supported the fact that lesser events can 
be just as damaging and they remain under-analysed (Jakobsen, 2012:30). 
 
Ever since the 1990s the majority of political risk scholars such as Butler and Joaquin 
(1998), Wells (1998) and later Jakobsen (2012), have come to recognise that 
government intervention along with policies are actually the most common forms of 
political risk. Focus in recent times has turned to low-key changes made by government 
as they now pose the greatest threat to international companies. Thus, as previously 
mentioned attention was now being paid to the less dramatic events, which both Kobrin 
(1981) and Jakobsen (2012) had identified as being under-analysed. These low-key 
changes are more threatening than the impact of the actions of non-governmental 
organisations, such as terrorism, kidnapping and sabotage. Even though from this 
perspective terrorism is determined to not affect companies as much as low-key 
government changes, its effects can still be severe. The damages and effects of these 
attacks can end up costing companies millions of dollars in damage and in very severe 
cases the death of employees. 
 
While earlier definitions, such as Korbin’s, were key to the development of political 
risk, much criticism was placed on these definitions. A few years later Fitzpatrick 
(1983) put forward a critique against these definitions, arguing that the early definitions 
of political risk were far too narrow. This particular critique was supported and further 
expanded fifteen years later by Alon and Martin (1998). Alon and Martin (1998) 





identification of two other key problems from these early definitions. As a result of 
these narrow definitions, there has been a failure in conceptualising topics associated 
with political risk. This resulted in companies ending up with the wrong results because 
they utilised the incorrect data in their analysis. As stated in the previous section, taking 
a risk will not always result in a negative outcome, there is the potential for a positive 
outcome. Lastly, it was argued that with too much focus placed on governmental 
policies and other political events the other causes of political risk are not considered 
(Alon & Martin, 1998:11). 
 
Alon et al. (2006), in their writing identified that there were several ways in which it 
was possible to identify political risk that international companies could potentially 
face. These political risks are explained as follows “(1) prevalent legal rules and 
regulations within a given country; (2) war and security issues, (3) governmental 
economic and (4) fiscal policies; (5) the existence of trade barriers” and more (Alon et 
al., 2006:625). Each of these factors has the potential to affect international companies 
operating within a country. However, Alon et al. (2006) argues that the impact of these 
political risk factors differs from company to company, depending on the sector in 
which they operate (2006:625). The risk of war (civil) or a terrorist attack will pose a 
greater risk to the oil and gas industry (Alon et al., 2006:625). 4 
 
One of the best all round definitions of political risk many authors argue is the definition 
provided in Simon’s writing (1982). Simon states that political risk refers to the 
following: “the governmental and societal actions and policies, originating either within 
or outside the host country, and negatively affecting either a select group of, or the 
majority of foreign business operations and investments” (1982:68). In the article 
written by Alon and Martin (1998) and later Alon et al. (2006), both argue for the 
validity and the usefulness of Simon’s definition. Alon and Martin supported the 
definition by stating it was relevant because it took into consideration that international 
 
4 The financial sectors are far more concerned with the risks of balance of payments, changes in interest 
rates, hyperinflation and market liquidity, in their consideration in investing in a particular country. Alon 
et al. presented the example of the Brazil when their currency devaluated by 40 percent in 1999, which 
resulted in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) withdrawing from the country and creating an 





companies from “the host-country environment, home-country environment, 
international environment and the global environment” (Alon & Martin, 1998, cited in 
Alon et al., 2006:625). Alon et al. (2006) put forward three reasons in their argument 
for supporting Simon’s definition, even though the definition at that stage had been 
developed over twenty-four years earlier. They argue that the definition “(1) views 
political risk in the general environmental context, (2) differentiates between macro and 
micro risks, and (3) distinguishes between internal and external causes of political risk” 
(2006:625). Alon et al. (2006) does critique Simon’s (1982) definition as they extended 
the definition by adding an economic dimension. Alon et al. (2006) argues that an 
economic dimension is an important source of political risk, as economics and politics 
are often inseparable from one another. This is an important critique, as oil and gas 
companies often take into consideration economic factors with their political risk 
analysis because their focus is on maintaining their profit.  
 
While many might consider Simon’s (1982) definition to be the best well-rounded 
definition some authors argue that this definition is no longer sufficient for political risk 
in the twenty-first century. Simon’s (1982) is no longer sufficient as when Simon wrote 
it, he could not have predicted the role that the growth of technology would play and 
the changes that would occur in political risk as a result. In the recently published book 
Political Risk: How Businesses and Organisations Can Anticipate Global Insecurity 
the authors, Rice and Zegart, address these inefficacies and put forward a far more 
sufficient definition of political risk for the twenty-first century. Rice and Zegart in 
their writing do support the earlier authors’ definitions such as Robock (1971), Kobrin 
(1979) and Simon (1982), which view the government as being the main arbiter in the 
business environment (2018:14). While they support this perspective, they argue that 
the government is no longer the only important arbiter.  
 
The authors state that technology such as cell phones enable citizens, customers and 
organised groups to galvanise action at local, state, federal and international levels. As 
a result, the environment of risk in and outside countries has grown to be complicated 
and messy with players overlapping and intersecting. Rice and Zegart identify five 
levels of action generating political risks: Individuals, local groups, national 





(2018:36-37). As such, Rice and Zegart put forward that political risk in the twenty-
first century should be defined as “the probability that a political action could affect a 
company in significant ways” (2018:15-16). Rice and Zegart specifically chose to use 
the words  political action in order to indicate the growing role of risk generators outside 
the traditional places such as capitals, army barracks and party headquarters. The risks 
generated by these actors are continually growing but Rice and Zegart identify ten 
major political risks, which face business and companies. The following is a list and 
summary of each of these risks: 
 
1. Geopolitics: Interstate wars, great power shifts, multilateral economic sanctions and 
interventions 
2. Internal conflict: Social unrest, ethnic violence, migration, nationalism, separatism, 
federalism, civil wars, coups, revolutions 
3. Laws, regulations, policies: Changes in foreign ownership rules, taxation, 
environmental regulations, national laws 
4. Breaches of contract: Governments reneging on contracts, including expropriations 
and politically motivated credit defaults 
5. Corruption: Discriminatory taxation, systemic bribery 
6. Extraterritorial reach: Unilateral sanctions, criminal investigations and prosecutions 
7. Natural resource manipulation: politically motivated changes in supply of energy, 
rare earth minerals 
8. Social activism: Events or opinions that “go viral,” facilitating collective action 
9. Terrorism: Politically motivated threats or use of violence against persons, property 
10. Cyber threats: Theft or destruction of intellectual property, espionage, 
extortion, massive disruption of companies, industries, governments, and 
societies. 
(Rice & Zegart, 2018:74-75). 
 
A number of different definitions for political risk have been presented in this section. 
For the purpose of this research study the definition of political risk presented by Rice 
and Zegart’s (2018) will be utilised. Rice and Zegart’s definition will be used because 
their definition acknowledges the inefficiencies of older definitions to address the new 
political risk landscape in the twenty-first century. In addressing these inefficiencies 





research study. Rice and Zegart state that, “political risk is the probability that a political 
action could affect a company in significant ways” (2018:15-16). 
 
2.5 Macro and Micro Political Risk 
Political risk is divided into two subcategories: macro and micro political risk. When 
an unexpected change occurs within the political environment and has an influence 
on all foreign business within a region, is referred to as macro-political risk. Large-
scale disruptive socio-political events such as revolutions, wars and changes to 
investment rules, which have an affect on all foreign companies within a country, 
are all examples of macro-political risk. This will generally occur when a country is 
going through periods of political unrest or different groups are targeting it across 
the political spectrum. A further division found within macro-political risk is that it 
can also be internal or external. Internal risk refers to risk posed by the domestic 
environment and external risk refers to the country itself or an outside company and 
even the global environment (Alon & Martin, 1998). In earlier literature Simon 
(1982) already critiqued this separation of internal and external risk. Simon (1982) 
instead argues that they should rather be combined, and political risk should be 
identified as being either society-related or governmental-related risk factors. Micro 
political risk is defined differently and is identified by different characteristics to 
that of macro political risk. 
 
Change that only has an effect on specific industries or even specific companies is 
classified as micro-political risk (Robock, 1971:9). Kobrin argued in his writing that 
macro-risk is not the biggest political risk facing foreign companies, but rather that 
micro-political risks that have a greater effect on actual operations rather than overall 
ownership (1981:253). As was previously stated, Kobrin conducted a study that 
showed that expropriations were limited. Simon (1982) further argues that Robock’s 
(1971) differentiation between micro- and macro-political risks was crucial in 
indicating to both international investors and companies that they need to pay 
attention to the little changes that are industry-specific conditions, instead of the 
changes that come with more large-scale events which are perceived as catastrophic 
(Simon, 1982:66). Examples of micro-political risk, which the oil and gas industry 





examples are as follows: terrorist attacks against oil and gas installations, taxation 
increase aimed specifically at oil and gas companies, price controls for utilities and 
selective expropriation (2012:38).  
 
The divide between macro- and micro-political risk is very much like the early 
division between authors on the matter of whether political instability or government 
intervention were the main political risk, according to Jakobsen (2012).  Macro-
political risk events tend to be those that are more eye-catching and have their own 
set of consequences. Micro-political risk events tend to be those that are considered 
less high profile and not as newsworthy. As stated previously, these micro-political 
risk events actually tend to occur far more frequently and have a higher impact on 
firms and result in greater losses. Even though the forms of macro-political risk, such 
as expropriation and mass nationalisation, are decreasing they still do exist. Though 
companies today face other risks now that fall under the concept of micro-political 
risk. 
 
In the case of micro-political risk, Berlin, Berlin and Vrooman (2003), state that it 
can additionally be referred to as industry-specific risk or as a firm-specific risk. The 
distinction is important as it indicates how risk can differ from industry to industry. 
Lambrechts, Weldon & Boshoff (2010) argue that in the future there will 
predominantly be two factors that will have an influence on political risk. The first 
factor that will have an impact is when foreign-owned businesses hold a higher share 
in a country with increased micro-political risk there will be a greater level of change 
experienced in that industry (Lambrechts et al., 2010:112). The second factor is that 
over time the local workforce will become more skilled providing them with a 
greater ability to run the companies successfully on their own which will essentially 
only lead to greater micro-risk (Lambrechts et al., 2010:112).  Micro-political risk 
is important to companies and will be further expanded on under the conception of 
industry- or firm-specific risk, which as stated is the other way of referring to micro-
political risk. 
 
Frynas and Mellahi provide an important critique that argues for the recognition that 





even the difference in the products that they produce (2003:542). Frynas and Mellahi’s 
critique supports Kobrin’s much earlier argument in his own writing in which he noted 
that political events have varied influence on different firms and different projects 
(Kobrin, 1982:40). Robock and Simmonds (1989) came to this same conclusion in their 
writing in which they were able to recognise that different businesses were sometimes 
impacted less than others by political risk. This was especially evident in their example 
of the political unrest that had occurred in El Salvador between the 1970s and 1980s. 
Earlier writing of Kobrin (1980) supports Robock and Simmonds, as his research was 
based on several companies where he found that the companies that were selected for 
expropriation were chosen because of the type of company that they were. Frynas and 
Mellahi further argue that it is necessary to recognise that investment decisions done 
through risk assessment are “highly project-specific and occasionally firm-specific or 
even product-specific” (2003:542). Even companies within the same industry, such as 
oil and gas companies, when experiencing the same political event might be affected 
differently. 
 
Frynas and Mellahi confirmed this notion in the conclusion of their writing on their 
study of oil and gas companies in Nigeria (2003:558). Within their study, they found 
that the companies of Shell and Elf-Aquintaine, were able to handle potential political 
risks better than other companies as they were better equipped to deal with these 
potential risks (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:559). Thus, they indicate that these two firms’ 
willingness to invest in the region of Nigeria is best understood under their firm-specific 
risk or their overall ability to reduce the risk that they face. Critics have noted that 
industries such as oil and gas have little choice but to invest in high-risk locations as 
this is a common trend for extractive industries. The reason for industry-specific risk 
being prevalent in the extractive industry is as result of “growing nationalistic feelings 
and a conviction that natural resource endowments should be exploited for the welfare 
of all people in a nation rather than for profit” (Robock, 1971:10). 
 
Another critique regarding firm specific risk was provided in Alon and Hebert (2009), 
in which they argued that there has been a lack of guidelines on how firms should 
approach an assessment of the specific risks that a specific firm could potentially face. 





scholars to continue to place more focus on the study of the branch of firm specific risk, 
rather than on the level of country- and industry-risk (2003:562). This argument of 
Frynas and Mellahi (2003) was supported in the later writing of Alon and Herbert 
(2009) who provided a similar critique, which stated that there was still far too little 
research that effectively covers the characteristic of firm-specific political risk. 
 
Alon et al. (2006) worked to address this critique as their writing focused exclusively 
on the oil and gas sectors and the industry-specific risks that they face. Within their 
writing Alon et al. argue that one of the most sensitive sectors in which to invest in is 
the oil and gas industry (2006:631). Alon et al. (2006) are not alone in their statement 
that the oil and gas industry is the most sensitive investment sector. As the later writing 
by Lambrechts and Blomquist supports this statement in outlining that oil and gas 
companies are sensitive because of the fact that these natural resources are often 
perceived as being a country’s national patrimony (2016:2). This sensitivity stems from 
the fact that the oil industry has the ability to produce wealth and power.  
 
There are numerous risks that the oil and gas industry face that Lambrechts and 
Blomquist outline as follows: “corruption, taxation systems, governmental regulations, 
civil and labour unrest, political instability, environmental activism, repatriation 
restrictions, war, external threats and terrorism” (2016:2). Berlin et al. indicates that a 
reason for the heightened risk that the oil and gas industry faces is because they are 
predominantly located in unstable regions (2003:2). Berlin at al. (2003) estimates that 
roughly sixty-five percent of oil and gas reserves are located in the Middle East. This 
political instability does not hinder oil and gas companies from willingly exposing 
themselves to these risks, because as Alon et al. argue as long as they can manage this 
risk and still make a profit, they will accept this high-risk (2006:632). Following the 
September 11 terrorist attack in America, one of the predominant micro-risks that oil 
and gas industries face is terrorist attacks (Yetiv, 2011:193). The increase of attacks has 
resulted in a change in thinking about risk within the oil and gas industry. While 
terrorism did force a change in the thinking about risk in the oil and gas industry, 
another change in thinking is going to be needed. The threat landscape of the oil and 
gas industry is changing due to increased automation use making oil and gas 





attacks are predicted to be the biggest threat to face the oil and gas industry in the future 
as they replace traditional methods of terrorist attacks. 
 
2.6 Risk Management and Risk Mitigation 
With a rapidly expanding global market a point of great concern for international 
companies and investors according to Lambrechts and Blomquist is that they need to 
take into consideration all of the political risks involved in their investment (2016:1). 
This is especially true of the oil and gas industry, as an extractive industry, they will 
never be free of risk. However, Alon et al. argues that the oil and gas companies are far 
more willing to be exposed to these risks if there is a way to effectively manage these 
risks and maintain their profits (2006:632).  These findings support earlier arguments 
that the primary objective of oil and gas companies, when investing, is risk management 
(Miller, 1992:311). In more recent literature, Brink defines political risk management 
as follows: “the sum of the actions foreign investors or multinational corporations 
(MNC) take to try and keep at an acceptable level the degree or measure of investment 
risk associated with their activities” (2004:149). Years earlier Haendel (1979) provided 
a more well-rounded and in-depth definition. Haendel defines risk management as 
“identifying risks, assigning a value to them, anticipating losses, and making objective 
decisions about what steps to take before losses occur so that they have the least impact 
on the operations of the enterprise” (1979:135). Haendel’s definition of risk 
management follows the process of decision-making used by the rational man described 
at the beginning of this chapter. 
 
It is through a company’s assessment of the different risk factors, which could have an 
effect on their investment, that decisions can be made on what mitigation measures they 
should take (Berlin et al., 2003:6). Within Brink’s (2004) writing on political risk 
management, she distinguishes between two techniques: protective and integrative. 
Protective techniques seek to reduce the overall severity of a company’s loss and 
endeavour to ensure the protection of key internal strengths of an MNC (Brink, 
2004:156). Integrative techniques are focused on “reducing the frequency of loss and 
their main aim is to influence relations with institutions and actors in the political 
environment” (Brink, 2004:156). Instead a well-rounded risk management plan will 





et al., puts forward two different ways in which to mitigate political risk: political risk 
insurance or what they term de facto insurance (Berlin et al., 2003:6). Political risk 
insurance does not seek to prevent loss, instead it focuses on assuring investors that 
they will receive compensation for part or all of their investment if a loss does occur 
(Berlin et al. 2003:6). De facto political insurances seek to prevent losses from 
happening in the first place. These two methods of mitigation, are same as Brink’s 
techniques, complement one another and are not mutually exclusive (Berlin et al., 
2003:6). 
 
Within the literature there is recognition that while it is necessary to conduct political 
risk analysis and propose plans for management and mitigation prior to investment, it 
is not always done. This is particularly true within oil and gas companies. Often times, 
this analysis is conducted in response to an event that is already happening rather than 
continually conducting political risk management. Alternatively, risk forecasts are 
conducted at the request of investors who are looking to invest or increase their 
investment. As a result of companies not continually looking at risk management or 
updating their analysis, they often are only able to manage a problem after it has become 
apparent. One of the best-case studies of this occurred in 2013 with the In Amenas 
terrorist attack. The plant was a joint venture between BP and Statoil. Both companies 
did not publish the details of their security plans. Prior to the attack, a Statoil employee 
stated that the company considered political risk to be seen mainly as a public relations 
problem (Lambrechts & Blomquist, 2016:11). 
 
A critique put forward by Lambrechts and Blomquist (2016) is that despite the number 
of political events that could affect the oil and gas industry there has still been a lack of 
effort in developing political risk management strategies. A critique put forward in the 
literature, before the one made by Lambrechts and Blomquist, was that many oil and 
gas companies continue to remain dependent on forecasting potential political 
developments (Lax, 1983:174). As was seen with Statoil prior to the In Amenas attack. 
The company lacked a holistic approach to their risk management. After the 
consequences of the attack become, did they initiate the creation of a political and 
security risk task force (Lambrechts & Blomquist, 2016:11). Oil and gas companies are 





attack in 2013, it was realised that the biggest risk that oil and gas companies were 
going to face in the future is terrorism. As a result of the world economy’s dependence 
on oil and gas, it makes the possibility of completely mitigating the threat of terrorism 
extremely difficult.  
 
Even though it is not possible to completely mitigate the risk posed by terrorism, it is 
possible for oil and gas companies to manage this threat through “continuous evaluation 
[…] conducted before and during international operations” to make sure they are 
capable of addressing these changes” (Lambrechts & Blomquist, 2016:14-15). Finally, 
another important critique against risk mitigation and risk management is made in 
Lambrechts and Blomquist writing in which they state there still remains a rather 
limited amount of exploration conducted on how an increase of terrorist attacks affect 
the management and mitigation of risk (2016:4). Thus, it is necessary to continue to 
develop and expand on this literature but in order to do this, an understanding of cyber-
threats and how they are changing is needed as well. 
 
2.7 Cyber-Threats 
In order to understand cyber-threats, one first needs to understand the space in which 
these attacks are occurring. It is therefore necessary is necessary to look again at one of 
the driving forces of globalisation: the growth of the Internet. When trying to establish 
and explain the origin of the Internet  begun as an internal experiment in the US 
military. Since its obscure beginning, the Internet has rapidly developed and grown  
according to Ahmad and Yunos it is now at the “centre of modern life and has become 
an important medium for business, economics, politics and communities” (Ahmad & 
Yunos, 2012:149). Ahmad and Yunos’ observation on the Internet’s development is 
supported in the writing of Negroponte, Palmisano and Segal, who state that the Internet 
can “transform commerce, create social and cultural networks with global reach, and 
become a surprisingly powerful vehicle for political organisation and protest alike…” 
(2013:ix).  Evidence of the proliferation of the Internet is further evident in the statistics 
that the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) published in 2015. The ITU’s 
statistics estimate that roughly “3.2 billion peopled are now using the Internet…” (ICT 
Data and Statistics, 2015:1). As the Internet has developed, Information and 





resulted in there being “enormous gains in efficiency and productivity” (Ahmad & 
Yunos, 2012:149). This technological progress and infrastructure deployment has 
allowed the Internet to rapidly spread, which is only increasing in speed.  
 
The growing interconnectedness has meant that in the 21st century we are rapidly 
moving towards a digital society. The pervasiveness of the Internet has brought 
changes, which are irreversible, to the global environment. According to the writing of 
de Borchgrave, Cillufo, Cardash and Ledgerwood this pervasiveness has brought with 
it the creation of “significant personal, organisational and infrastructural dependencies 
that are not confined by national borders” (2000:1). Despite there being many perceived 
benefits to the increased interconnectedness for the public, it has additionally brought 
with it the creation of numerous opportunities for those with devious motives to cause 
harm. These opportunities occur in the space referred to as cyberspace. While 
cyberspace is the arena where these events occur, there is still no standard or objective 
definition as to what it is. 
 
The prefix ‘cyber’, is utilised to indicate a characteristic, which pertains to “information 
technology and the Internet in its capacity as an electronic communications network” 
(Hiralal, 2017:2). According to Choucri’s writing, cyberspace is defined as a “venue 
that allows users to engage in activities conducted over electronic fields whose special 
domains transcend traditional territorial, governmental, social and economic 
constraints” (2012:6). In defining cyberspace, Ahmad and Yunos’ indicate that those 
wishing to conduct cyber-attacks will utilise the cyberspace and ICT to their advantage 
(2012:149). Ahmed and Yonus’ are in agreement with Chourcri on the transcendent 
nature of it, as they state the following: “cyberspace has no boundaries” (2012:149). 
Thus, traditional borders, which distinguish one country from another, do not govern 
cyberspace, as it does not have these same boundaries. Ultimately, the Internet and 
cyberspace have brought inherent insecurities. 
 
Inherent insecurities of the Internet and cyberspace provide contemporary terrorists and 
terrorist organisations, nation-states and people’s movements with the ability to utilise 
cyberspace and the wide range of opportunities it provides. According to Stohl, 





and if they are proficient, significantly further their political objectives” (2006:229). 
While the concepts of crime and terrorism are considered to be traditional concepts and 
occur in the physical domain, the newest addition in this instance is the aspect of the 
‘cyber’ domain. The convergence of the cyber domain and terrorism or crime is often 
referred to as cyberterrorism. Senior research fellow at the Institute for Security and 
Intelligence in California, Barry Collin, was the first to coin the term cyberterrorism in 
his writing in the 1980s (Gordon & Ford, 2003:3; Ahmad & Yunos, 2012:149-150; 
Denning, 2001:241).  Collin, in defining the concept of cyber-terrorism, stated that the 
vehicle of cyberterrorism was formed from the convergence of the virtual world5 with 
the physical world6. Collin’s definition of cyberterrorism may be the earliest definition 
but since the concept’s introduction numerous other authors have supplied numerous 
definitions. 
 
Pollitt (1998), in his writing on cyberterrorism, combines Collin’s definition with the 
US Department of States’ definition of terrorism7 in order to construct a definition of 
cyberterrorism. Pollitt (1998) provided the first working definition of cyberterrorism. 
Pollitt defines cyberterrorism as “the premeditated, politically motivated attack against 
information, computer systems, computer programmes and data which results in 
violence against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents” 
(1998:9). However, a problem with Pollitt’s definition is that it is very narrow. Pollitt 
argues that he kept his definition narrow in order to be able to differentiate from other 
forms of computer abuse.8  
 
 
5 Collin classifies the virtual world as being the arena where computer programmes are able to function 
and where data moves (Collins cited in Ahmad & Yunos, 2012:150). 
6 Collin defines the physical world as the place where society lives and functions (Collins cited in Ahmad 
& Yunos, 2012:150). 
7 The US Department of Defense (DOD), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and State Department 
define terrorism as the calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to 
intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or 
ideological (Lachow, 2009:438). 






This points to a weakness in Pollitt’s definition, as these other forms of computer abuse 
start to be included in other authors’ definitions, such as Lachow’s (2009) which will 
be looked at later. Lewis, in his work on cyberterrorism, defined it as “the use of 
computer network tools to shut down critical national infrastructures (such as energy, 
transportation, government operations) or to coerce or intimidate a government or 
civilian population” (Lewis, 2002:1). Lewis’ definition, unlike Pollitt’s, acknowledges 
the fact that the perpetrators are using the computer networks and the fact that they can 
be aimed at critical infrastructures. Lewis adds that nations and critical infrastructures 
are becoming more dependent on computer operations providing the premise for 
cyberterrorism. Ultimately this creates what Lewis refers to as a “massive electronic 
Achilles’ Heel” (Lewis, 2002:1). 
 
Alternatively, author Nagpal (2002) sought to examine cyberterrorism in the context of 
globalisation. In his examination he defines cyberterrorism as “the premeditated use of 
disruptive activities, or the threat thereof, in cyberspace, with the intention to further 
social, ideological, religious, political or similar objectives or to intimidate any person 
in furtherance of such objectives” (Nagpal, 2002:2). Another author whose definition 
is often utilised by others is Weimann’s (2004a) definition of cyberterrorism. Weimann 
defines cyberterrorism as “unlawful attacks and threats of attacks against computers, 
networks and information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a 
government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives.” (2004a:4). 
Rollins and Wilson state that in defining cyberterrorism there are at least two ways in 
which to do so. The first is effects-based and the second is intent-based. Rollins and 
Wilson (2007) define effects-based cyberterrorism as “when computer attacks result in 
effects that are disruptive enough to generate fear comparable to a traditional act of 
terrorism even if done by criminals” (Rollins & Wilson, 2007:3). Intent-based 
cyberterrorism is defined as existing “when unlawful or politically motivated computer 
attacks are done to intimidate or coerce a government or people to further a political 
objective, or to cause grave harm or severe economic damage” (Rollins & Wilson, 
2007:3). Negpal, Weimann and Rollins and Wilson all acknowledge that cyber-
terrorism is utilised to intimidate governments or people through computer attacks to 






Stohl in his examination of the various definitions of cyberterrorism, argued that each 
of the definitions he has looked at “include[d] some form of intimidat[ion], coerc[ion], 
influence as well as violence or threat [thereof]” (2006:229). Stohl’s argument proves 
to be true in looking at the above-mentioned definitions of Rollins and Wilson (2007), 
Weimann (2004a), Negpal (2002), Lewis (2002) and Pollitt (1998). As previously 
mentioned, each of these definitions of cyberterrorism mentions the use of violence, 
threat of violence, influence and intimidation. Thus, Stohl utilises his finding in 
formulating his own definition of cyberterrorism and defines it as follows: “the 
purposeful act or the threat of the act of violence to create fear and/or compliant 
behaviour in a victim and/or audience of the act of threat” (2006:229). Stohl’s definition 
is a far broader definition, thus leaving a lot more open to interpretation.  
 
The most widely cited paper on the issue of cyberterrorism is Dorothy Denning’s 
testimony before the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism (Denning, 2000). Denning 
is considered to be a leading authority on the subjects of cyberterrorism and information 
warfare. In defining cyberterrorism, Denning supports the understanding that 
cyberterrorism is the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism, as was originally stated 
by Collins (Denning, 2000:1). Ultimately, Denning states that cyberterrorism is defined 
as follows: 
 
It is generally understood to mean unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, 
networks, and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or 
its people in furtherance of political or social objectives. Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, as 
an attack should result in violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to 
generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions, plane crashes, water 
contamination, or severe economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against critical 
infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending on their impact. (Denning, 2000:1) 
 
Denning adds to this overall definition of cyberterrorism and states that any cyber-
attacks, which disrupt nonessential services or is merely a costly nuisance, are not 
considered to be cyberterrorism (Denning, 2000:1). Within her early research, Denning 
concluded at that time cyberterrorism did not seem to pose an imminent threat but still 
cautioned that this could easily change in the future (Denning, 2000:8). Denning 





fact that it can be conducted remotely and anonymously (Denning, 2000:8). Denning’s 
conclusion altered slightly as did her definition over the next seven years in the further 
research she conducted on the topic of cyberterrorism. Denning updated her definition 
of cyberterrorism, in her research, on the threat that cyberterrorism posed following the 
9/11 attacks. Denning’s updated definition of cyberterrorism states that it is defined as 
follows: 
 
Highly damaging computer-based attacks or threats of attack by non-state actors against 
information systems when conducted to intimidate or coerce governments or societies in pursuit 
of goals that are political or social. It is the convergence of terrorism with cyberspace, where 
cyberspace becomes the means of conducting the terrorist act. Rather than committing acts of 
violence against persons or physical property, the cyberterrorist commits acts of destruction and 
disruption against digital property (Denning, 2007:124). 
  
In conclusion to her updated analysis, Denning states that over the past couple of years 
terrorists have shown a growing interest in cyberterrorism and that it could start to pose 
a far more serious risk in the future (Denning cited in Lachow, 2009:451). The change 
in Denning’s findings, in the space of a few years, indicates how rapidly the threat 
posed by cyberterrorism can develop and increase. 
 
In later writing by Lachow (2009), he introduces one of the most important critiques to 
the utilisation of the term cyberterrorism. Lachow argues that the term cyberterrorism 
is often applied or misapplied to a wide range of activities (2009:439). Applying the 
term to a wide range of activities has resulted in cyberterrorism seeming to be the 
biggest threat. Lachow draws attention to the fact that when news articles utilise the 
term cyberterrorism it is not terrorist groups engaging in cyberterrorism but rather 
nation-states, hackers and criminals (Lachow, 2009:439).  Lachow proposed that 
cyberterrorism is merely one method of cyber-attack, not the only one. Lachow (2009) 
suggests that there are rather at least five methods of attack and they should rather be 
referred to as cyber-threats. This idea is supported in the authors’ earlier writing. An 
example of this is seen in Beggs’ writing when he argues that one cannot confuse 
hacking with cyberterrorism, as they are two completely different things (2005:472). In 
the recent writing of Rice and Zegart, the authors utilise the term cyber-threats that they 





disruption of companies, industries, governments, societies” (Rice & Zegart, 2018:75). 
Lachow summarises these different methods of cyber-threats in the table below:  
 













Source: (Lachow, 2009:439). 
 
Lachow defines hacktivism as the act of manipulating digital information for either 
politically or socially motivated purposes (2009:439). Hacktivism does not seek to 
create fear or a sense of horror. Decision-makers are generally the targets of hacktivism. 
Black hat hacking on the other hand is done with the explicit purpose of achieving a 
personal gain (Lachow, 2009:439).  Cyber-espionage is defined by Lachow as the 
utilisation of “information technology systems to gather information about an 
organisation or society that is considered secret or confidential without the permission 
of the holder of the information” (2009:440). A wide range of actors such as groups, 
companies and nation-states can conduct cyber-espionage. In regards to the cyber-
threat of cybercrime there is no widely accepted definition. However, most definitions 
of cybercrime, place their focus on the utilisation of networks or computers in 
facilitating crimes such as spamming fraud, data theft and child pornography. In 
defining the cyber-threat of information war, it refers to undisguised and offensive 
attacks by nation-states in order to deliberately disrupt or damage information and 





and Ronfeldt, 1997:28-30). Despite identifying these different methods of cyber-
threats, it is still easy for the boundaries between each of these methods still blur 
together. Additionally, it is of importance to note that a cyber-attack is not limited to 
using only one of these methods of attack at a time. It is therefore better to use the term 
cyber-attack when referring to a cyber-threat evolving into an actual attack. Thus, for 




Terrorist attacks by terrorist groups or organisations, against oil and gas companies 
have traditionally been carried out using physical methods. Terrorist groups attack 
through the use of weapons, bombs and infiltrating the oil and gas plantations, holding 
workers hostage and in the worst circumstances killing the plantation’s workers. 
However, these methods of attack are slowly changing and being replaced. Physical 
terrorist attacks will not completely cease to be utilised but will continue to occur. The 
new rising trend of cyber-attacks will become the dominant method used in terrorist 
attacks against the oil and gas industry. The rising threat of cyber-attack was confirmed 
27 years ago in the following statement: “tomorrow’s terrorist may be able to do more 
damage with a keyboard than with a bomb” (National Academy of Sciences, 1991:7). 
Additionally, Statoil, an international energy company and the world’s largest offshore 
operator, conducted a full risk assessment following the devastating attack at the In 
Amenas facility.  
 
The purpose of this assessment was to determine if there was a future risk of such an 
attack occurring. Instead the assessment determined that cyber-security attacks would 
be the new long-term threat that oil and gas operations will face - not physical threats 
(Boman, 2015). In order to fully understand the threat that cyber-attacks pose it is 
necessary to look at the literature on cyber-attack’s influence and whether it has an 
influence on specific industries. Additionally, it will be necessary to look at the 
operating systems within oil and gas companies and establish what the rapid 
development of technology has had an influence on. With technology rapidly 
developing industries are becoming increasingly digitalised and as such this puts them 





to a push for more integration in the business environment and the oil and gas industries 
operating systems are no exception. 
 
Within the oil and gas industry industrial control systems play a vital role. The 
industrial control system (ICS), Operational Technology (OT) Network, plays the 
largest role in automisation which consists of various industrial automation and control 
systems which are as follows: SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition), DCS 
(distributed control systems), PLC (Programmemable Logical Controllers), OPC (Open 
Platform Communications) servers, and other critical components (Polyakov, 2016).  
These OT automation and control systems are responsible for controlling and 
monitoring physical processes in the oil and gas industry. Ernst and Young published 
an assessment on the threat of cyber-attacks on the oil and gas industry that stated that 
cyber-threats to these OT systems could result in “production stoppages, a decrease in 
product quality or even destruction of infrastructure” (Ernst & Young, 2014). 
 
Historically a majority of these OT networks have been isolated from the Internet and 
office networks through the use of air-gaped computers. This allowed for the OT 
systems to utilise proprietary hardware, software and communication tools in isolation 
from office networks and provided oil and gas companies with a strong protection 
against attacks. However, as time has progressed this level of protection has been 
removed as a result of the push for more business insight (Ernst & Young, 2014). This.  
combined with the “requirements for remote network access and the spread of hardware 
and software from traditional information technology (IT)”, such as Windows based 
platforms, has resulted in oil and gas companies integrating their control systems and 
their enterprise IT systems (Ernst & Young, 2014). All of which provides the oil and 
gas industry with greater flexibility but introduces a serious risk through an increased 
vulnerability through OT systems by providing a possible access point for cyber 
criminals to infiltrate networks and take control of the OT systems. The rise of cyber-
threats and the creation of the vulnerabilities within the OT systems allow for cyber-
attacks to be carried out against the oil and gas industry from a distance but still have 






In Ernst and Young’s assessment, they referred to the individuals that carry out these 
attacks as being hacktivists (Ernst & Young, 2014). These hacktivists are not concerned 
with the acquisition of company data but are rather seeking to create highly visible 
incidents that will embarrass or harm the companies involved in the oil and gas industry 
(Ernst & Young, 2014). These outcomes can be more visible in the manner of macro 
risk but remain a micro risk as cyber-attacks are industry specific. The outcome of a 
cyber-attack is dependent on the method of attack used. According to an article 
published by Forbes, if a cyber-attack is successful it can result in some of the following 
outcomes:  plant shutdown, equipment damage, utilities interruption, production circle 
shutdown, inappropriate product quality, undetected spills and safety measure violation 
resulting in injuries and even death (Polyakov, 2017). These cyber-attacks could 
potentially be coupled with actual physical terrorist attacks to create even greater 
damage.  
 
In an article published in the Pipeline & Gas Journal the top ten cyber-security 
vulnerabilities were identified as follows: 
 
1. Lack of cybersecurity awareness 
2. Remote work during operations and maintenance 
3. Using standard IT products with known vulnerabilities in the production 
environment 
4. A limited cybersecurity culture among vendors, suppliers and contractors 
5. Insufficient separation of data networks 
6. The use of mobile devices and storage units including smartphones 
7. Data networks between on- and off- shore facilities 
8. Insufficient physical security of data rooms, cabinets, etc. 
9. Vulnerable software 
10. Out-dated and ageing control systems in facilities 
(Top ten cybersecurity vulnerabilities for oil and gas, 2016:26). 
 
ABI Research expected that by 2018 oil and gas companies would be spending roughly 
US$1.87 billion on cyber-security alone (Polyakov, 2017). Despite the predicted 
increased expenditure on cyber-security and the vulnerabilities identified, the oil and 





understanding. In a report published by the European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security (ENISA), they confirmed in their key findings that there are just 
a few specialists, within the oil and gas industry, who have an in-depth understanding 
of cyber-security and the complexities of OT systems (European Union Agency for 
Network and Information Security, 2017). In their report ENISA also found that not 
that many companies within the oil and gas industry remain, which places the most 
importance on their physical infrastructure instead of the security of their computer 
process systems and data. This, despite the fact that oil and gas companies such as 
Statoil are starting to identify that cyber-attacks are going to be the greatest threat to 
the oil and gas industry. Lastly, the ENISA report highlights that there still is a lack of 
good practices identified to deal with this threat and there is a lack of visibility in terms 
of information sharing within the oil and gas industry (European Union Agency for 
Network Information Security, 2017). This falls in line with the fact that there is still 
currently a lack of academic literature that covers the risk management and mitigation 
of cyber-attacks against the oil and gas industry.  
 
Despite the lack of literature on risk management and mitigation, cyber-attacks against 
the oil and gas companies have been occurring for a long time. One of the most 
prominent cyber-attacks against the oil and gas industry, thus far, occurred in 2012 
when Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s state-run oil giant, was hacked. Thirty thousand 
of Saudi Aramco’s Windows-based computers were wiped clean by a self-replicating 
virus and was replaced by an image of a burning American Flag (Polyakov, 2016; 
Bronk & Tikk-Ringas, 2013:81).  This attack had an effect on Aramco’s business 
processes and some of the drilling and production data were lost.  Aramco managed to 
clean the affected workstations and return to normal business, but it took roughly two 
weeks for Aramco to fully recover from this attack.  The fact that the virus, which was 
dubbed Shamoon, was able to gain access to industrial control systems of the 
computers, which are involved in the drilling and refining operation, indicated how 
important it is for companies to utilise spare computers for business operations and the 





companies’ operations.9 The Cutting Sword of Justice claimed responsibility for this 
attack and stated that they aimed to stop oil production and its flow into the international 
market because of the Al-Saud regime utilising Muslim oil resources.  
 
While the attack on Saudi Aramco is the most prominent attack, it is not the only one. 
While physical terrorism generally takes place in politically unstable regions, it is 
possible for cyber-attacks to occur in regions that are not characterised by political 
upheaval, instability and conflict. Cyber-attacks can be conducted from great distances 
and do not require political instability to occur. Cyber-attacks are capable of attacking 
oil and gas companies in countries where there is political stability and relative peace, 
such as Norway. The second case occurred in 2014 where dozens of oil and gas 
companies in Norway were targeted by a cyber-attack, including Statoil one of 
Europe’s biggest suppliers of energy. There is limited literature available on this event 
and it is mostly covered in news reports.  Statoil was considered to be the main target 
of the attack (Leyden, 2014). However, the method used in the attack is unknown and 
the extent of the influence that the hack had also remains unknown (Bryne, 2014). 
Despite the lack of information available this attack is useful in showing that oil and 
gas companies in political stable regions are also likely to be targets of cyber-attacks. 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
To conclude, this literature review sought to provide the conceptualisation and the key 
concepts in looking at risk mitigation and management of cyber-attacks against the oil 
and gas industry. The theoretical grounding of rational choice theory, problem solving 
and decision-making provided the understanding of how decisions and problems are 
made though rational thought in using the information available to them. The 
conceptualisation of risk, political risk, political-security risk, macro-and micro risk 
with the focus being on industry-or firm-specific risks helped to further develop an 
understanding. The literature that exists on risk management and mitigation and 
 
9 The upstream sector is in control of searching for potential underground or underwater crude oil and 
natural gas fields, drilling of exploratory wells, and subsequently drilling and operating the wells that 
recover and bring the crude oil and/or raw natural gas to the surface (Polyakov, 2016). The downstream 
sector is responsible for refining of petroleum crude oil and the processing and purifying of raw natural 





terrorism were also conceptualised and looked at in order to understand their 
significance to the oil and gas industry and also with the emergence in literature of the 
new trend of cyber-attacks to the oil and gas industry. In the case of risk management 
and mitigation, Lambrechts and Blomquist identified that there has been little effort put 
towards political risk management strategies. 
 
Lastly, the conceptualisation of cyber-attack was provided in order to establish if there 
was literature that addressed risk mitigation and management of cyber-attacks against 
the oil and gas industry. This is a very new field of study and is still developing. As 
result, there was a lack of literature that specifically addresses risk management and 
mitigation of cyber-attacks against oil and gas companies. There are news reports that 
cover the attacks but despite this there has not been a lot of academic writing on the 
topic. Despite this, there is recognition within the literature that is available that cyber-
attacks are going to become one of the biggest threats that oil and gas companies face. 
With the recognition of this threat there is a lack of understanding and people qualified 
to manage and address this threat. The vulnerabilities that exist within the oil and gas 
























The aim of this chapter is to examine the influence cyber-threats are having on the oil 
and gas industry. By examining the influence of cyber-threats on the oil and gas 
industry this chapter will also seek to identify vulnerabilities that are indicators of risk. 
Identifying these vulnerabilities which put oil and gas companies at risk of being the 
target of a cyber-attack, is crucial to oil and gas companies being able to develop 
strategies or propose methods to manage and mitigate the risk of cyber-threats.  In order 
to decipher the influence of cyber-threats on the oil and gas industry, this chapter will 
start off by looking at how technology, automation and the introduction of the Internet 
of Things (IoT).  Looking at this facet of the oil and gas industry is crucial to 
understanding why this industry is vulnerable to cyber-threats as they are the source of 
the creation of these vulnerabilities. Following the development of this understanding 
of how these vulnerabilities were introduced into the oil and gas industry, the second 
section of this chapter will seek to answer the main question of this research study by 
identifying these vulnerabilities. Due to the vast and complex environment of the oil 
and gas industry in order to identify the vulnerabilities, the second section will be 
divided into the three sectors of the oil and gas industry: upstream, midstream and 
downstream. By dividing the second section into these three sectors it will help 
establish how within each sector different vulnerabilities to cyber-threats exist.  
 
3.2 Automation and the Internet of Things (IoT) in the Oil and Gas Industry 
The utilisation of automation within different industries and companies is not a new 
concept. Automation started as far back as the 18th century during the industrial 
revolution, which saw machinery being utilised to reduce the need for human 
assistance. Automation has only increased and grown, as technology has rapidly 
improved, and is now being utilised in numerous industries such as the car automotive 
industry, electronics manufacturing, medical industry and the food industry. The oil 
and gas industry have been slower in moving towards automation. The oil and gas 
industry started feeling immense pressure around 2016 to move towards even more 





2014 and creating the need to cut costs (Clark, Abraham & Goyal, 2016: 1; Automation 
in Oil and Gas industry, 2018; Thomson, 2017). Automation in the oil and gas industry 
has existed traditionally through Industrial Control Systems (ICS) such as Distributed 
Control Systems (DCS)10, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)11, 
Safety Instrumented System (SIS)12 and Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES)13. 
Automation helps the industry to ensure safe and reliable conditions. Over the last few 
years, there has been an increased reliance on automation; reliance has actually doubled 
in the past decade alone (Automation in Oil and Gas Industry, 2018). One of the primary 
reasons for oil and gas companies increasing their reliance on automation is that it cuts 
costs. 
 
As mentioned above, the oil and gas industry faced a weak demand and low prices 
during the period from 2014 to 2016 and thus needed to find ways in which to cut costs. 
This new market reality facing the oil and gas industry resulted in massive layoffs as 
well as facility closures and cutting costs in all areas that they could. Becoming more 
reliant on automation, allowed oil and gas companies to continue to complete the 
process without delay while being able to increase productivity within budget. Oil and 
gas companies are going to become increasingly reliant on automation. DNV GL, 
technical advisors to the Oil and Gas industry, support these findings as they concluded 
in a recent report that the future of technology in the oil and gas industry lies in 
automation and operating digitally (DNV GL, 2016:58). Automation is changing as the 
industry is starting to demand a more integrated system, which has multiple 
functionalities. Oil and gas companies are rapidly seeking to integrate robotics, 
analytics and IoT (Mittal, Slaughter and Zonneveld, 2017:2).   
 
10 DCS are instrumental to controlling the complex production process. DCS supervises and coordinates 
each of the various controllers used in a plant system.  
11 SCADA is a control system that uses computers, networked data communications and graphical 
interfaces for high-level process supervisory management. SCADA also makes use of peripheral 
deceives such as programmable programmable logic controllers (PLC) to interact with plant processes 
and machinery 
12 SIS are hardware and software controls that are used in critical process systems. SIS is primarily used 
in processing facilities such as refineries to provide protection. 
13  MES is a computerised system which is utilised in manufacturing to track and document the 






IoT refers to the ability to connect any device which has an on and off switch to the 
Internet. IoT platforms would create the ability to integrate communications, sensing 
and analytical capabilities. The core enabling technologies of IoT have improved in the 
last five years and developed enough that it is now being widely adopted by different 
industries, including the oil and gas industry (Slaughter, Bean & Mittal, 2015:2). IoT 
platforms create the ability for every system and every plant, at every location to be 
connected to one another as well as enabling remote monitoring that helps limit the 
danger to workers. While the integrated systems of IoT may hold many benefits, such 
as increased connectivity and driving value creation, it still comes at a cost. Automation 
through integrated IoT systems is allowing oil and gas companies to become even more 
vulnerable to cyber-breaches.  
 
As was stated in chapter 2, oil and gas companies have been targets of cyber-attacks 
for years already. In the last few years alone, the oil and gas industry has seen the nature, 
scale and severity of cyber-attacks evolve and dramatically increase. According to a 
study conducted by Symantec in 2015, 43 percent of international energy companies 
were successfully hacked (Deering & Sweeney, 2017:65). Ernst and Young published 
a report, which examined the rise of IoT and how it was changing the threat landscape 
of the oil and gas industry with the introduction of cyber-threats (Digitization and cyber 
disruption, 2017). Through information gathered by Ernst and Young the report was 
able to establish just how much more the oil and gas industry is affected by the 
introduction of cyber-threats in comparison to any other industry, which is displayed in 




























(Source: Digitization and cyber disruption in oil and gas, 2017)14 
 
Figure 1 shows just how disproportionately the oil and gas industry is influenced in 
comparison to other industries. While forty-two percent of all other sectors are targets 
of cyber-attacks seeking to steal intellectual property or data the oil and gas sector, in 
comparison is the target of sixty-five percent of such attacks. As will be established in 
the next section intellectual property and data are a vital and expensive part of the 
upstream sector. Figure 1 identifies an issue that leaves the oil and gas sector vulnerable 
to the risk of a cyber-attack, which is out-dated information security systems or 
architecture. While this is a factor that would affect other sectors only forty-eight 
percent suffer from this while sixty-five percent of the oil and gas sector is influenced 
by this vulnerability. This figure acts to ultimately display an overall issue and that is 
the low cyber-maturity of the oil and gas industry despite statistics and findings such 
as those shown in figure 1. 
 
 
14 Spelling errors found in figure 1 could not be altered due to it being acquired from a secondary source 





While the oil and gas industry does have really low cyber-maturity, this maturity does 
tend to vary from sector to sector.  Boards of oil and gas companies present a fairly 
limited strategic appreciation for the issue that cyber-threats pose.  Specialists and 
researchers, who have a long history of working in both energy and cyberspace argue 
that oil and gas companies are struggling to keep up with defending their organisations 
from the more advanced methods of attack and new generation malware (Deering & 
Sweeney, 2017:65). The sheer size of the oil and gas industry is yet another factor which 
makes it difficult to secure against cyber-threats. Networks of pipelines, exploration 
and production and refineries can stretch across continents. Not to mention, each 
operation in the industry is made up of thousands upon thousands of automated systems 
and IoT devices. In contrast, a hacker merely needs to identify a small number of 
security flaws in order to successfully exploit a system.  This is just one harsh reality 
facing the oil and gas industry in trying to secure itself against cyber-threats. On the 
other hand, some oil and gas companies are utilising out-dated networks, which were 
not designed to handle the new security challenges facing the industry. According to 
cyber-security consultants a large number of companies use networks run by Windows 
XP; a 2003 system that is no longer updated by Microsoft (Eaton, 2017a). Some 
companies are using even older versions of Windows operating systems and in rare 
cases a few oil and gas companies still utilise MS-DOS.15 The utilization of out-dated 
networks indicates that some oil and gas companies are not taking cyber-threats, posed 
by old network systems and the influence that a cyber-attack can have on overall 
security, seriously.  
 
It is clear that automation has already made the oil and gas industry vulnerable to cyber-
threats and IoT has only exacerbated that vulnerability. Each value stream in the oil and 
gas industry, from upstream right down to the petrol pump in the downstream, 
possesses weaknesses that make them vulnerable to cyber-threats. It is important to 
look at each sector of the supply chain to establish which areas are targets due to their 
vulnerability, which form of cyber-threat would be used against it and what influence 
a potential attack could have on the sector. Figure 2 displays the flow of the different 
 
15 MS-DOS is an operation system used by personal computers and developed in the 1980s. It acted as 





operations of the oil and gas industry in the value chain. Each of these operations falls 
under a different sector of the oil and gas stream. In order to identify the vulnerabilities, 
the next sections will look at each sector of the oil and gas industry individually in order 
to combat the complexity of the oil and gas industry. Each sector will start with a brief 
overview in order to understand the operations specific to each sector before taking a 
deeper look at identifying the vulnerabilities that are indicators of risk. This section of 
this chapter will start with the upstream sector as it is where operations of the oil and 
gas companies start.  
 














(Source: The Cyber Security Threat to the Oil and Gas Industry, 2017). 
 
3.3 Overview of Cyber-Threats to the Upstream Sector of the Oil and Gas Industry 
Exploration and Production (E&P) or the upstream sector of oil and gas industry is 
highly vulnerable to cyber-attacks. According to research, conducted by Rick and Iyer, 
the upstream sector is considered to be the most vulnerable to cyber-attacks (2016:2). 
This vulnerability stems from the upstream sectors’ status as critical infrastructure 
along with a complex ecosystem made-up of computation, networking and physical 
operational processes that are spread around the world (Mittal et al., 2017:3). As a 











surface refers to the total sum of vulnerabilities in any computing device or device 
which is accessible to a hacker. Attack vector refers to the path or ways a hacker will 
use in order to gain access to computers or network services to carry out an attack.  
Another factor that contributes to the vulnerability of the upstream sector is the 
contrasting priorities between an oil and gas companies’ operation technology and 
information technology (IT) departments. These contrasting priorities create a clash of 
objectives in the upstream sector of safety versus security. Operation systems, 
especially those closest to drilling and well sites, have the priority of ensuring that 
devices such as sensors and programmemable logic controllers can perform tasks, are 
available and can operate twenty-four seven. Thus, availability is their highest priority 
for operation technology followed by integrity and confidentiality.  While IT systems 
focus on processes such as resource planning, their priority is confidentiality, while 
availability is the last. In other words, these two aspects have completely opposite 
priority focuses.  
 
More security challenges face the upstream sector as a result of the technical setup of 
ICS. The technical setup stems from the fact that ICS are made up of different service 
providers, which use different technologies and have different IT security standards 
(Mittal et al., 2017:4). Another issue, which adds to the diversity problem, is the life 
cycle of wells and ICS that make it very difficult to standardize, upgrade, and retrofit 
each of these systems frequently. With the introduction of connected technology, 
through using IoT and connecting the upstream operations in real time, the sector has 
opened an entirely new landscape of attack vectors for hackers. IoT systems are being 
utilised at field level and in doing so the upstream sector has taken cyber-threats right 
to the frontline of its operations. As the upstream sector is continuing to adopt these 
integrated technologies, it is ahead of the sectors’ cyber-security abilities. This results 
in the upstream sector’s core operation imperatives of safety for works, reliability of 
operations and creation of new value to be at risk due to the threat of cyber-attacks. 
 
While everything discussed above provides a general perspective of the cyber 
vulnerabilities in the upstream sector, it is important to look at each of the different 
stages of the upstream sector (exploration, development and production). A focus on 





exist, as well as identify which operation in the upstream is the most vulnerable to 
cyber-threats. The vulnerabilities to cyber-threats in each industry need to be secured 
but identifying which stage is the most critical and risk prone stage will show 
companies where they need to start first. Figure three, pictured below, provides a basic 
overview of each of the operations in the different stages and their vulnerability to 
cyber-attacks and what the severity of these attacks could be. A more detailed analysis 
of figure three will be provided in the sections below. Identifying the vulnerabilities of 
each operation will aid in showing at which stage security needs to be prioritised. In 
general, identifying where the vulnerabilities exist is beneficial in helping to develop 
plans of managing and mitigating the threat cyber-attacks pose. 
 
3.3.1 Identifying Cyber-threat Vulnerabilities in the Exploration stage 
The exploration stage is made up of three separate operations: seismic imaging, 
geological surveys and exploratory and appraisal drilling. Vulnerabilities exist in each 
of these operations. Generally, the exploration stage in the upstream sector is ranked as 
having the lowest vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks and has a low severity impact as can 
be seen in Figure 3.   
 





















Source: (Mittal et al., 2017:7). 
 
The low rating of seismic imaging and geological surveys is the result of the fact that 
both these operations have a very simple ecosystem. The simplicity of their ecosystem 
stems from the fact that very few vendors are used in this stage, as the top geological 
vendors take up to fifty to sixty percent of the market and provide a wide range of 
services (Mittal et al., 2017:6). Another factor, which aids in the low vulnerability in 
the exploration stage, is that these two operations have a closed data acquisition system. 
A closed data acquisition system means data captured about the rock formations is done 
through magnetics, geophones and hydrophones. The data captured by these devices is 
typically given to oil and gas companies through physical tapes or it is processed 
through propriety models. By sending physical tapes it keeps the data disconnected 
from being sent through e-mail, which would provide the opportunity for the e-mail to 
be hacked and the data stolen. The third operation in the exploration and production 
stage is exploratory and appraisal drilling, which in comparison to the previous two 
operations has a far higher risk profile.  
 
Unlike the previous two operations, exploratory and appraisal drilling is considered to 
have a high vulnerability to cyber-attacks and the impact may have a high severity. 
Exploratory and appraisal drilling follows seismic and geographical surveys and its 
findings are key to an oil and gas company’s decision on whether or not they will 
continue with exploration and appraisal activities. Exploratory drilling will try to see if 
there actually is a presence of oil and gas. If there is a presence, then appraisal drilling 
will follow. Appraisal drilling utilises delineation wells in order to determine the extent 
of the reserves and can take a few years to complete and is a costly process. The data 
obtained through appraisal drilling is further analysed to decide if it is economically 
viable for an oil and gas company to produce oil from the reservoir. If the reservoir is 
considered to be economically viable, models are built in order to determine the volume 
of the reserve that development drilling can access. This data forms oil and gas 





the risk of cyber-attack (Mittal et al., 2017:6). An example of such an attack is that of 
the Night Dragon. 
 
The Night Dragon was a cyber-attack, which was carried out over a period of roughly 
three years from 2008 to 2011 (Mittal et al., 2017:6; Deering & Sweeney, 2017:65). 
Five major oil and gas companies, including ExxonMobil, BP PLC and Chevron, and 
other large oil companies were targeted in the attack. Hackers discovered vulnerabilities 
on the different firms’ internet-facing websites and the attack took advantage of these 
vulnerabilities. Once the cyber-attack had gained access to the proxy server the 
attackers sought to disabled proxy-settings in order to gain access to specific files of 
interest (Mittal et al., 2017:6). The files of interest were focused on proprietary 
information on operational oil and gas field production systems, financial transactions 
and the exploration and bidding data from oil and gas companies (McAfee Foundstone 
Professional Services and McAfee Labs, 2011:7).  The attackers, in some instances, 
collected data on different SCADA systems. The methods and tools used in this 
corporate espionage attack were unsophisticated, which allowed them to go undetected. 
As a result, it aided in keeping the attackers from being detected by the standard security 
software and network policies used by the various oil and gas companies. Chevron 
eventually admitted to not having been aware of the successful compromises of their 
data systems (Deering & Sweeney, 2017:66).  Insufficient cyber-security on the 
different companies’ websites is what put these companies at a greater risk of cyber-
attacks. The Night Dragon attack presents a challenge facing the oil and gas industry in 
their management and mitigation of cyber-attacks as it shows, despite having security 
software, it was still not enough to protect their data.  
 
Another challenge identified by the Night Dragon attack is even though exploration 
operations are classified as having a low vulnerability to the risk of cyber-attacks it can 
still be a target of an attack. This means that even if an operation or sector is considered 
to have a low vulnerability it does not mean it is safe. As such even though oil and gas 
companies will seek to prioritise the most vulnerable operations, those with lower 
vulnerability will need to be just as much of a priority. Another factor to consider is 
that the relatively low vulnerability can change in the near future as oil and gas 





information on a supercomputer (Mittal et al., 2007:6-7). This will create a higher level 
of vulnerability to cyber-attacks in the exploration stage and will have a greater impact 
on an oil and gas company. The second challenge exploration operations put forward 
is the matter of attacks taking place and going undetected, as was seen in the Night 
Dragon attack. Being unable to detect attacks or on-going attacks hinders any oil and 
gas companies’ ability to properly protect against them. Additionally, an inability to 
detect attacks will make creating risk mitigation and management plans even more 
difficult.  
 
3.3.2 Identifying Cyber-threat Vulnerabilities in the Development stage 
Unlike the exploration stage, the development stage of the upstream sector has a higher 
exposure to cyber-threats. Figure 2 indicates that the process of developmental drilling 
has a very high to extreme vulnerability to cyber-attacks and the severity of an attack 
would be extreme. The vulnerability to threats, which face the development stage, are 
similar to those facing exploratory and appraisal drilling but it has a far larger cyber-
attack vector (Mittal, 2017:7). The larger attack vector of the development stage is 
caused by a variety of factors such as its higher drilling activities and the complexity 
of having to monitor operations above and below ground. Additionally, the 
development stage has a vastly more complex ecosystem than that of the exploration 
stage. This complex ecosystem is made up of different engineering firms, equipment 
and material from various suppliers as well as drillers and service firms. The complex 
ecosystem creates vulnerabilities to the risk of cyber-attacks as each of the different 
firms, suppliers and vendors utilise different methods of security to protect their 
products. These factors merely ensure that it is even more difficult for oil and gas 
companies to create risk mitigation and management plans. 
 
Originally it was the diverse interests and objectives of all the different stakeholders in 
the development stage that created one of the biggest challenges to operators in creating 
a single cohesive protocol regarding cyber-security. This challenge was coupled with 
systemic concerns regarding rigs and/or new devices being used that might already be 
infected with malware entering into this already complex and challenging ecosystem 
(Hsieh, 2015). The malware, which already exists in these rigs and devices, goes 





new rigs or devices. However, cyber-security tests are not done on the rigs being built 
or even once they are completed only the normal routine functional acceptance tests 
(FATs) and site acceptance tests (SAT). This points to the lack of concern and 
awareness of the threat that a cyber-attack poses to the development stage and the oil 
and gas industry as a whole. 
 
The lack of concern for and awareness of the threat regarding malware existing on rigs 
is the result of the belief that these systems were designed around an isolated network 
(Mittal et al., 2017:8). The lack of concern and awareness given to the threat of cyber-
attacks is another challenge facing the oil and gas industry in developing management 
and mitigation strategies to combat this new and rising threat. As well as being a 
challenge to the development of mitigation and management strategies, the lack of 
awareness and concern is one of the most significant vulnerabilities facing the oil and 
gas industry when it comes to cyber-threats. One of the reasons why these cyber-
security tests are not run is that the oil and gas industries considered physical barriers 
to reaching rigs and the natural defence of miles of ocean (mainly in the case of offshore 
rigs) to be enough of a barrier to keep rigs safe from cyber-attacks. This natural barrier 
is no longer enough or rather the strength of its protection is being reduced. The 
introduction of real-time operations allows for data collected on an oil rig to be accessed 
from anywhere in the world. The ability to access these rigs from anywhere in the world 
has taken the barrier away for hackers making oil rigs vulnerable and putting them onto 
hackers’ radars. The consequences of the removal of the natural barrier has already seen 
attacks on oil rigs occurring.  
 
According to Wagstaff, in 2014 hackers managed to tilt an oil rig forcing it to be shut 
down (2017; Mittal et al., 2017:8).  Four years earlier, there was another incident 
involving a rig, which had been en route from South Korea to South America and was 
so riddled with malware that it was forced to shut down for nineteen days before the 
malware could be removed (Wagstaff, 2014; Mittal et al., 2017:8). These attacks act as 
indicators that development operations need to find and/or create a more 
comprehensive plan in securing its operations from cyber-attacks. Companies operating 
in the oil and gas industry can no longer rely on traditional security plans or their 






3.3.3 Identifying Cyber-threat Vulnerabilities in the Production stage 
The production stage of the upstream sector operates with the purposes of extracting 
hydrocarbons and separating the mixture of liquid hydrocarbons, gas, water and solids 
from one another. Production also requires the removal of the constituents, which are 
non-saleable, and the selling of the liquid hydrocarbons and gas. The production stage 
is considered to have the highest vulnerability to the risk of cyber-attacks out of all 
three operations in the upstream sector. Figure 2 indicates that production has an 
extreme vulnerability to cyber-attacks with a very high to extreme severity impact. The 
vulnerability of the production stage is mainly a result of the legacy assets that this 
stage uses. The legacy assets are older assets used in operations and were not created 
with concerns for cyber-security in mind as such they have had to be retrofitted and 
patched sporadically over the years (Mittal et al., 2017:8-9).  In addition to the 
vulnerability these legacy assets pose, there is also a lack of monitoring tools that exist 
on these networks. In 2017, it was estimated that of the forty-four percent of facilities, 
which operate offshore worldwide, less than half of these oil and gas companies use the 
necessary monitoring tools on their networks (Heidar, 2016). Only fourteen percent of 
these companies have a fully operational Security Operations Centre (SOC). Without a 
SOC it means that even if companies conduct monitoring twenty-four seven and there 
is not an experienced team in place to analyse the data essentially, this makes the 
monitoring taking place ineffective and acts to indicate another vulnerability facing the 
oil and gas industry: a lack of educated employees who know how to deal with cyber-
threats (Heidar, 2016). 
 
Another factor, which intensifies the vulnerability which cyber-threats pose to the 
security of oil and gas companies, is its expansive operation environment. This factor 
is exacerbated by the fact that the role of instrument vendors has changed from being 
system suppliers to system aggregators. In 2017, it was estimated that in the US alone 
there were over twenty-five thousand producing wells (Mittal et al., 2017:8). Each of 
these twenty-five thousand rigs have their own diverse set of ICS’. A lot of the ICS 
systems come from different vendors, which means each one has been built with a 
different configuration of vulnerabilities (Black Hat Amsterdam: Oil and Gas cyber-





times. These varied maintenance schedules raise another aspect in which integrated 
systems create vulnerability in the oil and gas industry. While one ICS of an integrated 
system might have had routine maintenance to address vulnerabilities and made it more 
secure it can still be targeted by hackers gaining access through another part of the 
integrated system which has unaddressed vulnerabilities.  
 
Burner Management System is the perfect example of how a system used in the both 
exploration and production operations in the upstream sector can be breached in a 
cyber-attack. In a presentation presented by Alexander Polyakov and Mathieu Geli, 
titled Cyber-security for oil and gas industries: how hackers can manipulate oil stocks, 
they stated that Burner management systems (BMS) are considered to be one of the 
areas that can be most easily manipulated by hackers. BMS performs vital safety 
functions in the process of separation of liquid hydrocarbons, gas, water and solids from 
one another. The main purpose of BMS is to allow and to ensure the safe-start-up, 
operation, and shutdown of the Fired Heater (Cybersecurity for Oil and Gas Industries: 
How Hackers Can Manipulate Oil Stocks, 2016). There are multiple risks, including 
the risk of an explosion if hackers were to gain unauthorised access to BMS. One of the 
easiest ways for hackers to attack BMS is to turn off the purge, which can burn and 
damage the equipment.16 Turning off the purge can in a more severe case result in an 
explosion. BMS is merely one example of a system, in the production stage, being a 
target of a cyber-attack because of its inherent vulnerabilities. 
 
3.4 Overview of Cyber-threats to the Midstream Sector of the Oil and Gas 
Industry 
There has been a lack of information regarding how cyber-threats affect the oil and gas 
industry, this is particularly true for the midstream sector operations. Very few reports 
exist on how operations in the midstream sector are affected by cyber-attacks. There is 
a reason for the lack of reports, as will be seen when it comes to cyber-threats to oil 
tankers. The midstream sector is also a very hard sector to define. This confusion in 
 
16 Following firing periods deposits of coal and/or oil need to be purged from the system in order to 
reduce the concentration of flammable gas in the system. It needs to be done to ensure that no ignitable 





defining the operations the midstream sector is responsible for stems from the fact that 
sometimes they can be included in upstream and downstream operations. Most 
commonly it is understood that the midstream sector is responsible for the collection 
and transportation of crude oil and natural gas from the upstream sector to the 
downstream operations. Once crude oil has been refined into its different products it 
can be stored at oil depots (also referred to as tank farms, installations or oil terminals). 
From the oil depot the midstream sector is responsible for overseeing that the refined 
products are distributed to downstream distributers and consumers. The midstream 
sector company usually transports oil through the use of pipelines, rail, barges, oil 
tankers or trucks. Each method of transportation used in the midstream sector faces its 
own unique vulnerabilities to the risk of cyber-threats. Each of the vulnerabilities need 
to be looked at individually as these cyber-threats can only be dealt with independently 
by the businesses or companies that are supplying the services of transportation and/or 
storage. 
 
3.4.1 Identifying Cyber-threat Vulnerabilities in the Distribution Sector 
The infrastructure of pipelines has become increasingly more dependent on digital 
systems. This dependency has made pipelines a ripe target for cyber-attacks (Krauss, 
2018). Control valves, pressure monitors and various forms of automated monitoring 
devices are used to observe theses pipelines all of which are connected to wireless 
networks.  In the US for example there is an estimated two and a half million miles of 
oil, gas and chemical pipelines, which crisscross the country. According to cyber-
security expert Andrew R. Lee if one of the valves or pressure monitors is breached by 
a cyber-attack, delivery services could be disrupted or it could be far more catastrophic 
(Krauss, 2018). If pipelines are tampered with it could result in explosions, oil spills, 
or fires all of which would put property, the environment and human lives at risk. As 
pipelines are one of the main methods of transportation that connect the upstream to 
the downstream, if there is a disruption at an individual pipeline it has the potential to 
disrupt operations in both the upstream and downstream sectors. The vulnerability of 







In 2008 a pipeline exploded in Refahiye, Turkey. Investigators at the time determined 
that the explosion was the result of mechanical failure due to oversight of the Turkish 
government’s supervisors. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a pro-Kurdish 
militant group, with a history of pipeline bombings, claimed responsibility for the 
attack. Western intelligence agencies did not believe the PKK were actually cable of 
such an attack. Following further investigation, however it was reported in 2014 that 
the explosion was actually the result of a cyber-attack (Hsieh, 2015; Robertson & Riley, 
2014).  The investigation conducted by the US identified that the hackers behind the 
attack had breached the pipeline’s surveillance systems and valve stations. The hackers 
had then shut down the alarms systems and super pressurised the crude oil inside the 
pipeline, which resulted in the pipeline exploding. Recently four of the US’ natural-gas 
pipeline operators were forced to temporarily shut down their computer 
communications with their customers for a week due to a cyber-attack on a shared data 
network (Krauss, 2018). Despite the shut-down, the cyber-attack did not stall gas 
service during that time. The companies targeted stated that they shut down their 
communication with customers merely as a precaution. Nevertheless, it remained 
unclear if the hackers had actually managed to steal customer data or not. Oneok, 
Energy Transfer Partners, Boardwalk Pipeline Partners and Eastern Shore Natural Gas, 
all of whom are leaders in the pipeline industry all reported to have suffered from 
communication system interruptions. 
 
When it comes to oil depots, they are typically located close to oil refineries or close to 
where marine oil tankers are easily able to offload their cargo. In comparison to other 
operations in the oil and gas industry, oil depots are relatively unsophisticated. In many 
oil depots the same types of tanks and pipelines in use have been used for a very long 
time. Utilising older equipment can at times pose more of a risk to cyber-attacks than 
newer equipment; the storage of oil at depots is no exception. At the StocExpo Europe 
conference it was put forward that the two biggest threats facing oil depots are 
ransomware and Denial of Service (DDos). Cyber-espionage is another threat facing 
oil depots and terminals because though some may think it irrelevant to the industry, 
hackers could still utilise programmes to manipulate and/or influence the stock market 
(Storage Terminals need protection against cyber-attacks, 2018). Hackers can do this 





relatively unsophisticated there has been a greater degree of automation used within 
them than before. Tank inventory systems (TIA), Terminal management systems and 
tank management systems are examples of automation systems used at oil depots. 
TIA’s collect data from tank gauging system, which has made the task of checking the 
inventory status at oil depots far simpler. 
 
TIA’s are also very vulnerable to cyber-attacks and if the management consoles are 
breached an attack will have the ability to change alarm settings for tank levels, the 
temperature of the tanks and the pressure in the tank. If these tanks are tampered with 
by hackers, there is the potential for plant sabotage or shutdown, equipment could be 
damaged, certain legal compliances could be compromised and the safety of works and 
the surrounding areas could be at risk. In the previous mentioned presentation Cyber-
security for oil and gas industries: how hackers can manipulate oil stocks, Polyakov 
and Geli explained how hackers could gain control of TIA’s to the point where it was 
possible for a hacker to steal oil from a storage tank but the level shown in the tank 
gauge system would not change to indicate the decreased level of oil (Cybersecurity for 
Oil and Gas Industries: How Hackers Can Manipulate Oil Stocks, 2016). If hackers did 
this it would decrease the supply of oil and result in oil and gas companies losing a 
portion of their profit revenue.  
 
Oil tankers are another method of transport when it comes to moving unrefined crude 
oil from their extraction points in upstream operations to downstream refineries. Much 
like other operations throughout the oil and gas industry oil tankers have also turned to 
and started utilising technology in order to help improve production, costs and also 
reduce the delivery schedules (Wagstaff, 2014). Oil tankers according to research have 
significant holes in three key technologies which sailors use in order to navigate, which 
makes them vulnerable to the risk of cyber-threats. These three technologies are Global 
Positioning System (GPS), marine Automatic Systems (AIS), and a system used for 
viewing digital nautical charts called Electronic Chart Display and Information System 
(ECDIS). While these technologies have been identified as being vulnerable to cyber-






According to maritime cyber-security experts, companies or businesses who own the 
oil tankers often do not want to report if a cyber-attack has occurred as they do not want 
to alarm their investors, regulators or insurers (Wagstaff, 2014). As such there are very 
few reports that exist on hackers having compromised maritime cyber-security. An 
example of companies’ and businesses unwillingness’ to report attacks can be seen in 
a report published by the IT company Panda Security in 2015 titled Operation Oil 
Tanker: The Phantom Menace. The hackers utilised what is referred to as legitimate 
tools with self-made scripts, which allowed them to bypass the warnings that antivirus 
software would detect. This reaffirms the fact that traditional security software is not 
sufficient in protecting the oil and gas industry from cyber-threats.  
 
While the attack first appeared to be a non-targeted attack upon further investigation it 
was determined that it was actually a systematic and targeted attack against this specific 
sector of the oil and gas industry (Operation “Oil Tanker”: The Phantom Menace, 2015: 
7). Some believed that the purpose of the attack was to steal information and 
credentials, which the hackers could use to defraud oil brokers. The report, however, 
concluded that while the attack was targeted at oil tankers the object of the attack still 
remains unknown. Panda Security identified that a dozen or so companies had the 
system compromised by the cyber-attack. Yet none of these companies were willing to 
come forward to report the breach of their systems because they were unwilling to risk 
global attention on the vulnerabilities found in their IT security networks (Operation 
“Oil Tanker”: The Phantom Menace, 2015). The unwillingness to share such 
information poses a challenge to security companies wanting to help mitigate the 
influence of cyber-attacks. 
 
3.5 Overview of Cyber-threats to the Downstream Sector of the Oil and Gas 
Industry 
The downstream sector consists of a wide number of operations and processes. It makes 
up two sectors of the value chain of the oil and gas industry. The first sector is 
processing and refining and the second is the trading sector. The pipelines, refineries 
and tank farms located in the downstream sector all utilise ICS in order to maintain 
smooth and safe operations (Shattuck et al., 2017:3). This has led to there being a long 





of maturity when it comes to monitoring the risks of cyber-threats to these systems. The 
higher level of maturity in monitoring of risk in the downstream sector could be 
challenged with the new pressure placed on the sector with the introduction of new 
areas of optimisation and starting to extend the value of the sector beyond the refinery. 
This pressure stems from the previously mentioned slow growth of demand for oil and 
gas, which has affected the industry as a whole.  
 
As a result, new sensor technology, processing power, and remote operational 
capabilities are starting to be introduced into the downstream operations. In addition to 
these new technologies, IoT technology has also started to be introduced to the 
downstream sector. IoT technology will help the downstream sector unlock new value, 
which will be done by “eliminating redundancy, increasing uptime, and more promptly 
allocating feedstock, plant utilities, and products, while reducing costs” (Shattuck et 
al., 2017:3). While IoT does come with many benefits it does bring with it new 
challenges to security as it makes the sector vulnerable to cyber-threats.  
 
A report published by Deloitte examined the downstream sectors’ vulnerability to 
cyber-threats. The report determined that the downstream sector, as a whole, has a far 
lower level of vulnerability to cyber-attacks in comparison to the upstream sector 
operations (Shattuck et al., 2017:4). While the report made this determination, it does 
not rule out the fact that vulnerabilities to cyber-threats still do exist in the downstream 
sector. As such, it is still important for oil and gas companies to consider the probability 
of a cyber-attack and the influence one could have. Figure 4 shows the level of 
vulnerability to a cyber-attack and the level of influence that an attack could have on 
different processes and operations in the downstream sector. Figure 4 also shows why 
the downstream sector is classified as having a low vulnerability to cyber-attacks. The 
risk is very unequally distributed as a majority of the operations in the downstream 
sector are clustered as having a low to medium vulnerability to cyber-attacks and for 
any cyber-attacks to have a low to medium impact.  On the other hand, plant wide 
utilities have a very high to extreme vulnerability to cyber-attacks and can have a very 
high to extreme impact. Despite being perceived as having a low vulnerability, the 
opposite can still be argued. Companies operating downstream assets will still have a 





to looking at the cyber vulnerability in the downstream sector the findings are subject 
to change as the findings are gathered from a specific number of groups and are a 
snapshot of the time period that this research was conducted. 
 















Source: (Shattuck et al., 2017:6). 
 
As in the other sectors, the downstream sector has operational controls, and as figure 4 
shows they have high vulnerability to cyber-threats, which can have a high impact. This 
ranking stems from the fact that these operational controls are vulnerable to 
manipulation and can have the same physical and financial impacts as the upstream and 
midstream sector (Zonneveld & Slaughter, 2017:6). The downstream sector has not 
seen the introduction of many new technologies into its system, which means its 
security protocols have rarely needed to change. If a cyber-attack were to occur in the 
downstream sector the possible influences that could be felt are a loss in revenue, their 
brand could be damaged and/or there could be regulatory and compliance violations 
(Zonneveld & Slaughter, 2017:6). New operational systems are being introduced and 
are creating new vulnerabilities to cyber-threats in the downstream sector. These 





ecosystem, which as discussed previously, is an issue which makes it very hard for 
companies to develop mitigation and management strategies.  
 
This overview has provided a very brief insight into the vulnerability to the cyber-
threats facing the downstream sector. This overview does however, help confirm that 
vulnerabilities in the downstream sector exist but does not clearly define them. The 
following sections will focus on the two sectors in the oil and gas, refining and 
processing sector and the trading sector. It is important to look at each of these sectors 
individually as both of them are made up of very different operations and as such will 
have different vulnerabilities to cyber-threats. This is true for the entire oil and gas 
industry and ultimately each sector will need to develop individual plans to manage and 
mitigate the cyber-threats. As has been shown through this chapter a one size-fits-all 
cyber-security approach will not work in the downstream sector. 
 
3.5.1 Identifying Cyber-threat Vulnerabilities in the Processing and Refining 
Sector 
The basic operations of the processing and refining sector entail the transformation and 
refinement of crude oil. Crude oil requires processing and refining because without 
refinement it essentially has one use, burning for fuel. The refining and processing of 
crude oil produces many different petroleum products, the focus is largely placed on 
the conversion of heavy fuel oil into gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and other fuel. There are 
many companies engaged in the refining and processing sector, which include oil 
refineries, petroleum product distributors and petrochemical plants. While the whole 
oil and gas industry is margin-driven, this is particularly true for the downstream sector. 
If a single day of operations is lost in 100,000 barrel-per-day refineries for example, 
revenue will be reduced by an estimated US$ 5.5 million and profit by US$1.4 million 
(Shattuck, Slaughter & Zonneveld, 2017:4). Cyber-threats are placing these operations 
at risk even using traditional methods of operation, especially since the introduction of 
technology. 
 
Traditionally manual valves have been used along with safe design practices that have 
reduced the risk posed by cyber-threats. While it might reduce the risk of cyber-threats 





Processing and refining operations can continue to use manual valves and safe design 
practices to keep the risk of cyber-threats down but doing this will be at the expense of 
efficiency. As has been established, the processing and refining sector is margin-driven 
and thus will not sacrifice the efficiency provided by new technology over slower 
manual valves. An example is new sensors that are being introduced into the processing 
and refining sector. The sensor brings many benefits in value creation and efficiency, 
but it introduces new vulnerabilities to the risk of cyber-threats. Each sensor and the 
point where these new sensors are connected to monitor represent a new potential attack 
surface (Shattuck et al., 2017:5). If a hacker successfully hacks a sensor on a pipeline, 
the hacker has the ability to alter the readings of how much gas is running through, 
change the pressure of the flow in the pipeline and even tamper with the heat of 
pipelines. Any of these alterations can result in either damaged equipment, which could 
potentially lead to millions or billions of US dollars to repair or put a halt to operations. 
This presents a dilemma for the oil and gas industry as automation through new 
technology is the way forward and they cannot sacrifice efficiency to decrease this risk. 
Essentially, this indicates that in order to continually produce efficiently oil and gas 
companies will need to be willing to accept a higher level of risk associated with these 
new technologies.  
 
In 2017, a large oil refinery in the US hired the Minnesota based company RedTeam 
Security. RedTeam Security was hired for the specific purpose of testing the refinery’s 
defences against cyber-attacks (Eaton, 2017b). The first member of the team stood just 
beyond the fence line of the refinery and swung a rubber mallet into the dirt. This was 
done in order to try and produce vibrations, which would distract the refinery’s ground-
penetrating radar system. The first member did not have to do this for long as a passing 
train provided the necessary cover for the rest of the team. What is concerning is that 
such a security method, which is considered a highly sophisticated form of security, 
could so easily be breached through simple methods.  A further two members emerged 
and threw wool blankets over the barbed wire fence and climbed over it and made their 
way towards a small building which housed the facility’s computer controls. The team 
had expected to have to hack the electronic lock that had been installed to prevent lock 
picking. They had stolen and cloned badges of employees of the refinery to deal with 





to steal employees’ badges, without them noticing, is concerning as it again points to a 
lack of vigilance and awareness amongst employees about cyber-threats. It also 
indicates how cyber-attacks are not merely limited to malicious malware attacking a 
system. 
 
Despite acquiring these badges, the team actually found they did not need them. The 
door no longer sat properly in its frame creating just enough space that the team could 
just shimmy it open. The fact that a high-tech device meant to make the facility more 
secure, was easily manipulated physically due to lack of maintenance and is reason for 
concern. Ultimately, this indicates that oil and gas companies cannot become overly 
reliant on high-tech security methods as they can easily be circumvented in attempts to 
gain access to facilities’ controls in a cyber-attack that is combined with physical 
penetration of a facility. After the team had gained access to the control room, the team 
planted a small device roughly the size of a credit card. The device began penetrating 
the refinery control systems giving the team control of the industrial control systems. 
The team was able to breach the refinery’s system with only a couple of hundred 
dollars’ worth of gear (all of which had been bought on Amazon) without anyone being 
aware of the attack (Eaton, 2017b).  
 
The easy success that RedTeam Security had, presents a stark reality when looking at 
the cyber-attacks of the processing and refining sector. If this attack had been real, the 
implications would have been devastating. While many might think or hope that the 
success of this test was an exception it is not. In other private tests conducted by other 
private specialists there have been numerous successful cyber-attacks of valves, pumps 
and pipelines (Eaton, 2017b). Jason Larsen, a leader of a security team at IOActive 
states that whenever they conduct tests, they always gain access and often without being 
detected. The success of these tests indicates that refineries are actually one of the most 
vulnerable targets of cyber-attacks in the oil and gas industry, which appears to be due 
to a lack of awareness surrounding the sector’s vulnerability to cyber-attacks. 
 
3.5.2 Identifying Cyber-threat Vulnerabilities to the Trading sector 
Identifying and examining vulnerabilities to cyber-threats to trading operations is far 





one considers cyber-threats to the trading sector, the immediate thought is petrol/gas 
stations. This assumption is not entirely wrong. Trading operations of the downstream 
sector do deal directly with customers, such as at petrol pumps. The direct interaction 
with costumers creates the opportunities for hackers to steal customer information, such 
as their credit card information. Hackers have for a long time stolen the financial 
information of drivers through the use of credit card skimmers (Morris, 2018). A credit 
card skimmer is a small electronic device which hackers install inside card readers at 
self-servicing petrol pumps. The stolen information is sent back to the hacker via 
Bluetooth. Credit card skimmers are typically undetectable to consumers. The use of 
credit card skimmers was particularly evident last year in the US. Credit card skimmers 
have become a rampant issue, which saw the US Secret Service going to over eighty 
locations in twenty-one states to find credit card skimmers at gas stations. In their 
search, they found roughly fifty-nine credit card skimmers (Shoot, 2018). The Secret 
Service estimated that millions of dollars were stolen from consumers at gas stations as 
a result of credit card skimmers. While credit card skimmers are a method of cyber-
attacks on oil and gas companies, it is mostly consumers, not the oil and gas companies 
that feel the impact. However, if credit card skimmers are found at a particular gas 
station it has the ability to damage the reputation of the company. Damage to an oil and 
gas industry reputation can result in less consumers utilising their stations to buy gas, 
which can result in a loss of revenue. 
 
Credit card skimmers are not the only vulnerability to cyber-threats facing gas stations. 
Another vulnerability in trading operations at gas stations is the rise of cyber-attacks 
aimed at stealing gasoline from petrol pumps. Petrol pump systems are vulnerable to 
cyber-attacks because they are Internet facing systems and have no security measures 
in place to protect against cyber-threats. The vulnerability of pump systems first arose 
in 2015 when a pump monitoring system in the US was modified by a hacker (Wilhoit 
& Hilt, 2015). The hacker, who investigators suspect of being affiliated with the group 
Anonymous, merely changed the name of the pump. While there might not have been 
any major impact from the attack it did draw hackers’ attention to the vulnerability of 
petrol pumps. Security experts have since continued to warn gas stations of the 





companies. This once again is due to the lack of concern given to the threat by those in 
senior positions in oil and gas companies.  
 
The lack of concern is evident as last year a petrol pump in the US was breached by 
hackers and it resulted in 600 gallons of gas being stolen from the gas station. The loss 
of the 600 gallons gas resulted in the gas station losing US$ 1,800 of revenue which 
was the estimated value of the gas (Morris, 2018). No details on the technical aspects 
of the hack have been reported only that an attendant at the station was unable to turn 
off the pump using the normal methods. Another attack occurred when an employee at 
a BP gas station manipulated the gas pump computers, which allowed him to steal 
roughly US$ 300,000 of gas over a three-year period (Morris, 2018; Grom, 2018). The 
BP station became aware of the hack when they started to notice that the amount of fuel 
being delivered to the station and the number of sales did not add up. The company 
originally thought the discrepancy was due to mechanical problems, underground 
storage leaks or equipment issues (Grom, 2018). When each of these possibilities were 
ruled out computer diagnostic tests were run which then revealed the manipulation of 
the gas pump computers. Successful cyber-attacks result in large loss of revenue to oil 
and gas companies that cannot be overlooked. 
 
While it is clear that trading operations face their own unique vulnerabilities to the risk 
of cyber-threats, such as petrol pumps being targeted, it is worth noting that trading 
operations have the ability to suffer from the influence of cyber-attacks to other sectors. 
If a cyber-attack on a pipeline transporting oil results in an explosion this will result in 
shortage in supply which could result in a loss of revenue for distribution companies. 
The business or company, who bought the oil, will suffer from a loss of revenue as they 
will need to buy more oil to replace the oil lost in the explosion in order to avoid a lack 
of supply.  
 
3.6 Vulnerabilities to Cyber-threats Identified within the Oil and Gas Industry 
As was outlined in the introduction of this chapter one of the key purposes was to 
identify vulnerabilities to cyber-threats in the oil and gas industry. Identifying these 
vulnerabilities is an important step towards developing and putting in place protocols, 





oil and gas industry and their different operations individually, various vulnerabilities 
were identified. While a hand-full of vulnerabilities was identified in the different 
sectors, ten of these vulnerabilities were ones that affected every sector of the oil and 
gas industry. While all the vulnerabilities identified are very important these ten 
vulnerabilities can be considered the most concerning as they are not limited to one 
sector. These ten key vulnerabilities to cyber-threats in the oil and gas industry 
identified in this research study are summarised in the table below. 
 
Table 2: Top Ten Vulnerabilities to Cyber-threats in the Oil and Gas Industry 
Vulnerability Explanation of Vulnerability 
Low cyber-maturity of the oil and gas 
industry 
Due to the fact that cyber-threats are a 
new vulnerability facing the oil and gas 
industry companies do not have well-
developed plans to deal with the risk and 
in some cases no plans have been put 
into place. 
Lack of boardroom buy-in 
Board members of oil and gas 
companies’ limited acknowledgement of 
the risk posed by cyber-threats has 
resulted in the industry not taking the 
threat seriously. 
Size of the oil and gas industry 
The size of the industry makes it 
difficult to secure all the different 
automated systems and IoT devices 
being used in various operations. 
Utilisation of out-dated and legacy 
assets 
Oil and gas facilities using out-dated and 
legacy assets find themselves vulnerable 
due to the fact that they are not designed 
to deal with cyber-threats 
Complex ecosystem 
Through the use of different firms, 





(Compiled by author for this study). 
different security systems to protect 
their assets, it becomes a complex 
environment to secure. 
Reliance on traditional methods of 
security 
Reliance on traditional methods of 
security, such as natural barriers and 
standard virus detection software, makes 
oil and gas companies vulnerable to 
cyber-threats. 
Reputational Risk 
Oil and gas companies, which have a 
reputation as being a large source of 
revenue to their local government, are 
highly vulnerable to cyber-threats. Due 
to this reputation nation-states or other 
groups can target these oil and gas 
companies to destabilise their 
government’s economy. 
Lack of monitoring to detect cyber-
threats 
Oil and gas companies do not have any 
programmes or methods of monitoring 
for cyber-threats operating on their 
systems. Without having methods to 
monitor for cyber-threats, companies 
run the risk of having a cyber-attack 
going undetected for years. 
Uneducated Employees 
Employees, who are uneducated or not 
trained to deal with cyber-threats, results 
in them not being equipped to deal with 
an attack and they therefore lack overall 
awareness and vigilance. 
Unwillingness to share information 
about their experience with cyber-
threats 
Oil and gas companies’ unwillingness to 
share information about their experience 
creates a lack of awareness and concern 






While these are not the only vulnerabilities to cyber-threats at present, they are a key 
starting point for oil and gas companies when it comes to securing their facilities. 
However, political risk is constantly changing and evolving and that is particularly true 
of the political risk of cyber-threats. Cyber-threats are constantly developing, evolving 
and becoming more sophisticated at a rapid pace. As such, the vulnerabilities to cyber-
threats found in the oil and gas industry will change and evolve just as rapidly. The 
table above will thus have to evolve with these changes. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The aim of Chapter Three was to identify vulnerabilities to cyber-threats, which exist 
throughout the oil and gas industry. This chapter established that the oil and gas 
industry has opened themselves up to the risk of cyber-threats through the increased 
use of automation, technology and IoT. Despite the increased vulnerability very little 
awareness about the rising threat of cyber-attacks exist in the industry. In order to 
identify vulnerabilities of risk to cyber-threats each of the three sectors of the oil and 
gas industry were looked at individually. Each of the operations in the different sectors 
possess their own unique vulnerabilities due to the different forms of technology used 
in the different operations. Additionally, this chapter showed that each of the sectors in 
the oil and gas industry would experience different levels of severity should they be the 
target of a cyber-attack. One of the key observations of this chapter is just how complex 
the threat of cyber-attacks against the oil and gas industry are. This complexity points 
to oil and gas companies not being able to mitigate the threat of cyber-attacks and thus 
only manage the threat they pose. The political risk of cyber-threats is only going to 
change and develop at an increasingly rapid pace posing as a greater threat to oil and 
gas companies in the future. Cyber-attacks on oil and gas facilities, whose revenue 
certain governments are reliant on, can result in losses of revenue which can result in 
political upheaval in the country. 
 
Chapter four will examine the selected case studies of this research. This examination 
will start with the cyber-attacks on the oil and gas company Saudi Aramco in Saudi 
Arabia. Specific focus will be placed on the first cyber-attack, which took place in 2012 





cyber-attack on oil and gas companies in Norway will be examined. In the examination 
of the two case studies, Chapter Four will utilise the information provided in this 
chapter together with the theoretical and contextual foundation from Chapter Two to 




































Chapter Four: The Influence of Cyber-Threats on the Oil and Gas Industry 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two provided the theoretical foundation of this research study, while Chapter 
Three built on this foundation and sought to identify vulnerabilities to cyber-threats 
throughout the different sectors of the oil and gas industry. Hackers can exploit the 
identified vulnerabilities in order to gain access to facilities through different methods; 
ten key vulnerabilities were outlined and defined in Table 3.1. Chapter Four will utilise 
the information provided in earlier chapters to answer the research question of whether 
or not cyber-threats increase the risk faced by oil and gas companies. It will also look 
at one of the sub-research questions of how the oil and gas industry can utilise the 
vulnerabilities identified to either mitigate or manage the risk of cyber-threats. In order 
to do this, Chapter Four will be divided into three sections.  
 
The first section of Chapter Four will analyse the cyber-attacks carried out against 
Saudi Aramco starting with the Shamoon attack, which is considered to be the biggest 
cyber-attack to have been carried out against an oil and gas company. This will be 
followed by Triton attack on a Saudi Aramco petrochemical facility, which happened 
in 2017 and is one of the most recent cyber-attacks. This section will examine the events 
of the attack, how the company was influenced and what the overall influence of the 
cyber-attack was on the oil and gas industry. The third section of this chapter will utilise 
the same analysis used in the first section on the case study of the cyber-attack on 
Norwegian oil and gas companies. Specific focus will be placed on Statoil and their 
management of the cyber-attack in comparison to Saudi Aramco’s management. The 
last section of this chapter will look at how oil and gas companies can either manage or 
mitigate the risk of these identified vulnerabilities to cyber-threats. This final section 
will also establish and show just how complex and difficult it is and will be for oil and 
gas companies to develop plans and strategies to manage and mitigate the risk of cyber-
threats. 
 





One of the most publicised cyber-attacks on an oil and gas company is the one on Saudi 
Arabian Oil Company (more commonly known as Saudi Aramco), which is a state-
owned Oil Company located in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Aramco is a producer, 
manufacturer, marketer and refiner of crude oil, natural gas and petroleum products 
(Bronk & Tikk-Ringas, 2013:3). Saudi Aramco is considered to be the leading player 
in the petroleum industry as well as being the world’s most valuable company (Perlroth, 
2012). Historically, the earnings made by Saudi Aramco have not been publicised but 
in 2019 they opened their books for the first time. In opening their books, it revealed 
that Saudi Aramco had generated a net income US$111.1 billion in 2018 which makes 
it the most profitable company in the world by far (Reed, 2019). Saudi Aramco’s net 
income outstrips competitors such as Royal Dutch Shell (US$23.9 billion) and Exxon 
Mobil (US$ 20.8 billion) (Reed, 2019). While this does reveal how highly profitable 
Saudi Aramco is, it also acts to show that this profitability is tightly bound to one 
country. 
 
Saudi Aramco is headquartered in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia and they manage the world’s 
largest proven conventional crude oil and condensate reserves of 259.7 billion barrels 
and ranks among the world’s top refineries and natural gas liquids’ exporters. 
Established in 1933 and owned entirely by the Government of Saudi Arabia since 1980, 
this corporation represents a bundle of strategic business interests (Bronks & Tikk-
Ringas, 2013:3).  It is important to note that Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy, as 
a result the government is dominated by the royal family. The conglomerate still holds 
subsidiaries and affiliates in the United States, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, 
China, Japan and Singapore. 
 
4.2.1 Events Prior to Shamoon Attack 
Prior to the Shamoon attack on Saudi Arabia there were two cyber-attacks that acted as 
precursors to the Shamoon cyber-attack on Saudi Aramco. The first of these cyber-
attacks, titled the Stuxnet cyber-attack, occurred in 2010. The second cyber-attack titled 
Flame occurred in 2012, a few months prior to the Shamoon attack. Both of these 
attacks targeted Iran’s oil and gas industry. Both should have acted as warnings to Saudi 
Aramco of their potential vulnerability to the risk of cyber-threats. In addition, both 





operational systems of Saudi Aramco. Stuxnet was first discovered following reports 
that there was a new computer malware that was spreading rapidly across the Internet 
in 2010 (Bronk & Tikk-Ringas, 2013:82). While both these cases may appear to be 
separated from the Shamoon attack they are not. Each of these attacks, as already stated, 
should have acted as warnings to Saudi Aramco and the oil and gas industry as a whole. 
 
While Stuxnet was only discovered in 2010 it is believed by some that it had been in 
development since 2005. Iran was considered to be the main target of the Stuxnet cyber-
attack. The attack resulted in there being significant disruption and damaged caused to 
Iran’s uranium-enrichment through dramatically altering the speed of centrifuges at 
Iran’s facility at Natanz (Bronk & Tikk-Ringas, 2013:82). When Stuxnet was 
discovered, it was reported that there was a concentration of the virus found in .id 
(Indonesia), .in (India) and .ir (Iran) domains (Johnson, 2016:92). Those who have 
studied the Stuxnet malware have considered it to be a very sophisticated worm (Bronk 
& Tikk-Ringas, 2013:82). It is important to note that even now it is still unknown how 
Stuxnet was introduced but it was specifically designed to target unknown zero-day 
vulnerabilities, which exist in Windows operation systems and elevate permissions. 
The zero-day exploits allowed for a complete system compromise by outside users. For 
years prior to the attack, they went completely undetected by both cyber-security 
researchers and larger software development communities.  A reason why Stuxnet may 
have gone undetected, was that it was made to appear as if it were a valid device driver 
software that had come from a reputable developer (Bronk, 2016:83). The fact that the 
Stuxnet malware was capable of appearing as a valid device driver software also acts 
as an indicator of the sophistication of the attack. 
 
Another reason Stuxnet is considered to be sophisticated is the payload it was carrying. 
Typically, a computer worm is used for other means such as Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attack or sending spam e-mails but the Stuxnet worm did not do this. Instead Stuxnet 
worm was designed with specific instructions for it to target systems Siemens Simatic 
Series 7 programmemable logic controller (PLC) computers, which are the brains 
behind the operation of SCADA systems (Bronk, 2016:83; Johnson, 2016:92). The 
Stuxnet worm was capable of controlling and monitoring the systems it had infected 





throughout the oil and gas industry and oversee numerous operations. While PLCs are 
useful in running machines, they are only capable of doing so within very specific 
parameters with very little tolerance for variation or fault. Stuxnet’s ability to take 
control on PLCs and rewrite instructions is very concerning for oil and gas companies 
as PLCs are used in a majority of oil and gas companies all across the world.  
 
The second cyber-attack that Saudi Aramco should have taken as a warning was the 
Flame virus. The virus, which is a form of Spyware worm, is believed to have been 
jointly developed by the US National Security Agency, the CIA and Israel’s military 
(Nakashima, Miller & Tate, 2012). It is believed that this joint venture started as far 
back as 2007. However, following the attack and upon further investigation all parties 
denied all and any involvement. Reports covering the Flame virus started to surface in 
May 2012 due to Iran detecting a series of cyber-attacks on its oil industry as well as 
other computers across the country that had been infected by a rather sophisticated 
computer virus (Nakashima, 2012; Nakashima, Miller & Tate, 2012). It is believed by 
some experts that Flame utilised the data, which had been exploited by Stuxnet, to 
launch their attack however, this is just conjecture (Johnson, 2016:93). Researchers did 
find that the Flame malware did identify more zero-day exploits in Microsoft Windows 
system. This acts to explain why researchers also found that Flame mainly attacked 
computers, which were running Microsoft Windows OS as well as the malware being 
utilised to conduct cyber-espionage against various countries. 
 
Flame, much like Stuxnet, was utilised to target very specific systems or network 
components. Flame’s ability to target these different systems and networks was aided 
by the fact that it was capable of evading the majority of security software. The Flame 
malware was capable of doing this as it adopted a Rootkit approach which essentially 
means that it attacked the Microsoft Windows OS at its root thus allowing the malware 
to bypass security systems (Johnson, 2016:93). This points to the sophistication of the 
Flame virus. Another similarity to Stuxnet, reported by security companies CrySIS Lab 
and Kaspersky Lab, is that Flame had been operating on the operating system for four 
years already (Perlroth, 2012: Johnson, 2016:93). This discovery is concerning as they 
can only guess what data and information could have been collected by the malware in 






The Flame malware contained an erasing mechanism that was given the name wiper. 
The wiper mechanism is most probably the most concerning aspects of the Flame 
cyber-attack as it was the factor which most impacted the oil and gas industry in Iran. 
According to Iranian oil ministry officials, it was this wiper software code that forced 
them to shut off their Internet connection to their oilrigs and the Kharg oil terminal 
(Perlroth, 2012). Breaking the Internet connection between the Kharg oil terminal is 
concerning as the terminal is responsible for eighty percent of Iran’s oil exports. The 
most concerning aspect about these findings is this same wiper software code, as will 
be discussed later, is the exact same component found within the code of the Shamoon 
cyber-attack. The directors and managers at Saudi Aramco should have analysed the 
findings of the reports and started to implement mitigation and management strategies, 
especially in light of its proximity to Iran and the fact that they are Saudi Arabia’s 
primary regional rival (Dehlawi & Abokhodair, 2013). Another aspect of concern for 
Saudi Arabia is the ties to the US, which has already been the target of terrorist attacks. 
Saudi Aramco would be an ideal target for Iran to exact revenge for the Flame cyber-
attack considering the belief that the US was a partner in the attack. 
 
4.2.2 Saudi Aramaco’s Cyber-security prior to Shamoon attack 
Before looking at Saudi Aramco’s cyber-security prior to the Shamoon attack it is 
important to look at their approach to physical security. Former Executive Director of 
Saudi Aramco affairs, Abdullatif Othman, established the importance placed on 
ensuring the safety of their facilities when he stated that for years they have recognised 
how important it is to protect their vital facilities (Cordesman & Obaid, 2005:320). 
Even prior to Saudi Aramco experiencing any form of terrorist attacks, the company 
maintained a very high level of security. Saudi Aramco later placed even more 
importance on the physical security of their infrastructure following a thwarted terrorist 
attack on one of their massive petroleum-processing complexes at Abqaiq. Following 
the attack on Abqaiq, Saudi Aramco began consulting and working with experts and 
companies from the US to help create contingency plans as well as security solutions 






Saudi Aramco’s physical security was so well established that in 2010 they were 
acknowledged by the American Society of Industrial Security for their efforts. Saudi 
Aramco has placed such high importance on protecting their physical infrastructure 
from terrorist attacks as they recognised even a partial disruption to their facilities, in 
any area, would result in there being an immediate influence on oil and gas prices along 
with the knock-on effect for the global economy. Yet, despite Saudi Aramco’s high 
concern for physical security they did not factor in the rising threats of cyber-attacks to 
their physical infrastructure. Very little is known about Saudi Aramco’s cyber-security 
capabilities which is interesting considering their coordination with US experts as 
cyber-security started becoming a concern following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the 
US as was outlined in Chapter 2. However, this may be on purpose as it would be 
counterintuitive for the company to publicise how they dealt with threats. This 
unwillingness to share is ultimately one of the biggest issues when it comes to 
addressing cyber-threats in the oil and gas industry. 
 
As a result of the fact that there is very little known about Saudi Aramco’s cyber-
security, there is a limited amount of literature available to the public in either English 
or Arabic, with the exception of a few media mentions (Dehlwai & Abokhodair, 2013). 
One key source in particular is an article, which was written by Prince Naef Bin Ahmed 
Al-Saud, who is Brigadier General and a member of the Saudi royal family. The article 
was entitled A Saudi Outlook for Cyber security Strategies Extrapolated from Western 
Experience and was published in the first quarter of 2012. As result, it could have 
provided an idea of what cyber-security policy or initiatives would have been in place 
prior to the Shamoon attack on Saudi Aramco. The article primarily focuses on what 
steps the US has taken in forming and creating cyber-security policies. Special focus 
was placed on the partnerships between the US Department of Defense and different 
industries. Yet, in the article Al-Saud failed to actually provide any details with regard 
to cyber-security in the kingdom at all.  
 
While he did not provide any details, Al-Saud did imply that at the time of the article 
was written no financial incentives were being provided for companies in Saudi Arabia 
to invest in cyber-security. Another issue was that there was no coordination between 





of directors of Saudi Aramco, regarding cyber-defence. Ironically, Al-Saud provided a 
hypothetical scenario using Saudi Aramco as his example of how a cyber-attack could 
be a serious concern to Saudi Arabia (Al-Saud, 2012:78). Al-Saud believed that if 
hackers were to compromise Aramco computer systems it could possibly be considered 
a national security threat to Saudi Arabia. Following the Shamoon attack Al-Saud’s 
hypothetical scenario was proven to be true as the Interior Ministry stated the following: 
“the August cyber-attack on Aramco’s computer network targeted not just the company 
but the Kingdom’s economy as a whole” (Dehlawi & Abokhodiar, 2013). Al-Saud does 
provide insight into how little attention had been given to cyber-security in Saudi 
Arabia, but it fails to answer critical questions on any actual existing cyber-security 
policies or the future of cyber-security policies in Saudi Arabia.  
 
4.2.3 Outline of the events of the Shamoon attack on Saudi Aramco 
On 15 August 2012 at 11:08am (Saudi-Arabian time), Saudi Armco was the target of 
the cyber-attack Shamoon, also referred to as W32.Dsttrack. According to numerous 
reports on the Shamoon attack, it is considered to be the most destructive and the worst 
hack to ever been seen (Pagliery, 2015; Perlroth, 2012). Shamoon is a self-replicating 
computer virus initiated by an unknown person with the virus overwriting files on the 
hard drives of roughly thirty thousand of windows-based computers. Shamoon 
effectively erased three quarters of Saudi Aramco’s data including documents, 
spreadsheets, e-mails and other files. All of the files that were erased by the Shamoon 
malware were replaced with an image of a burning American flag. The date of the 
cyber-attack plays a significant role in the cyber-attack as the evening of 15 August is 
Lailat al Qadr, which is one of the holiest days of Ramadan (Perlroth, 2012; Bronk, 
2016:88). As result, over 55,000 Saudi Aramco employees had stayed home that day in 
order to prepare for the occasion, which meant there were not enough people to be 
aware of the problem or respond quickly to it either.  
 
This left Saudi Aramco computer technicians, who were available, frantically ripping 
cables out of computer servers at data centres all over the world. By physically 
unplugging the computers from the Internet the technicians hoped to prevent the virus 
from spreading any further (Pagilery, 2015). Along with physically unplugging 





such as shutting down their corporate internal network, disabling all Aramco 
employees’ e-mails and cutting off Internet access. Saudi Aramco immediately 
announced to the wider public that they had taken these measures but made no further 
comment on the attack. The Shamoon attack was kept from being far more devastating 
as Saudi Aramco had separated oil production from the company’s internal network. 
This deliberate separation of the company’s network from their production facilities 
could be a possible mitigation or management strategy the company put in place in 
order to protect their infrastructure from cyber-threats. 
 
A group of hackers who called themselves the Cutting Sword of Justice took 
responsibility for the attack on Saudi Aramco a few hours after the cyber-attack had 
begun. The group posted the following message on PostBin, which is a hacker forum, 
a few hours after the attack had begun which stated the following:  
 
We, behalf of an anti-oppression hacker group that have been fed up of crimes and 
atrocities taking place in various countries around the world, especially in the 
neighbouring countries such as Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon, Egypt and ..., and also 
of dual approach of the world community to these nations, want to hit the main supporters 
of these disasters by this action. One of the main supporters of this disasters is Al-Saud 
corrupt regime that sponsors such oppressive measures by using Muslims oil resources. 
Al-Saud is a partner in committing these crimes. It's hands are infected with the blood of 
innocent children and people. In the first step, an action was performed against Aramco 
company, as the largest financial source for Al-Saud regime. In this step, we penetrated 
a system of Aramco company by using the hacked systems in several countries and then 
sended a malicious virus to destroy thirty thousand computers networked in this 
company. The destruction operations began on Wednesday, Aug 15, 2012 at 11:08 AM 
(Local time in Saudi Arabia) and will be completed within a few hours. This is a warning 
to the tyrants of this country and other countries that support such criminal disasters with 
injustice and oppression. We invite all anti-tyranny hacker groups all over the world to 
join this movement. We want them to support this movement by designing and 
performing such operations, if they are against tyranny and oppression. 
(Untitled, 2012).    
 
Their message provides an understanding that while Saudi Aramco was the target of 





Saud royal family, for as the group states in their reasoning  they perceive the Al 
Saud regime as being corrupt and continuing to support so called tyrant countries 
through the use of Muslim oil. The group targeted Saudi Aramco as it is the largest 
financial provider to the Al Saud regime and thus one of the most effective methods 
of targeting the regime. While a cyber-attack on Saudi Aramco would have an effect 
on the Al Saud regime there is the possible advantage of disturbing other Western 
economies through the same attack. Thus, providing those responsible for the 
Shamoon with a political motivation for their attack on Saudi Aramco. Ultimately, 
this message does provide a motivation for why the cyber-attack occurred and why 
Saudi Aramco was attacked and who was behind the attack. However, this became 
a more complicated issue once a deeper more thorough investigation began on the 
Shamoon attack, which will be discussed further in the next section. 
 
Only after Saudi Aramco had established that oil exploration and production had not 
been affected did the president and CEO Khalid Al-Falih make an official statement on 
the company’s Facebook page. Al-Falih firstly assured the wider public that their 
workstations had been cleansed of the virus, which they had done through replacing 
tens of thousands of the company’s computers’ hard drives (Perlroth, 2012).  Al-Falih 
continued his statement with the following: 
 
[Saudi Aramco] addressed the threat immediately, and [our] precautionary procedures 
helped to mitigate these deplorable cyber-threats from spiralling. Saudi Aramco is not 
the only company that became a target for such attempts, this was not the first nor will it 
be the last illegal attempt to intrude into our systems, and [Saudi Aramco] will ensure 
that [we] will further reinforce [our] systems with all available means to protect against 
a recurrence of this type of cyber-attack. [Saudi Aramco] would like to emphasize and 
assure [our] stakeholders, customers and partners that [their] core businesses of oil and 
gas exploration, production and distribution from the wellhead to the distribution 
network.  
(Bronk & Tikk-Ringas, 2013:86; Fineren & Bakr, 2012).  
 
In Al-Falih’s statement confirms the fact that the separation of their internal network 
from their oil production was a deliberate mitigation strategy to protect the company 





only target of this attack. This could be alluding to the fact that Saudi Aramco was 
not the only oil and gas company hit by the Shamoon virus. Copies of the Shamoon 
virus were found on the computers of RasGas, based in Doha, Qatar, which is a joint 
venture between the nation of Qatar and ExxonMobil (Bronk, 2016:88; Zetter, 
2012). Al-Falih’s statement also draws attention to the fact the Saudi Aramco 
recognised that they would need to continue to improve their mitigation strategies 
of cyber-threats in order not be subjected to such an event again. Following this 
announcement, a much more detailed investigation of the Shamoon attack began. 
 
4.2.4 Further investigation of the Shamoon attack on Saudi Aramco 
Shortly after Al-Falih’s statement was posted on Facebook stating that the company 
was back online and operating, Saudi Aramco’s website remained inaccessible to 
the public. In addition, Reuters sent e-mails to people within Saudi Aramco only to 
have them continually bounce back (Fineren & Bakr, 2012). Two months later these 
problems continued to occur with employees being unable to access their corporate 
e-mail and the internal network. Saudi Aramco’s executives, following the Shamoon 
attack recognised that their systems were still vulnerable. In order to manage the 
vulnerability to cyber-threats executives stopped their employees from being able to 
gain access to Saudi Aramco’s internal network remotely. It actually took Saudi 
Aramco roughly five months to fully come back online (Rashid, 2015). In Chapter 
three, it was discussed that in the upstream sector a lot of value placed on both 
drilling and production data that is a vulnerable sector for cyber-attacks. The 
Shamoon attack acts to highlight this very vulnerability as it wiped Saudi Aramco’s 
data from their hard drives. Saudi Armco lost both its production and drilling data, 
which included drilling data from companies such as Santa Fe, Ocean and 
Schlumberger (Roberts, 2012). Saudi Aramco held all the filtered data stored on 
their systems, which typically would be stored and backed up twice a day. However, 
due to employees being out for Lailat Al Qadr no back-ups of the filtered data were 
saved that day (the filtered data holds the most value not the raw data). The loss of 
this data was something Saudi Aramco did not address in their statement despite the 







As different companies started examining and analysing the malware and its main 
components, they started to identify the key components of the malware as well as 
errors in coding of the malware.17 Symantec, a software company offering cyber-
security software and services, identified that Shamoon actually launched a three-
pronged attack. Symantec were able to breakdown the components of the malware 
into these three parts: a Dropper, a Reporter and a Wiper (Johnson, 2016:95; Bronk 
& Tikk-Ringas, 2013:85; Perlroth, 2012). The Dropper module is the main 
component of the malware as it is the original source of the malware and then 
supports the spread of the malware across the infected network of machines. The 
Reporter module is responsible for collecting the data from the computers infected 
and sending it back to the source of the malware. The Wiper module is the most 
destructive part of the malware as it is responsible for destroying all the data on the 
infected computer and replacing it with the image of the burning American flag and 
in the process removing the evidence of the malware from the computers to cover 
any traces of the attack.  The identification of the wiper module started to raise 
questions about whether or not the Cutting Sword of Justice were actually the ones 
responsible for the Shamoon cyber-attack on Saudi Aramco. 
  
As was previously discussed in the first few days following the Shamoon attack, 
before the malware was examined, the belief remained that the Cutting Sword of 
Justice was responsible. However, once more in-depth investigations were begun by 
various security groups and government departments, the validity of the Cutting 
Sword of Justice actually being responsible for the attack on Saudi Aramco started 
to be questioned. Focus immediately turned to Iran being the ones actually 
responsible for Shamoon. Iran became the focus due to the identification of the 
Wiper module in malware as it had the same main component of the Flame cyber-
attack against them. Some investigators believed that Iran was merely using the 
Cutting Sword of Justice as a front to hide behind but this was merely inferential 
reasoning which could have led investigators astray. However, Iran did have a 
 
17 The error in coding was identified by Kaspersky which they spoke about in their report on Shamoon. 





motive to have launched the cyber-attack against Saudi Aramco as economically 
they were suffering under tightening sanctions in 2012.18  
 
These tightening sanctions heavily impacted the Iranian oil and gas industry and 
resulted in a lot of their oil going unsold while Saudi Arabia continued to produce 
ten million barrels per day. The sanctions also made it difficult and expensive for 
Iran to resume their stalled oil production. Saudi Arabia is Iran’s regional competitor 
and Saudi Arabia were not responsible for any of the sanctions against Iran. 
However, Iran could have decided to use Saudi Aramco as a target of a cyber-attack 
due to their relationship with the US and as they export a large amount of their oil 
to the US. Thus, through targeting them the US would essentially also be affected 
economically and politically because of their economic reliance on the import of oil. 
This thinking about Shamoon should act as reminder to key infrastructures, such as 
Saudi Aramco, that they need to be alert to the fact that they could become political 
or economic targets of cyber-threats. The development of these perceived 
motivations, in addition to the identification of the Wiper module, resulted in US 
intelligence officials strongly refuting the notion of the Cutting Sword of Justice 
being responsible and stated only Iran would actually have the cyber-ability to 
mount an attack like Shamoon. Despite making these claims, US intelligence never 
provided any information or evidence to support this claim. Therefore, their claim is 
merely speculation (Perlroth, 2012). Despite US intelligence and other investigators 
pointing to Iran as being responsible, Iran officially and publicly denied having any 
part in the construction and deployment of Shamoon (Bronk & Tikk-Ringas, 
2013:24). While there is evidence to support Iran being responsible, they were not 
the only source considered to be behind the Shamoon attack on Saudi Aramco. 
 
Some investigators have stated that the Shamoon attack had to have involved an 
insider. Investigators state that only an employee or contractor of Saudi Aramco 
 
18 In 2012 the US imposed sanctions against Iran’s central bank which is the clearing house for Iran’s 
oil export profits. Additionally, the European Union (EU) put in place an oil embargo in order to get Iran 
to stop their nuclear programme. US put forward a second sanction, which banned any of the world’s 
banks from being able to complete oil transactions with Iran. The EU also put in a second sanction, which 





would have had the ability to introduce the Shamoon malware on their internal 
network. This could have been done through unknowingly opening a link in an e-
mail infected with the malware or by purposely copying it from a USB device 
(Perlroth, 2012: Bronk &Tikk-Ringas, 2013:18). While Saudi Aramco found 
possible individuals who could have been behind the attack, the names were never 
disclosed due to the company not wanting to comment on an on-going investigation. 
Ultimately, finding that someone inside the company played a role in the Shamoon 
attack raised important questions for Saudi Aramco in regards to how they 
implement their cyber and physical security measures. The greatest issue with 
different investigators and institutions pointing fingers as to who is responsible 
indicates how incredibly difficult it is to identify those actually responsible for 
cyber-attacks like Shamoon. The finger pointing also only makes the process of 
identifying those behind a cyber-attack even more difficult because of the lack of 
consensus. 
 
Three years after the Shamoon cyber-attack on Saudi Aramco, Chris Kubecka, spoke 
about her experience during the events of the Shamoon attack. Kubecka, a former 
security advisor to the company, had been hired by the company following the attack 
in order to make sure that Saudi Aramco’s satellite offices in Africa, Europe and the 
Middle East remained secure (Rashid, 2015; Pagliery, 2015). Kubecka stated that 
while the company’s drilling and exploration production had not been interrupted, 
the same could not be said for the rest of the business as it was in turmoil. As result 
of the company being forced to go offline as a protection against further damage, 
things such as managing supplies, shipping, contracts with governments and 
business partners were all required to happen on paper (Pagliery, 2015). Another 
issue caused by the shutdown, according to Kubecka, is that all the company’s 
payment systems were affected too, which resulted in miles of domestic gasoline 
tank trucks being turned away as they could not be paid. This continued for 
seventeen days following the attack until the company eventually started to give the 
oil away for free to ensure that it kept flowing within Saudi Arabia. Kubecka also 
drew attention to the fact that the oil and gas industry was not the only industry 






As discussed in the previous section, Saudi Aramco bought hard drives to replace 
the ones infected on all the company’s computers. Saudi Aramco did this by flying 
representatives of the company directly to computer factories in Southeast Asia, 
where they bought every single computer hard drive in the manufacturing line. Saudi 
Aramco was capable of doing this because of their high revenue which gives them 
the advantage of being able to buy the hard drives and replace them quickly. Saudi 
Aramco bought roughly fifty thousand hard drives at a higher price than every 
computer company in the world in order to get the hard drives (Pagliery, 2015). At 
the time, the world supply of hard drives was already under pressure due to flooding 
in Thailand. Saudi Aramco purchasing the hard drives brought the supply to a halt. 
In addition, the prices for hard drives increased which increased the price of 
computers from September 2012 to January 2013.  
 
It is important to note that buying the hard drives was merely the fastest method to 
enable Saudi Aramco systems to get up and running without the virus. The original 
drives could have been reused and rebuilt after they had been wiped. In doing this 
Saudi Aramco could have tried to recover some of the lost data but it would have 
been far too time consuming. This is interesting as it shows that while the company 
had maintained oil production and exploration the crippling of the internal network 
had its own devastating effects. This acts to demonstrate that despite Shamoon not 
being consider sophisticated, by companies such as Kaspersky, it did not have to be 
to inflict the amount of damage that it did. While Saudi Aramco might have only 
been knocked down by Shamoon temporarily, it took a significant amount of time 
for the company to fully recover from the attack. If any other company had been 
targeted, they would not have had the same outcome, especially a smaller company, 
which would not have had the same resources available to them as Saudi Aramco 
does. 
 
4.2.5 Legacy of Shamoon Attack on Saudi Aramco 
While Shamoon did not result in impacting Saudi Aramco’s oil production and 
exploration infrastructure it did have a financial impact on the company and the 
operational side of the company. Saudi Aramco’s experience with the Shamoon cyber-





the way they approach the risk assessments of their key infrastructures. In particular, it 
has forced companies to pay attention to the risk cyber-threats pose as they are no longer 
a far-fetched notion, Shamoon shows just how real the threat of cyber-attacks is.  
  
Saudi Aramco managed to remove the Shamoon malware from their corporate 
computers through replacing all of the company computer hard-drives but it did not 
actually destroy the malware itself. As a result, in 2016/2017 different companies in 
Saudi Arabia were hit by an updated version of Shamoon. One of the targets of 
particular interest is Sadara Chemical Company (Perlroth & Krauss, 2018). Sadara is 
of interest as it is a joint venture between Dow Chemical and Saudi Aramco, which 
means this was the second time that Saudi Aramco had been attacked by Shamoon, 
even if they were hit indirectly. Much like Saudi Aramco, the Shamoon 2.0 virus again 
exploited a zero-day exploit in the Microsoft operating systems and forced Sadara to 
shut down their computer network while they dealt with the attack. They stated that 
operations at the facility were not affected by the down time.  It appears that Sadara 
were able to recover faster than Saudi Aramco, which suggests that Saudi Aramco’s 
experience with Shamoon meant they knew how to help Sadara recover quickly. 
Ultimately, this second Shamoon cyber-attack demonstrates another challenge of 
cyber-threats which is that while oil and gas companies can recover from cyber-attacks 
they will never actually be rid of future threats of suffering from the same malware or 
an updated version of it in the future. 
 
4.2.6 Second Cyber-attack on a Saudi Aramco Petrochemical plant  
In mid-March, 2018 the first reports of yet another cyber-attack started to emerge. The 
cyber-attack, called Triton, had been carried out against a Saudi Arabian petrochemical 
plant. The attack occurred eight months prior to the attack being reported because the 
investigators remained tight-lipped about the cyber-attack. The investigators being 
tight-lipped emphasises the issue of the lack of information sharing about cyber-attacks 
between oil and gas companies. Oil and gas companies need to share information in 
order to properly start developing mitigation and management strategies that are 
effective. The attack was a different kind of cyber-attack, unlike any they had 
experienced before as unlike Shamoon this cyber-attack was not designed with the 





cyber-attack was meant to sabotage the plants industrial control systems and cause an 
explosion (Perlroth & Krauss, 2018). The only reason why the malware failed in 
achieving its goal was that there was a minor error in the coding of the malware. 
 
Investigators are unwilling to disclose the company which was the target of the attack 
while Area 1 Security, a computer security firm founded by veterans of the US National 
Security Agency, stated in a confidential report that they had identified Saudi Aramco 
as the petrochemical plant which was attacked (Groll, 2017). Others who have 
investigated the attack have agreed with the findings of Saudi Aramco being the target 
of the attack, while others are unwilling to support these findings due to Saudi 
Aramco’s denial of being the target. This denial could be due to their unwillingness to 
damage their public reputation, as Saudi Aramco was in the process of preparing for 
the largest public offering of all time. The company’s IPO (initial public offering) has 
been staked as a sweeping reform plan, which sought to diversify Saudi Arabia’s 
economy by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (Groll, 2017). Saudi Aramco 
being the target of a second known cyber-attack in four years would clearly have a 
negative influence on the up-coming public offering of the company which would 
impact attempts to diversify the economy outside of oil and gas. Furthermore, no one 
who was investigating this second Shamoon attack was able to identify who could have 
been responsible or behind it. 
 
The Triton cyber-attack acts as a marker to indicate how cyber-threats and attacks are 
escalating and how hackers are displaying both the drive and the ability to cause some 
serious physical damage to critical infrastructure and employees (Perlroth & Krauss, 
2018). The American-engineered computer systems, which were compromised in the 
Triton attack, are utilised by oil and gas companies all over the world. This has caused 
concern for US government officials, as well as their allies and cyber-security 
researchers, that a cyber-attack such as this could be replicated and used against another 
oil and gas company. Investigators found that a computer in the engineering 
workstation had a peculiar file on it that looked like it should be there, but this file held 
the malware that sabotaged the systems. Investigators said that the file had not been put 
there by an inside man; this points to the malware sabotaging the system remotely 





malware’s code stopped it from achieving its deadly goal, investigators truly believe 
that the hackers could have fixed this coding error. The implication is, that it is only a 
matter of time before the updated Triton malware is deployed against another industrial 
control system. The updated Triton malware components can easily be sold to others 
seeking to cause damage or harm to other industrial control systems on websites such 
as eBay. 
 
A greater point of concern with the Triton cyber-attack was how sophisticated the 
attackers had been in the coding of the malware. Those responsible for the attack had 
to have understood the design of the control system as well as the layout of the 
petrochemical plant as they needed to know which pipelines went where and which 
valve did what in order to know which one to turn-off to cause an explosion (Perlroth 
& Krauss, 2018). This sophistication indicates to investigators that the individuals 
behind the attack took their time developing the malware and had plenty of resources 
available to them. Still investigators were unable to identify there being any sort of 
profit motivation in the Triton attack. This is concerning as it indicates that those behind 
the development of the malware were most likely being supported by a nation-state. 
According to cyber-security experts very few nation-states possess this level of 
technical sophistication which quickly narrowed down the list of nation-states to Iran, 
China, Russia, the US and Israel.  
 
Despite these five nation-states having the technical sophistication to carry out an attack 
such as Triton, according to the initial investigation none of them appeared to have the 
motivation to carry out this attack except for Iran. Investigators ruled China and Russia 
out as both nation-states had in the previous years been making increasingly more 
energy deals with Saudi Arabia.  Israel and the US were ruled out as an option as both 
states were working in cooperation with Saudi Arabia in dealing with Iran. This left 
Iran as the only viable option seeing as tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia had only 
increased over the years prior to this. Additionally, Iran has started growing their 
military hacking programme. While they might be the only viable option as being the 
nation-state behind the attackers, Iran denied having been involved with the Triton 
malware. These initial findings would be brought into question with the publication of 






During October 2018 FireEye, a major cyber-security company, published their report 
concerning the Triton cyber-attack. FireEye identified that the Scientific Research 
Institute of Chemistry and Mechanics, located in Moscow, was behind much of the 
effort of the creation of the Malware. The Institute has deep ties with the Russian 
government, which date back to before the 1917 Bolshevik revolution (Sanger, 2018).  
The involvement of the Institute raises many unanswered questions about why Moscow 
would even target a Saudi Arabian plant. One possible reason is that Russia and Saudi 
Arabia are rivals in the petroleum marketplace, but this does not seem to be enough 
motivation. This has brought about speculation that Iran was still actually behind the 
attack but that they had had a lot of help from Russia. When developing the malware 
Iran could possibly have sent the malware to the Institute to provide their expertise to 
help fine tune it. Another important discovery in FireEye’s report is that even though 
much of the coding and activity to maintain and rewrite elements of the malware can 
be traced back to the Russian Institute, they did not initiate the attack. The Russian 
government has denied having anything to do with the placing of the malware. 
 
In the greater scheme of things, this particular attack has garnered much more attention 
from experts concerning the issue of cyber-threats and the influence they have on the 
oil and gas industry due to their vulnerability. Following this attack more articles and 
reports started being published covering the evolving cyber-threat landscape in the oil 
and gas industry along with some suggestions on how these threats can be managed and 
mitigated. Despite the greater focus, the field still remains fairly limited on resources 
and information. For oil and gas operators in the Middle East greater pressure was 
placed on them, following the Triton attack, to do more to defend themselves against 
cyber-threats. The Triton attack also indicated that despite Saudi Aramco having 
experience with cyber-attacks and improved cyber-threat management strategies, there 
were still vulnerabilities in their system, which could be exploited.  
 
At the beginning of 2019 it was announced that Saudi Aramco and Raytheon, a US-
based security contractor, had partnered in a joint venture seeking to “develop, market 
and provide cyber-security services in the Saudi Kingdom and in the region” (Middle 





just a few days after Italian oil and gas contractor Saipem had announced that hundreds 
of their servers in Saudi Arabia, as well as in United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, had 
been the target of a cyber-attack. A few days later, Pertrofac, a second oil field in the 
Middle East was attacked. Both companies work extensively with Saudi Aramco, 
which seems to indicate that due to Saudi Aramco being one of the top targets of cyber-
attacks that by extension those closely associated with them can be targets as well. 
 
4.2.7 Evaluating the Presence of Vulnerabilities to Cyber-threats in the Saudi 
Aramco Case Study 
In Chapter Three, vulnerabilities to cyber-threats were identified and summarised in a 
table. It is important to draw a correlation between the vulnerabilities to cyber-threats 
in Chapter Three and whether or not they are present in the Saudi Aramco case study 
as well as those, that were not present. The following is an independent analysis of the 
case study and the vulnerabilities present. The first vulnerability to cyber-threats 
identified in the Saudi Aramco case is the lack of information sharing. Following the 
Stuxnet and Flame cyber-attacks on facilities located in Iran no information regarding 
the attacks was made public. This lack of information sharing led to Saudi Aramco 
being unaware of just how real the threat of cyber-attacks were in the region. However, 
it is important to remember that Iran would most likely not have been willing to share 
information with Saudi Arabia, especially not an oil and gas company such as Saudi 
Aramco. This is due to the fact that Saudi Arabia and Iran are regional rivals but this 
rivalry ties into another vulnerability identified in the Saudi Aramco case and will be 
discussed later in this section. While Saudi Aramco was made vulnerable to cyber-
threats due to a lack of information sharing, they are guilty of the same thing. Following 
the events of both the Shamoon and Triton cyber-attacks, Saudi Aramco was unwilling 
to share information regarding their experience handling a cyber-attack within oil and 
gas companies.  
 
The second most evident identified vulnerability found in the Shamoon attack was 
Saudi Aramco’s overall low cyber-maturity. Saudi Aramco’s low level of cyber-
maturity is evident prior to the Shamoon cyber-attack as the company had no manage 
or mitigation strategy in place to deal with cyber-threats. Saudi Aramco’s security plans 





view cyber-attacks as a credible risk. This lack of cyber-maturity can be questioned, as 
the company had separated their corporate infrastructure from their operational 
infrastructure, which did prevent the Shamoon attack from being more deadly. Another 
vulnerability to cyber-threats is evident when studying Saudi Aramco’s reliance on 
traditional methods of security, which could be seen in their utilisation of traditional 
anti-virus security software. The utilisation of traditional anti-virus security software, 
which is unable to detect the presence of malicious malware, allows malware to go 
undetected for extended periods of time. The reliance on traditional anti-virus security 
software leads to yet another vulnerability to cyber-threats found in the Saudi Aramco 
case, which is a lack of monitoring for cyber-threats. The lack of monitoring for cyber-
threats in both the Shamoon and Triton cyber-attacks on Saudi Aramco they were 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks and caught by surprise. 
 
Uneducated employees are another vulnerability present in the Shamoon cyber-attack 
on Saudi Aramco. When the Shamoon malware began to spread throughout the 
corporate computers, technicians did not know what to do to slow the spreading of the 
malware. Instead the technicians did the only thing they could think of which was to 
unplug all the computers. While this did stop the malware from further affecting other 
computers, if employees had been better educated and had, had a procedure to follow 
when a cyber-attack occurred fewer computers might have been infected. 
 
A final vulnerability to cyber-threats present in the Saudi Aramco case is reputational 
risk. Saudi Aramco is the largest source of revenue for the Saudi Arabian government, 
which makes them highly vulnerable to cyber-threats. Saudi Aramco could be targeted 
as a result of nation-states or terrorist groups seeking to destabilise the Saudi Arabian 
government. Saudi Aramco is also vulnerable to politically motivated attacks due to the 
political conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as their close ties to the US.  
 
4.3 Cyber-Attack on Oil and Gas Companies in Norway 
Before looking at the cyber-attacks on oil and gas companies in Norway can begin it is 
important to make a few important distinctions. Firstly, the literature and articles, which 
cover this cyber-attack in both English and Norwegian, is limited. The information 





of the articles merely provide the same information. Secondly, as was noted back in 
Chapter One the influence that the cyber-attack had on Statoil will be the focus of this 
section. While it will be seen that numerous oil and gas companies were targeted by the 
cyber-attack, it is believed that Statoil was the primary target of the attack. Examining 
Statoil’s experience with a cyber-attack provides an interesting comparison in how an 
oil and gas company in a developed country and one in a developing country experience 
a cyber-attack. Additionally, Statoil is somewhat similar to Saudi Aramco in terms of 
the fact that the government owns a majority of the company’s shares. Statoil is a vital 
contributor to Norway’s economy and state revenues much like Saudi Aramco. 
However, the manner in which the cyber-attack on Statoil and the way in which they 
dealt with the cyber-attack are vastly different. Unlike the Shamoon attack on Saudi 
Aramco, Statoil has divulged very little information regarding their experience about 
the cyber-attack as the problem was dealt with internally without outside assistance.  
 
4.3.1 Statoil cyber-security prior to the 2014 cyber-attack on Norwegian oil and 
gas companies 
According to a Norwegian article, following the Shamoon attack on Saudi Aramco in 
2012, Statoil started following the development of these new cyber-threats to the oil 
and gas industry (Helgesen, 2013). This points to one of the first differences between 
Saudi Aramco and Statoil’s management of cyber-threats, as unlike Saudi Aramco who 
did not start following the events of cyber-threats prior to Shamoon, Statoil’s 
management recognised the necessity of monitoring them. Additionally, according to 
Statoil’s press spokesman, Ola Anders Skauby, the company used a considerable 
amount of resources to put in place technical and procedural barriers. Statoil has 
focused on raising the competence of the individuals who work with process control 
systems regarding information security. Another fact, which makes Statoil interesting 
as the target of a cyber-attack, is the findings published in an incident report at the end 
of 2013. January 2013, roughly six months after the Shamoon cyber-attack, a terrorist 
attack was carried out on the In Amenas facility in Libya, which was a joint venture 
between Statoil, BP and Sonatrach. The attack had been unexpected and had 
devastating consequences and as such Statoil conducted an independent investigation 
on the attack. The purpose of the investigation for Statoil was to determine the 





security was (Boman, 2015)19. One of the findings of the report was that Statoil lacked 
a security culture as well as a security system, which is inadequate for an international 
company.  
 
The most important conclusion of the report was that the greatest long-term threat 
facing the company in the future is not actually physical attacks but rather cyber-attacks 
on the company. According to Adam Fulcher who is the Head of Security at Statoil, the 
fact that the majority of Statoil’s assets are located in Norway created a relaxed culture 
towards security. Fulcher stated that if Statoil’s industrial control systems were to suffer 
a major large-scale accident it would ultimately result in shaping and changing the 
future course of the company (Boman, 2015). Following the outcome of the report 
Statoil started to establish a security improvement programme, which would address 
different aspects of security. In regard to their cyber-security issues Statoil believes that 
security will need to be risk-based as well as intelligence-led.  
 
The Norwegian government has allowed Statoil to have access to intelligence 
information in order to help the company address security issues. This does provide the 
company with an advantage in regard to having the necessary information available to 
them (Boman, 2015). However, establishing these close connections with the 
government can result in Statoil being the target of a cyber-attack in an effort to hurt 
the government, such as the Shamoon attack on Saudi Aramco. In examining their 
cyber-security Statoil also identified two keys problems in preventing and mitigating 
cyber-attacks both of which would be challenges to any oil and gas company addressing 
cyber-threats. The first big challenge is that there is a lack of common standards which 
suppliers and vendors are held to when it comes to providing reassurance against cyber-
threats. Thus, despite cyber-security measures being implemented by Statoil, these 
security measures will not be effective if vendors and suppliers of equipment and 
products are not being held to the same standard.  
 
19 Karen Boman’s article Fulcher:Cybersecurity Ranks as Top Long-Term Threat to Statoil, will be 
heavily relied on throughout this section. This is due to the fact that she is one of the only people to 
write about the API Cybersecurity Conference in Houston in 2015 where Adrain Fulcher spoke about 






The second big challenge facing the management and prevention of cyber-attacks is 
that nation-states are becoming increasingly more reliant on cyber-attacks rather than 
physical methods to hurt the economy of other nation-states (Boman, 2015). 
Historically, Statoil has utilised the special military forces provided to them by the 
Norwegian government to protect their infrastructure from physical threats, but these 
will not be useful against cyber-attacks. Thus, now it is the responsibility of oil and gas 
companies, such as Statoil, to protect their infrastructure. Fulcher states that due to this 
change, oil and gas companies and host governments need to establish a comprehensive 
understanding of what responsibilities the oil and gas companies have for protecting 
their physical infrastructure and what protection would be provided by the foreign 
government which hosts the oil and gas company’s facilities (Boman, 2015). Despite 
Statoil being aware of the fact that their greatest vulnerability is now cyber-threats,  
according to the findings of the incident report, they were still vulnerable to a cyber-
attack. 
 
4.3.2 Outline of the Events of the Cyber-attack on Oil and Gas Companies in 
Norway 
In August 2014 over three hundred oil and gas companies in Norway were the targets 
of a cyber-attack. This cyber-attack is the largest cyber-attack to ever be coordinated in 
Norway. Prior to the attack occurring the Nasjonal Sikkerhetsmyndighet (NSM), which 
is the National Security Authority in Norway, had been forewarned about the attack by 
one of their international contacts (Bryne, 2014). NSM were then capable of issuing a 
warning to all the oil and gas companies, which they suspected could be targets of the 
pending cyber-attack. The hackers targeted the systems of the oil and gas companies 
by sending e-mails to key personnel within each company (Muller, Gjesvik & Friis, 
2018:7). The hackers structured the e-mail to appear as if it had come from a legitimate 
source with an attachment to be opened. The attachment held the destructive malware 
designed by the attackers. If the person targeted opened the attachment the programme 
would be launched into the company’s system.  
 
Of the three hundred companies warned, it is estimated that roughly fifty oil and gas 





remain at risk (Muller et al.,2018:6). Unlike with the Shamoon attack on Saudi Aramco 
little else is known about the cyber-attack and its influence. No group immediately took 
responsibility for the cyber-attack, like the Cutting Sword of Justice had done in the 
wake of the Shamoon attack. Even, following further investigation into the cyber-
attack, which will be discussed further in the next section, speculation still remains as 
to who was responsible. Additionally, nothing is publicly known about how the fifty 
oil and gas companies breached by the cyber-attack addressed and dealt with their 
systems being attacked. This stems from the fact that few of these fifty companies 
breached even made any statement saying that they had been breached or even 
acknowledging the cyber-attack - one of which was Statoil. Statoil’s statement both 
acknowledged and gave a minor insight into how they addressed the warning of the 
cyber-attack. The statement was given by Statoil’s Head of Press, which went as 
follows: “we have received a warning and are checking on our systems according to 
routines” (300 oil and gas companies hacked in Norway, 2015). Statoil likely made the 
statement to assure public shareholders of the company that there was nothing they 
needed to worry about much like Saudi Aramco did following the Shamoon attack.  
 
4.3.3 Further Investigation and Findings of the Norwegian Cyber-attack 
Upon further investigation of the cyber-attack one of the concerning factors of this 
attack, according to Hans Christian Pretorius, Director of the Operative division of 
NSM, is that the hackers responsible had obviously done their research before they 
launched their attack (Munson, 2014). This research can be seen by the fact that the 
attackers responsible knew exactly which key functions to go after and who the key 
personnel of the different companies were (Munson, 2014). The complexity and how 
the cyber-attack specifically targeted key individuals indicates that the attackers were 
not mere novices; as well as them having large financial resources backing them. The 
fact that the attackers are believed to have received substantial financial backing points 
to the possibility of a nation-state being the ones responsible for the attack. However, 
no nation-state has been identified as having the necessary motive to support this attack. 
Pretorius continued in his statement that e-mails were the common denominator in the 
attack and the way to instigate the cyber-attack. Pretorius believes that, in general, 
Norwegians need to be more discerning or sceptical about e-mails sent to them, as they 





cyber-threats (Hotvedt, Aardal, Lauritzen & Kristoffersen, 2014). In the case of this 
cyber-attack, if personnel opened the attachments it would have launched a destructive 
programme into the system of the company.   
 
The destructive malware was designed to find vulnerabilities or holes in the security of 
the target companies’ system. Once a vulnerability was identified a communication 
channel would open up with the hackers which would lead to the malware launching a 
much more serious attack on the company’s system (Munson, 2014). It is believed by 
NSM that the primary objective of the cyber-attack was to install a key-logger that 
would steal passwords to get into one of the oil and gas companies’ secure networks 
(Muller et al.,2018:7). By accessing the secure network, the hackers could potentially 
steal confidential intellectual data from the oil and gas company. Unlike the Shamoon 
attack on Saudi Aramco no outside help was required to help the targeted companies 
address and deal with the outcome and recovery from the cyber-attack. While there is 
extremely limited information available covering any aspect of the cyber-attack on the 
Norwegian oil and gas industry, as previously mentioned one interesting finding was 
that Statoil was believed to be the primary target of the attack. However, before looking 
at Statoil it is important to look at further research conducted in regard to who was 
responsible for the cyber-attack. 
 
While NSM may have warned oil and gas companies about the cyber-attack occurring, 
they originally stated that they did not know who was responsible or behind the attack. 
NSM, however, actually did have a slight indication of who could have been 
responsible for the attack but chose not to investigate any further as they stated it was 
not their responsibility to go after those responsible. Pretorius explains that NSM’s 
responsibility is just to uncover data which points to threats of cyber-attacks and assist 
in helping oil and gas companies in handling them and in some cases preventing them 
(Hotvedt, Aardal, Lauritzen & Kristoffersen, 2014). As mentioned at the beginning of 
this section, Pretorius did indicate that NSM believed that the hackers responsible did 
not appear to be novices and had resources available to them that could have only been 
supplied by a nation-state. One potential hacker group has been identified that could 






The Dragonfly hacker group (also known as the Energetic Bear) were first identified in 
2011 by Symantec, following the group’s successful cyber-attacks on thousands of 
companies around the world. Symantec believes that the Dragonfly group is following 
in the footsteps of the Stuxnet attack on the Iranian nuclear programme. The Dragonfly 
group first started with cyber-attacks that targeted defence and aviation companies in 
the US and Canada (Dragonfly: Western Energy Companies Under Sabotage Threat, 
2014; Johansen & Færaas, 2014). In 2013, the group changed its target to the oil and 
gas industry in the US and Canada but later they widened their scope to Europe as well. 
This development led to Symantec reaching out to warn the oil and gas companies in 
Europe so that they would be aware of the threat the Dragonfly group posed to the 
industry. The attacks conducted by Dragonfly supports the notion that it is a state-
sponsored operation due to the group displaying a high degree of technical capabilities. 
The nation-state sponsoring the group has yet to be identified but some point to Russia 
being responsible.  
 
The Dragonfly group fits the theory put forward by NSM of the attackers being 
supported by a nation-state. Another reason why the Dragonfly group is believed to 
behind the attack is because of the method that they used to infect systems. One of the 
earliest methods used by the Dragonfly group to infect a company’s system with 
malware was through e-mail campaigns (Dragonfly: Western Energy Companies Under 
Sabotage Threat, 2014).  Dragonfly’s e-mail campaign consisted of identifying and 
targeting selected executives and senior employees of a company and sending them an 
e-mail. The e-mail would have one of two possible subject lines either “The account” 
or “Settlement of delivery problem” and would contain an infected PDF attachment 
(Dragonfly: Western Energy Companies Under Sabotage Threat, 2014). Dragonfly’s e-
mail campaign mimics the method used to gain access to the different Norwegian oil 
and gas companies’ systems thus providing more motivation to support the idea that 
Dragonfly was responsible for the hack. Despite these findings supporting the notion 
of Dragonfly being responsible, NSM and other agencies remain unsure if they were 
actually responsible. 
 
As previously stated, those investigating the cyber-attack on the Norwegian oil and gas 





(Munson,2014; Muller et al., 2018:6). The head of Statoil’s press acknowledged the 
cyber-attack through making the following statement: “we have received a warning and 
are checking on our systems according to routines” (300 oil companies hacked in 
Norway, 2015). It is believed by some reporters covering the cyber-attack that Statoil 
was the primary target of the cyber-attack due to the role the company plays in 
Norway’s economy. It is important to note that the petroleum sector plays  a prominent 
role in Norway’s national economy. In 2014, the Petroleum sector accounted for twenty 
percent of Norway’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), twenty-seven percent of the 
state’s income and forty-six percent of all exports (Muller et al., 2018:6).  The 
Norwegian government owns a majority of Statoil’s shares, sixty-seven percent, while 
the rest is public stock. As a result of the Norwegian government owning a majority of 
Statoil, the company is also one of the biggest contributors to the government financial 
resources.   
 
This is similar to Saudi Aramco being the biggest source of income for Saudi Arabia, 
which is also owned by the Saudi government. Unlike Saudi Aramco, where the profits 
go to the Saudi royal family, the profits from Statoil do go towards the government’s 
coffers and are utilised to support the so-called ‘Scandinavian Miracle’ (Leyden, 2014). 
While Saudi Aramco is considered to be a giant in the oil and gas industry, Statoil is 
far smaller, but it is the largest oil and gas company in Norway and is the largest energy 
supplier in Europe (Bryne, 2014). This, however, confirms one of the biggest 
challenges identified by Fulcher, which was that oil and gas companies would be 
targeted to harm a nation-state economically. It remains unknown who was behind the 
cyber-attack, which hinders further analysis into the motives of the attackers. Outside 
of Statoil acknowledging the warning and testing their system no other information has 
been made publicly available regarding what influence the cyber-attack had on Statoil.  
A possible reason for the lack of information from Statoil being made available about 
the cyber-attack is because the company keeps its cards very close to its chest. Statoil 
does not want to publicly share how many resources they use in order to protect against 
cyber-attacks or how many cyber-attacks they have detected (Becker, 2013). According 
to Statoil’s IT director, they consider not sharing information as part of the risk picture 
because if they publicise how they deal with cyber-attacks it will inform hackers about 





working towards new measures in order to regularly ensure their protection against any 
potential cyber-threats. 
 
4.3.4 Legacy of cyber-attack on Oil and Gas Companies in Norway 
While there may have not been any other information available covering the influence 
the cyber-attack had on Statoil it did leave a legacy. Unlike Saudi Aramco, its legacy 
was not a re-emergence of the cyber-attack and its malware but a legacy of increased 
focus on cyber-security. According to a report published by DNV GL, a classification 
society headquartered in Norway, there had been over fifty cyber-attacks on the oil and 
gas sector in 2014 alone (Janbu, 2016). Further research by DNV GL found that 
combatting cyber-threat challenges to security will become a very important area of 
focus for the oil and gas industry. In the case of Norway, DNV GL’s research into 
cyber-threats has shown that only thirty-two percent of senior employees in Norway 
have any plan to invest in preventing, detecting and responding to cyber-threats (Janbu, 
2016). These findings have reinforced the necessity of counter-measures that will be 
able to handle larger and more sophisticated cyber-attacks to oil and gas companies.  
 
This awareness has seen DNV GL creating a joint project with Shell, Lundin, Siemans, 
Honeywell, ABB, Emerson, Kongsberg Maritime and lastly Statoil and will be 
observed by the Norway Petroleum Safety Authority. One of the main purposes of the 
joint project is for all of these companies to work together to develop and recommend 
methods of dealing with cyber-threats (Janbu, 2016). Through the different companies 
making recommendations the joint project hopes to create a guideline that can help 
protect oil and gas installations from cyber-threats and reduce cyber-attack incidents.  
There, however, is no one size fits all approach to securing oil and gas companies from 
cyber-threats. Additionally, the joint project seeks to cut the costs for operators, 
contractors and suppliers by reducing the resources that are needed to meet 
requirements. The overarching long-term goal of the whole joint project is to raise more 






4.3.5 Evaluating the Presence of Vulnerabilities to Cyber-threats in the Norwegian 
Case Study 
Looking at the case of cyber-attacks, utilising the table of vulnerabilities to cyber-
threats, a few of the identified vulnerabilities can be found in the Norwegian case study. 
The following is an independent analysis of the data presented from the case study of 
the cyber-attack on Norway. Unlike the Saudi Aramco, less vulnerability to cyber-
threats can be found when looking at the events of the cyber-attack on Norwegian oil 
and gas companies. The identification of less vulnerability to cyber-threats is possibly 
due to the fact that very little information covering the attack is available. One of the 
most noticeable vulnerabilities to cyber-threats, which can be found in the Norwegian 
case study, is that of uneducated employees. The malware used in the cyber-attacks on 
the various oil and gas companies was able to gain access to the different companies’ 
systems because of uneducated employees opening e-mails. If employees were more 
educated and aware of the risk of cyber-threats, they would be more cautious of opening 
every e-mail.  
 
The second vulnerability to cyber-threats found in the Norwegian case is the lack of 
information sharing. Some of the oil and gas companies targeted by a cyber-attack, such 
as Statoil, acknowledged the risk of cyber-threats following the Shamoon attack. 
Despite Statoil being aware of the risk of cyber-threats, any plans the company 
developed to manage or mitigate the new risk of cyber-threats was hindered due to the 
lack of information sharing about the Shamoon attack. This lack of information sharing 
points to a third vulnerability to cyber-threats evident in the Norwegian case and that is 
low cyber-maturity. While Statoil and other companies may have had some form of 
management plan, they were still impacted. This indicates that while they 
acknowledged the risk of cyber-threats the company’s cyber-maturity is still relatively 
low. 
 
The fourth and final vulnerability to cyber-threats in the Norwegian case is the 
reputational risk. Much like the Saudi Aramco case, Statoil has close ties to the 
Norwegian government and acts as a large source of revenue to the government. Both 





government’s revenue makes the company a viable target for a cyber-attack seeking to 
cause political or economic upheaval in Norway.  
  
4.4 The Management of Cyber-Threats and Complications with Mitigation 
The oil and gas industry remains to be a vital component of today’s world economy 
and as a result this makes the possibility of completely mitigating the risk of cyber-
threats from the industry impossible. This chapter has acted to show how cyber-attacks 
will not only continue but also increase in the future. The increase of cyber-attacks is 
especially true for oil and gas facilities located in the Middle East as the risk they face 
is heightened due to geo-political rivalries (Digitization and cyber disruption in oil and 
gas, 2017:6). Examples of this heightened risk are already evident in Saudi Aramco’s 
experiences, as we have seen in this chapter with the company being the target of two 
cyber-attacks. Countries without geo-political rivalries will, however, also experience 
this same increase due to how lucrative a target the oil and gas industry is. The 
advancement and the continued introduction of IoT technology will put all aspects of 
the oil and gas industry at risk from onshore installations, offshore installations, oil 
tankers and pipelines.  
 
Another factor, which presents a challenge to the mitigation of cyber-attacks on the oil 
and gas industry, is that they do not follow a distinct pattern. Typically, with traditional 
methods of attacks a pattern can be discerned due to the attacks typically being 
connected to periods of political instability in a region that has resulted in oil and gas 
infrastructure being the target of violent attacks (Giroux & Gilpin, 2013). Cyber-attacks 
do not tend to follow any particular pattern making them far too unpredictable to track 
or predict. Cyber-attacks can occur simply to cause a disruption at an oil and gas facility 
without there being any reason or motivation behind the attack. Such an example is the 
cyber-attack on Statoil, where no group ever took responsibility for the attack and no 
motivation was provided. Attacks can also be the result of a hacker testing the 
capabilities of their malware on a facility. Ultimately, cyber-attacks may not be able to 
occur at the same frequency due to how much planning and technological knowledge 






A further factor, which complicates the possibility of mitigating cyber-threats against 
the oil and gas industry, is the world’s dependence on oil and gas. Various countries 
around the world are dependent on the revenue created through exporting oil and gas. 
This is true for both Saudi Arabia and Norway as both Saudi Aramco and Statoil are 
the biggest contributors to government revenue. As result, targeting oil and gas 
infrastructure with cyber-attacks provides the opportunity to directly influence 
governments and their international partners.  The world’s reliance shows no sign of 
decreasing but rather progressively increasing which will only see cyber-attacks against 
the oil and gas industry increasing along with it. Ultimately, cyber-attacks against oil 
and gas installations will remain the best way to destabilise Western economies, which 
as stated in Chapter One is the primary goal of terrorist groups. 
 
The US has been moving towards attempting to import less oil and instead produce it 
themselves. In 2018, however, the US imported roughly 9.93 million barrels of oil per 
day. This means the US economy will still be influenced by cyber-attacks on oil and 
gas facilities. This chapter has established that cyber-attacks seeking to disrupt the US 
economy can happen on US soil as seen with cyber-attacks on pipelines. On the other 
hand, countries in Europe are just as vulnerable to the cyber-threats - maybe more so. 
This increased vulnerability is particularly concerning because Europe’s dependence 
on oil and gas is expected to drastically increase by 2035. This increased dependence 
only makes Europe oil and gas facilities a bigger target of cyber-attacks. 
 
Essentially, the oil and gas industry are going to continue to be a very lucrative industry 
and thus will continue to be a target of cyber-attacks. The number of cyber-attacks is 
only going to increase as new technology continues to be introduced to the 
infrastructure of oil and gas facilities. New technology will only continue to make the 
oil and gas industry more vulnerable. It is important to also remember that cyber-attacks 
have not reached their full potential and will also only grow in sophistication, that will 
see them become more deadly. The attack surface for cyber-attacks is only going to 
increase due to increased investment in the oil and gas industry, which will result in 
more oil and gas installations being built. Building these new installations will only 






4.5 Risk Management Recommendations for the Oil and Gas Industry  
As has been established through current research and recent history discussed in this 
chapter, the oil and gas industry has been and will continue to be one of the largest 
targets of cyber-attacks. Thus, it is absolutely crucial for risk management plans against 
cyber-threats to become the biggest priority of the oil and gas industry. The 
prioritisation of addressing the risk of cyber-threats needs to start at the executive level 
of oil and gas companies and filter down to the other business units. However, as has 
been established in looking at the cyber-attacks on Saudi Aramco and Statoil there is a 
lack of understanding and awareness about cyber-threats and how to manage the risk. 
For this reason, this research study will briefly present some recommendations which 
will improve the ability of oil and gas companies to identify and manage future cyber-
threats to their facilities. Before making these recommendations, it is very important to 
be aware that there is no one-size fits all approach to managing cyber-threats against 
oil and gas companies.  
 
The first recommendation is that awareness amongst employees needs to increase. Oil 
and gas companies need to start promoting cyber-security awareness amongst their 
employees and at all levels of the companies. In addition to raising employees’ 
awareness, oil and gas companies need to start training their employees by instilling in 
them the skills required to interact safely, securely and responsibly. In training 
employees, it will provide them with the know-how to deal with an attack as quickly as 
possible. 
 
The second recommendation is to put in place technological methods of risk 
management that can act as safeguards against cyber-threats. One suggestion is the 
employment of early warning and detection systems of cyber-threat breaches. Early 
warning systems provide oil and gas companies with the time necessary to ready 
themselves to manage the threat of a cyber-attack. The benefit of an early warning 
system is evident in the cyber-attack on the Norwegian oil and gas companies. A second 
suggestion is that oil and gas companies should start to deploy anti-malware reputation 
servers in order to supplement traditional, signature-based anti-virus software normally 
used at facilities. As was seen in the Stuxnet attack prior to the Shamoon attack, 





malware reputation servers will assist in monitoring for malware that bypasses 
traditional anti-virus software and alerts the company of this. A final suggestion is 
isolating potential attack surfaces through separating the business systems from 
operational systems. As was shown in the Shamoon attack on Saudi Aramco, the 
company’s separation of their corporate network from their operational systems 
hindered the attack from disrupting oil production and exploration. 
 
The third recommendation for the management of cyber-threats is that oil and gas 
companies must continuously focus on the risk of cyber-threats. Cyber-threats are 
constantly evolving and changing, and this is happening at an increasingly faster pace, 
much like the development and improvement of technology. Today’s cyber-threats 
facing the oil and gas industry may not be the same as those facing the industry in a 
few weeks’ time. In order to effectively manage the risk of cyber-threats evaluation 
needs to be conducted continuously in order to detect any form of breach or inaccuracy 
in a facilities’ system. This can be done through the use of anti-malware software and 
hiring of a cyber-security firm to run security checks. 
 
The fourth and final recommendation is that oil and gas companies need to start sharing 
information with one another with regards to their experiences with cyber-threats and 
steps they may have taken to manage the threat. It is understandable that some 
governments, such as Saudi Arabia’s, are unwilling to share information about their 
experience with cyber-threats due to the critical importance of the oil and gas 
infrastructure to their economy. Withholding this information, however, is only 
contributing to the lack of awareness about the risk of cyber-threats facing the industry. 
Oil and gas companies need to start sharing information in order for them to start 
effectively managing the risk of cyber-threats. Some oil and gas companies have moved 
toward sharing information to develop management strategies such as the joint project 
started by DNV GL with Shell, Lundin, Siemans, Honeywell, ABB, Kongsberg 
Maritime and Statoil. 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
Cyber-threats against the oil and gas industry have a very clear influence. While there 





industry, the influence that they have on the industry cannot be questioned. Cyber-
threats have the ability to influence oil and gas production in significant ways. As was 
seen in the Shamoon attack, Saudi Aramco experienced a halt in their business 
operations. The attack also stopped their payment methods from working, which 
resulted in seventeen days of domestic oil trucks waiting to refill and eventually saw 
the company giving oil away for free. This acts to show that cyber-threats can have an 
economic impact on countries. In the case of the cyber-attack on Statoil researchers 
could not identify any clear impact of the attack but it did act to demonstrate that even 
oil and gas facilities located in areas considered secure are vulnerable to the threat. 
Additionally, Statoil had risk management strategies in place that were focused on 
cyber-threats but were still able to be breached. The fact the company was still breached 
demonstrates that the oil and gas companies cannot mitigate cyber-threats. While cyber-
threats are a risk that all international oil and gas companies are going to have to accept, 
regardless of where they are located, they can start to develop plans to manage the risk 
of cyber-threats. Oil and gas companies need to start sharing information with one 






















Chapter Five: Conclusion and Evaluation of the Research Study  
 
5.1 Introduction 
It has become essential for oil and gas companies to take into consideration political 
risks before investing in a new oil field or even in their daily operations. Oil and gas 
companies monitor and assess these risks through political risk analysis. For a long 
time, the biggest political risk facing the oil and gas companies has been terrorism, but 
this is slowly changing with the introduction of new forms of political risk. The types 
of political risk that exist are constantly evolving and changing along with changes and 
trends in global society which has seen the introduction of the political risk of cyber-
threats. Cyber-threats are considered to be a political risk of the twenty-first century as 
a result of the rapid development of technology. In chapter one, the main research 
question was stated as: “Do cyber-threats increase the political risk which oil and gas 
companies face?” This question can now be answered accordingly. 
 
While the oil and gas companies have been targets of cyber-attacks, the industry as a 
whole has been slow to recognise and address the threat they pose. This is due to the 
fact that executives of oil and gas companies did not believe cyber-threats were a 
credible threat and would rather focus on protecting their facilities from physical 
attacks. The cyber-attacks on Saudi Aramco and on Norwegian oil and gas companies 
have established cyber-threats as a credible threat to the oil and gas industry. These 
cyber-attacks indicate that cyber-threats ultimately do increase the risk for the oil and 
gas industry. As well as showing that even oil and gas facilities located in areas 
considered to be low risk can fall victim to cyber-attacks. Attention is now turning to 
identifying vulnerabilities to cyber-threats. The vulnerabilities to cyber-threats act as 
risk indicators. These vulnerabilities are exploited by hackers when they launch a 
cyber-attack. Through identifying these vulnerabilities, oil and gas companies can start 
to develop new management strategies to address cyber-threats as they have already 
proved to have a significant influence on oil and gas companies. If oil and gas 
companies are slow to implement management strategies, they will continually fall 
behind in protecting their facilities. This stems from the fact that cyber-threats are 






This chapter provides the conclusion of this research study by providing an overview 
of progress in relation to the research questions as well as in terms of achieving the 
aims and objectives of this study. This chapter will additionally provide an evaluation 
of the research and conclude with recommendations for further studies in cyber-threat 
risk in relation to the oil and gas industry. 
 
5.2 Progress of the Research Study 
In Chapter One the research study was introduced, which was followed by a short 
literature review. This short literature review focused on areas that are relevant to this 
research study. This literature review included articles that covered the subjects of 
political risk and industry-specific risk. Literature, which covered cyber-threats and 
cyber-attacks on the oil and gas industry, were also covered. This ended with literature 
that dealt with two cyber-attacks that have occurred in the oil and gas industry, the 
attack on Saudi Aramco and the attack on Statoil. The main research question, as well 
as three sub-questions were presented in order to further support the main research 
question. The following were outlined and discussed: the objectives and relevance of 
this study, the research design and research methodology and the limitations of the 
research study were also presented and outlined. The chapter concluded with an outline 
of the research study.  
 
The primary purpose of Chapter Two was to provide the theoretical grounding 
necessary for this research study as well as to contextualise the key concepts of the 
study. The theoretical grounding is based on rational-choice theory, as well as problem-
solving and decision-making theory that provided this research study with a framework 
to work from. Other central concepts to this research study were clarified in this chapter 
including risk, political risk, macro and micro risk, industry and firm specific risk, risk 
management and mitigation and lastly cyber-threats. Through examining and 
expanding on these central concepts this chapter further built on the framework to 
provide a solid foundation on which this research study could build in Chapters Three 
and Four. 
 
Chapter Three sought to contextualise the influence that cyber-threats have on the 





into the oil and gas industry’s utilisation of automation, technological innovations; and 
the use of IoT was examined. The examination of the utilisation of these aspects is done 
in order to provide an understanding of how the industry environment has changed and 
essentially opened themselves up to the rising threat of cyber-attacks. In order to 
identify vulnerabilities that act as indicators of risk to cyber-threats the three sectors of 
the oil and gas industry (upstream, midstream and downstream) were examined 
individually. Through examining these sectors individually different vulnerabilities 
were identified in each sector as well as the different sectors experiencing different 
levels of impact. Identifying the different vulnerabilities provided valuable information 
for the analysis of Chapter Four. 
 
Chapter Four utilised the information presented in Chapter Three as a lens to analyse 
the cyber-attacks on Saudi Aramco and Statoil. Analysing the cases provided insight 
into the influence cyber-threats have on the oil and gas industry. This chapter also 
answered the sub-question utilised to supplement and improve on the quality of 
analysis. This chapter also scrutinised the ability of oil and gas companies to either be 
able to mitigate the threat of cyber-attacks or only be able to manage them. 
 
5.3 Main Findings of the Research 
The primary objective of this research study was to find out whether or not cyber-threats 
increase the political risk facing oil and gas companies. It is a recent development that 
at this point has not reached its full potential but is already evident. Despite it being 
evident that there is lack of awareness and literature covering the topic of risk of cyber-
threats facing the oil and gas industry. The purpose of this study was to increase the 
knowledge about the risk of cyber-threats to the oil and gas industry, as well as examine 
whether or not they increase the political risk for the industry. The main research 
question of this research study is: “Do cyber-threats increase the political risk which 
the oil and gas companies face?”. In order to fully answer this question theory, which 
was presented in Chapter Two and Chapter Three have been used to examine Chapter 
Four.  The case studies of the cyber-attacks against Saudi Aramco and Statoil provided 
a much deeper understanding of how cyber-threats increase the political risk faced by 






Cyber-threats have only recently been identified as a political risk. As such research on 
the cyber-threats as a political risk to the oil and gas companies is limited due to it being 
a new phenomenon. As cyber-threats are considered to be a political risk it essentially 
does increase the political risk faced by oil and gas companies. The Shamoon attack on 
Saudi Aramco showed how the cyber-attack affected the company in a significant way. 
Saudi Aramco was forced to shut down the corporate operations in order to recover and 
were forced to use significant financial revenue to recover as well as give oil away to 
local trucks to maintain domestic oil supply. Ultimately, while the company did try to 
recover quickly and despite the company stating that they had recovered shortly after 
the attack, it actually took the company over two months to fully recover. This shows 
that cyber-attacks against the oil and gas companies do influence them in more than 
one way. 
 
The first sub-question asked to support the main research was: “Which risk indicators 
of cyber-threats can be identified by oil and gas companies in order to help them 
manage and/or mitigate this threat?” The findings of this research have found that there 
are numerous indicators of risk identified in the vulnerabilities to cyber-threats that 
exist throughout the oil and gas industry. Until recently not much attention had been 
paid to the risk of cyber-threats to the oil and gas industry and thus new vulnerabilities 
are continually being identified or changing. In Chapter Three of this research study 
vulnerabilities to cyber-threats in the oil and gas industry were identified and outlined 
in Table 3.1. These identified vulnerabilities were used as a lens to look at the case 
studies of this research study and if there was a correlation between them. While some 
of the identified vulnerabilities were found in both cases not all of them were present. 
Four of the vulnerabilities identified in Chapter Three were identified in both case 
studies and were as follows: lack of information sharing, low cyber-maturity, 
uneducated employees and reputational risk. Identifying these vulnerabilities are key 
to aiding oil and gas companies in developing plans to either mitigate or manage cyber-
threats. 
 
The second sub-question asked was, “Will cyber-attacks result in oil and gas companies 
losing revenue and halt their daily operations?”. While there have been few well-





Saudi Aramco provided insight into answering this question. While Saudi Aramco did 
not have to halt their daily operations of oil and gas exploration other operations were 
halted. The business operations of the company were halted as they were trying to fix 
the computers infected by the cyber-attack. In order to fix the infected hard-drives Saudi 
Aramco were forced to use substantial financial resources to buy hard-drives from the 
computer manufacturing floors. Additionally, due to the shutdown of their corporate 
network the company’s payment systems were down which saw miles upon miles of 
domestic trucks lining up and waiting to be filled. Eventually, Saudi Aramco were 
forced to give the oil away for free which means the company lost out on a significant 
amount of revenue from their domestic market. While this answer is limited to the case 
of Saudi Aramco it does act to show that oil and gas companies do stand to lose revenue 
and experience a halt in production if they were to be the target of a cyber-attack. 
 
The third and final sub-question was, “Can international oil and gas companies actually 
mitigate the risk of cyber-threats or is this risk something that can only be managed?”.  
The findings of this research study have revealed that it would be almost impossible for 
the oil and gas companies to mitigate the risk of cyber-threats. Oil and gas company’s 
inability to mitigate the risk of cyber-threats stems from the fact that much of the world 
economy is still very much driven by oil and gas. The world’s economy’s continued 
dependence on oil and gas means that the companies who produce the commodity will 
remain targets of cyber-attacks. Another reason oil and gas facilities will continue to be 
targets of cyber-attacks is the fact that some countries are extremely dependent on the 
revenue generated by oil and gas exports. This dependency acts to explain why the 
industry is a prime target of cyber-attacks from terrorist groups or nation-states. It is 
becoming increasingly more important for companies to start developing management 
strategies to address cyber-threats. Both the cyber-attacks on Saudi Aramco and the 
cyber-attack on Statoil clearly demonstrate how serious the threat of cyber-attacks is to 
the industry. In the case of Saudi Aramco, they had no clear plan in place to effectively 
manage the threat and had not put into place risk management plans to prevent the 
attack from happening. This resulted in them using considerable financial resources to 
recover from the attack. If they had, had management strategies in place, they could 
have better protected themselves from the influence of the cyber-attack. While it may 





companies will need to accept the consequences and start to increase their focus on 
managing the risk of cyber-threats. 
 
5.4 Evaluation of the Research Study 
The oil and gas industry face numerous risks and will only continue to encounter more 
in the future. For a long time, the most concerning risk facing oil and gas companies 
was the threat of terrorism. Oil and gas companies have had to accept this risk due to 
the fact that they have continually been forced to invest in regions considered to be 
high-risk. Oil and gas companies have invested in these areas because fewer and fewer 
new sources of oil reserves are being discovered and those that are, are located in these 
higher-risk regions thus making companies more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. 
However, this threat landscape is changing with the introduction of cyber-threats. 
Cyber-threats do not just put oil and gas facilities located in high-risk regions at risk 
but even those located in low-risk regions. The purpose of this research study was to 
analyse whether or not cyber-threats increased the political risk oil and gas companies 
face. In order to support the research question the upstream, midstream and downstream 
operations were looked at individually to identify how various operations were 
influenced and what vulnerabilities to cyber-threats exist. The research question was 
further supplemented by the chosen case studies of the cyber-attacks on Saudi Aramco 
and the cyber-attack on Norwegian oil and gas companies, with specific focus on 
Statoil. These cyber-attacks were selected, as they are the most well documented attacks 
against the oil and gas industry, as well as the most serious. Both cases displayed how 
oil and gas companies will face increased political risk as a result of cyber-threats, as 
well as oil and gas companies only being able to manage cyber-threats. 
 
When it comes to the field of political risk there is a continued lack of consensus on 
how political risk is defined. Political risk definitions continually range from general to 
specific. To add to the difficultly in defining political risk, the concept is continentally 
evolving and changing due to global events and trends as well as technological 
developments. This evolution is evident in the introduction of new forms of political 
risk that had previously not existed before. In order to address the complexity of 
political risk and select a suitable definition for this research study, numerous 





of the term. As well as helping provide the most suitable definition of political risk for 
the twenty-first century. The chosen definition of political risk identified cyber-threats 
as a form of political risk facing companies. The field of cyber-threats is complex, wide-
ranging and very new. Defining cyber-threats is just as difficult due to the evolving 
nature of the field, as well as a lack of consensus regarding how the concept should be 
defined. Through examining different definitions, a clear definition was identified 
which was used together with the selected definition of political risk to provide the 
foundation for the rest of this research study. 
 
One of the biggest challenges this research study faced was the lack of information 
available be it primary data or secondary data. Information covering the cyber-attacks 
Saudi Aramco and Statoil was limited to a few academic articles and newspaper 
articles. Often these articles merely repeated the same information. International oil and 
gas companies have never given out detailed information regarding their risk 
management strategies due to security concerns. This is also true for oil and gas 
companies’ risk management strategies regarding cyber-threats as publishing them 
would be counter-intuitive and would inform hackers how to circumvent security 
measures. Risk management companies are just as unwilling to provide access to their 
management plans. Advisory branches of companies such as Deloitte and Ernst and 
Young provide models of risk management through their experience of working with 
oil and gas companies as well as independent research. They published these findings 
with the purpose of educating the oil and gas industry and providing a deeper 
understanding of the risk and dangers of cyber-threat to the industry. Other sources 
such as academic articles and newspapers and surveys done among some oil and gas 
companies were used to supply the primary data required for this research study. 
 
5.5 Recommendation of Further Research 
Political risk is a very complex concept with numerous sub-fields and is continuously 
developing. For a long time, the older definition of political risk has been utilised to 
define the concept but there are new definitions which acknowledge new forms of 
political risk in the twenty-first century. Cyber-threats are a key example of a new form 
of political risk that has only now been identified as a political risk. As cyber-threats 





researched in comparison to the political risk of terrorism. The connection of cyber-
threats to political risk needs to be expanded especially as it is considered to be a rising 
threat to numerous industries ranging from the medical industry to the oil and gas 
industry. 
 
A second recommendation concerns research being conducted on risk management in 
the oil and gas industry in regard to cyber-threats. In order to be able to identify how 
oil and gas companies manage the risk of cyber-threats, further primary research is 
needed. Field analysis of oil and gas companies’ risk management of cyber-threats 
would provide a better understanding and insight into how companies manage the risk. 
Interviews with personnel in charge of risk units in oil and gas companies would 
provide valuable insight into how these threats are managed. Additionally, primary 
research conducted on hackers would provide for a more in-depth understanding of 
hackers’ motivations and the methods of how they develop the malware used in cyber-
attacks. This in-depth understanding would also assist in informing risk management 
of cyber-threats to international oil and gas companies. More extensive primary data 
would provide for a deeper understanding and knowledge, which would serve to help 
better understand the risk cyber-threats posed to the oil and gas industry. 
 
The Shamoon attack on Saudi Aramco was one of the worst and most well documented 
cyber-attacks on an oil and gas company. The attack acted as the first visible warning 
about the oil and gas industries’ vulnerability to cyber-attacks. Yet literature remained 
low and overall awareness amongst companies was limited. The Triton attack in 2017 
had a deadly goal, which resulted in greater attention being paid to the threat and 
resulted in changes being made. Example of changes can be seen by Saudi Aramco 
entering into a joint partnership with Raytheon to develop methods to secure the oil and 
gas industry from cyber-attacks. Similarly, two years following the cyber-attack on the 
fifty oil and gas companies on Norway saw DNV GL initiate a joint venture with 
numerous companies with the aim of developing methods to manage the risk of cyber-
threats. A third recommendation for further research would be to analyse whether or 
not these changes and new focus on cyber-threats is just a temporary move or if it has 







Addressing the risk of cyber-threats is going to become increasingly more important 
for the oil and gas companies. It is going to be the biggest threat facing oil and gas 
companies in the future. Cyber-threats are not only of concern to oil and gas facilities 
in high-risk areas but even those located in lower risk areas. Cyber-threats are going to 
become more deadly and seek to cause explosions at facilities and this will put 
employees’ safety at risk. Failing to address this threat can result in severe 
consequences, as well as a significant loss of revenue be it from trying to recover from 
the attack or from different operations coming to a halt. This research study has 
contributed to drawing greater attention to the rising risk of cyber-threats to the oil and 
gas industry. It has demonstrated the importance of oil and gas companies developing 
effective management strategies to minimise the influence of cyber-threats. Despite 
there being documented cyber-attacks against oil and gas companies the industry has 
been slow to address the issue of cyber-threats and how to manage them. The oil and 
gas industry will continue to be targets of cyber-attacks in the future but if the oil and 
gas companies start to develop effective risk management strategies, they can minimise 
the influence of these attacks. The more cyber-attacks on the oil and gas industry are 
analysed the better they will be explained and thus better understood which will allow 
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